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Introduction
The aim of this thesis is to report on the conducting of an 
economic organisation study of one particular economic market - 
referred to broadly and for historical reasons as the Dundee jute 
industry. The study has therefore been carried out at the partial 
microeconomic level, and has been conducted within the framework 
referred to in industrial economics as structure, conduct and per­
formance analysis.’*' The originality claimed by the candidate
thus relates not to the design of a particular framework of analysis
2within which to conduct an individual industry study, but to the 
carrying out of the study itself and in particular to the use of some 
statistical data in attempting to arrive at conclusions on various 
aspects of economic performance. The analysis and conclusions in 
the study are based not only upon the assembled data (some of them 
hitherto unpublished, others being used in a novel manner) but also 
upon a large number of interviews held with senior management in the 
industry.
So far as the candidate is aware, after a thorough literature 
search, no other study of this aspect of the jute industry has been 
carried out. Earlier or contemporary work by Leveson and by 
McDowall and Draper has been concerned either with management as­
pects of the industry, or with using the jute industry as an example
3of a separate individual economic phenomenon.
The topic of this study is the Dundee jute industry. The
iv
epithet Dundee serves to stress not only the high degree of geographi­
cal concentration of the U.K. jute industry in that city (some 90% of 
spinning and weaving in the 1960's), but also the vital importance of 
the jute industry to Dundee: it accounted directly for some 50% of
4the city's employment within living memory. Unlike many industry
studies this is one of decline rather than of expansion - indeed of 
dramatic decline in the traditional work of jute spinning and weaving. 
But it is also an account of survival, in that it contains an analysis 
of the diversification of the existing "jute" firms both into man-made 
fibres (predominantly polypropylene) and into other market areas rel­
ated to the original industry. References in the title and elsewhere 
in the thesis to the Dundee jute industry thus cover both the tradit­
ional market for jute and the new industrial textiles etc.
The structure, conduct and performance approach accounts for the 
framework of the thesis. Chapter I comprises a historical introduction 
to the jute industry, and outlines the condition of the market in 1945. 
Structure refers to the main environmental features of an industry, 
and Chapter II contains an analysis of the major changes in this market 
over the period 1960-1977, and in particular over the last decade of the 
period covered by the study. The aim of this material is to provide 
an account and an analysis of the major structural changes in the 
industry over the period with a view to arriving at conclusions both 
as to the forces which caused the changes and also the impact which the 
changes had upon competition, efficiency and resource allocation in 
this particular market.
Chapter III, under the heading of Diversification, examines in
v
detail the conduct or behaviour of firms in the market: what Bain 
identifies broadly as "patterns of behaviour that enterprises follow 
in adapting or adjusting to the markets in which they sell (or buy)".^ 
Since diversification undoubtedly embraces the major company strategy 
in this process of adaptation or adjustment in this particular market, 
the major emphasis in analysing market conduct is placed upon it, and 
other features such as product improvement and technological adjust­
ment are subsumed within it.
Market performance is measured and analysed in Chapter IV under a 
number of headings, with reliance being placed very largely upon a 
quantitative approach. The purpose of the analytical section of the 
chapter is to offer an economic interpretation of the purely statis­
tical findings, and to compare these results with the general body of 
similar empirical studies in industrial economics.
The final chapter offers conclusions on efficiency and resource 
allocation across the industry, drawing upon the preceding three 
chapters in particular.
One of the major problems involved in carrying out empirical 
research in industrial economics is the degree of economic, or more 
particularly econometric, sophistication which is held to be approp­
riate; and with this is inevitably linked the issue of a case-study 
vis-a-vis large-scale statistical approach to any issue. It is in 
some way a question of balancing the quest for detail and generality - 
for "realism" and the drawing of formal conclusions. More particul­
arly it could be said to be a question of the relative merits of
vi
these two desiderata. This issue has been responsible for a signi­
ficant division of approaches to broadly similar topics in industrial 
economics. On the one hand there are those who favour a more 
detailed case-by-case approach to arriving at conclusions on industry 
behaviour. On the other hand there are those who would point out 
that the general validity of conclusions must lie in the use of cross- 
sectional and time-series analysis of large volumes of statistical 
data, and that it is not necessary to have a detailed regard to the 
highly specific "facts" of each individual case. The problem of 
choosing between these two approaches was put clearly by Alfred 
Marshall.
"If we include in our account merely all the conditions of 
real life, the problem is too heavy to be handled; if we 
select a few, then long-drawn-out and subtle reasonings 
with regard to them become scientific toys rather than 
engines for practical work."^
The relative merit of the large-scale cross-section or time- 
series study would appear to lie in the greater ability to draw 
general conclusions based upon statistical analysis of a large number 
of observations. Such conclusions may be of more value simply be­
cause they derive from an overall analysis of an economic issue, or 
because the large numbers involved allow one more "degrees of free­
dom" in statistical analysis. The value of the case-by-case 
approach lies in a greater acquaintance with the facts of a partic­
ular industry, a greater appreciation of the quality (or otherwise) 
of the statistics, and a more secure base upon which to arrive at
meaningful economic conclusions - albeit about a smaller part of the
7economic world involved.
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One would like to think that time would eventually bring about 
a union of the two approaches, or that each would be regarded as being 
valid in its own right or for its own particular purpose. This does 
not, however, appear to be the case at the present time. One cannot, 
moreover, rule out the influence of personal preference on the part of 
individual authors. Some writers simply prefer to work at the level 
which incorporates a degree of institutional detail - feeling that 
"statistical analysis does not always catch the spirit and the bustle
g
of industry when it is taking its pulse and temperature". Others
appear to have reservations about the value of the individual-industry
study "whose mountain of descriptive material is far too intransigent
9to be formed and informed by a theoretical framework". Having had 
experience, as a co-author of published studies, of two very different 
approaches to the analysis of the economic impact of U.K. competition- 
policy legislation,^ the candidate has attempted in this thesis to 
combine the advantages of each broad approach while accepting the in­
herent characteristics of case-study work as such. The thesis is con 
structed at a point along the spectrum of formal analysis and descript 
ion which will accommodate a sound economic framework, statistical 
analysis and some institutional detail. It is "historiate", to use 
the term adopted by Phelps Brown,^ but operates within the structure, 
conduct and performance framework of analysis accepted in industrial 
economics. This analysis is based upon examining the principal ele­
ments of market structure (concentration etc.), market behaviour and
economic performance, and involves establishing relationships between 
12these areas. Such analysis enables one to emphasise the most
appropriate historical details, to pay attention to the most relevant 
current characteristics of a market, and to draw more general con-
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elusions for further analysis than is often possible from a purely 
historical account of an industry's development or decline. At the 
same time such a mode of analysis allows one to explore further than 
would be possible within the confines of formal microeconomic analysis.
It is within this industrial economics framework that the following 
analysis has been carried out, and on the basis of which the final con­
clusions are offered.
Thus the purpose of this thesis is not simply to set out to 
describe what happened to the firms which at one time constituted the 
Dundee jute industry over a particular period of adjustment to new 
markets and technology. This in itself is of course important; and 
much time has had to be spent operating in what have been factually 
largely uncharted waters. The thesis, however, sets out to do more 
than this. It seeks in particular to do three things. First, to 
offer an explanation for the events whose course is traced. Second, 
to test the events of the industry's recent past against various hypo­
theses founded upon the theory of microeconomics or industrial econ­
omics. Third, to assess the resource allocative implications of the 
findings. Thus in respect of changes in markets and industry structure, 
an explanation is sought for the changes in the pattern of concen­
tration in the industry, the type of price leadership which at one 
stage emerged is compared with that which an understanding of economic 
theory would lead one to expect, and an assessment is made of the im­
pact of such changes and behaviour upon the efficiency of the industry 
over the period. As regards diversification, an explanation for the 
poor returns to this corporate strategy is attempted, certain hypotheses 
regarding diversification, profitability, size and growth are tested
ix
statistically, and again some attempt is made to assess the impact of 
the strategy upon resource allocation in the industry. In particular 
in Chapter IV, dealing with market performance across a number of 
dimensions, a range of statistical tests is carried out on variables 
such as profitability, growth, productivity, capital investment, and 
research and development expenditure. The purpose of this is not 
only to describe, but to compare the behaviour of our group of firms 
with findings on these phenomena relating to manufacturing industry as 
a whole, and to offer explanations for any observed differences. The 
hypothesis here is that our group of firms would be expected to con­
form to behaviour observed in much larger samples in cross-sectional 
and time-series analysis. The strands of thought brought out in res­
pect of individual aspects in Chapters II, III and IV are all drawn 
together in Chapter V in a final attempt to explain the happenings in 
this industry over the period studied, to compare the findings of our 
industry with those relating to the U.K. manufacturing sector as a 
whole, and to offer conclusions on the degree of economic efficiency 
within the industry.
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CHAPTER I
Historical Background to 1945
A. Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, to offer a brief 
economic history of the U.K. jute industry from its origins in the 
1830's until 1945. Second, to emphasise some of the most important 
economic characteristics of the industry in the post-World War II 
period so as to lay the foundation for the analysis of changing markets 
and industry structure over the period 1960-1977 in Chapter II.
Sections B. - E. below comprise a historical introduction; while 
Sections F. - J. outline the important economic features of the 
industry at the conclusion of World War II. It should be emphasised 
that the function of this chapter is introductory, and that it covers 
the history of the industry outwith the time period which is the main 
concern of the study. Thus although a brief economic analysis of the 
industry's early years is offered, reliance has been placed largely 
upon secondary sources, as seems appropriate for the introductory mat­
erial.
B . The Origins of the U.K. Jute Industry
Some form of historical introduction would appear to be necessary 
to any economic analysis of the Dundee jute industry. More than most 
industries it has been an economic prisoner of historical develop­
ments largely beyond its control. Thus two authors more recently 
refer to its development as "a catalogue of instability and frustrat-
1
ion", and highlight the rapid war-time expansions in the 19th century, 
and long-term contraction punctuated by occasional hectic prosperity 
within living memory.'*' As a particular example of this tendency one 
historian, writing of the conditions of the 1850's and 1860's, 
comments:
"At the height of the boom any man who could buy or rent a 
tumbledown mill could make a fortune. After the boom, 
shrinking markets and wildly fluctuating costs produced a 
situation in which entrepreneurial skills could have little 
effect on the downward trend of the industry
To appreciate the early development of the jute industry it is
necessary to know something of the economic history of cotton and linen 
3or flax. Flax spinning and weaving appears to have been in its
beginning a peasant occupation. But by the end of the seventeenth
century it was both a rural and urban trade, although at this stage
the final product was a rather rough and heavy cloth, and finer linens
were imported from the Continent. The growth of the linen industry
on any scale in the eighteenth century was dependent upon imports of
flax, and therefore tended to be concentrated in the north of the
country (including the Clyde valley in Scotland), based upon Baltic
imports. The histories of cotton and linen were closely intertwined
- literally so in the case of union goods with a flax warp and cotton
weft. As an example of this interrelationship, the rise in the
price of cotton in the mid eighteenth century as demand went ahead of
supplies gave linen manufacturers an opportunity to expand into new
markets? and by the last quarter of the century the two industries
4appear to have been of roughly equal size. However, in the closing
decades of the eighteenth century increased supplies of raw cotton from
2
the Southern States of America, and technical innovations in the 
spinning and weaving of cotton, gave the latter an advantage over 
linen in both home and export markets. These changes resulted in 
cotton displacing linen manufacturing on the west coasts; and Lanca­
shire, North-east Ireland and the Clyde valley declined as linen 
producing centres. It was these same changes which opened up oppor­
tunities in the linen trade for centres such as Darlington, Leeds and 
Dundee.
Historically the jute industry grew out of the linen or flax 
spinning and weaving trade. There was an established flax industry 
in Dundee in the late eighteenth century; and although, as mentioned 
above, linen was superseded by cotton in some markets with a conse­
quent downturn in the industry in parts of the economy, the coarse 
linen trade of Fife, Angus (then Forfarshire) and Perthshire prospered. 
For example, by 1822 over 2 2*5111. yards of linen were stamped in Forfar­
shire, compared with slightly less than 8m in Fifeshire, and 2*5111. in 
5Aberdeenshire. The markets catered for were sail canvas, "soldiers'
sarking" (i.e. coarse linen shirts for the army) and the clothing for 
negro slaves in America. Dundee appears to have been the focal point 
of this prosperity, and in the late eighteenth century rapidly became 
the centre of what had hitherto been a more dispersed domestic linen 
industry in its hinterland. What it may have lacked in water power 
it made up for as a thriving commercial centre. According to Peter 
Carmichael's autobiography, between 1815 and the early 1830's a sum of 
not less than £250,000 had been spent on the harbour; by 1833 the 
Earl Gray dock was under construction; there was a ferry across the 
Tay, a paddle vessel running to Perth, and a daily coach to Glasgow;
3
and the Dundee to Newtyle railway was the first to be opened in
Scotland in 1851.^ Dundee was well placed to receive Baltic flax;
and while in 1815 (the first year for which such figures are available)
Dundee imported 1,221 tons of flax (7% of the total U.K. figure), by
1836 the figure had risen to 30,653 tons - 40% of U.K. imports.
Between 1816 and 1833 the population of Dundee expanded from 30,000 to
50,000; and over the period 1811-1835 30 flax spinning mills were
opened. Such was the growth and increasing dominance of this area in
these trades that by 1867 176 of the total of 197 flax, hemp and jute
factories in Scotland were to be found in the counties of Forfar, Perth 
7and Fife. The period of the early nineteenth century was thus one 
of general prosperity for the traditional Dundee textile industry; and 
it was into this environment that jute was introduced.
C. The Rise of the Jute Trade
Warden, in his immensely detailed study of the linen trade, tells
of the tentative introduction of jute into this country at the end of
the eighteenth century and of its use in the manufacture of door mats,
ropes etc. The expansion of this experience led to its use in a form
of carpeting at Abingdon in Oxfordshire; and in the early 1830's simi-
8lar experiments were carried out in Dundee. The substitution of
jute for flax and hemp was particularly a possibility in Dundee, as 
compared with other linen centres such as Leeds, because of Dundee's 
specialisation at the coarse end of the trade. The introduction of 
jute spinning appears to have been complicated at this time because 
only at this date was flax spinning by power being introduced, and it 
was anticipated that the jute fibre would present additional diffi-
4
culties in the application of power spinning. There was also the
problem of securing the acceptance by users of goods made partly or
wholly of the new, inferior jute yarn. The commencement of jute
yarn production is usually dated from 1833 at the Chapelshade works
of Balfour & Meldrum - on the site now occupied by Dundee College of 
9Technology; and, stimulated by the acceptance by the Dutch Govern­
ment of jute in the place of flax tow in a large coffee bagging con­
tract in 1838, the jute industry began a period of considerable expan­
sion. Some indication of this can be gained from data relating to 
Dundee jute imports.
Table 1.1
Jute Imports into Dundee (Tons)
1832 182 1843 4,858 1854 16,590
1833 300 1844 5,515 1855 25,894
1834 828 1845 8,313 1856 31,031
1835 1 , 2 2 2 1846 9,230 1857 24,342
1836 16 1847 6,966 1858 30,086
1837 171 1848 8,905 1859 38,405
1838 1,136 1849 12,142 1860 36,965
1839 2,411 1850 14,080 1861 35,716
1840 2,745 1851 16,928 1862 38,277
1841 2,661 1852 16,983 1863 46,983
1842 2,740 1853 15,400
Source: A.J. Warden, The Linen Trade, Ancient and Modern (London
Longmans Green, 2nd ed. 1867} pp.76 and 633.
The jute industry thus expanded in and contributed to the general
prosperity of a city which was becoming a major commercial centre: a
city where trade in 1851 exceeded that of any Scots town except
10Glasgow according to a study of the period.
By the late 1850's jute had begun to overtake flax in importance
5
the full benefits of the American Civil War (1861-65), the respective
11tonnages of flax and jute were 23,474 and 46,983. This was also a
period of considerable mechanisation of the industry, as traditional 
handloom weavers were displaced by power looms. Thus as an ancillary 
development, the relatively specialist nature of the spinning and 
weaving machinery dictated the establishment by major textile firms 
of their own foundries.
as measured by tonnage imports; and by 1863, when jute was enjoying
Wars were a major source of prosperity for this industry. The
Crimean War of 1854-56 brought a demand for tents, sails and soldiers'
clothing, while demand for jute and linen during the American Civil
War was additionally stimulated by the non-availability of cotton from
the Southern States. The earlier Crimean War had provided a further
impetus to jute manufacturers as there were fears regarding flax from
12Russia, which supplied over 85% of Dundee's total flax imports. An 
additional source of demand for jute goods in the 1850's was the open­
ing up of Australia, with its large British immigrant population, in­
creased trade in primary products and vast need for temporary canvas 
13housing; while an indication of the impact of later increases m
demand may be seen in the fact that the price of some goods rose by
1450% in 1863 over their 1862 prices. It is from this era that
some of the domestic architectural heritage of the textile industry 
stems. So far as trade itself was concerned:
"The halcyon days which prevailed during the latter part 
of the American war, and for some time subsequent there­
to, have left their mark on the district. Old mills were 
rebuilt and extended, and new ones erected; power-loom 
factories sprung up in all directions, and for a time
6
builders and engineers had the entire command of the 
position. The result has been to transform and 
beautify and extend towns previously prosperous, and 
to vivify and invigorate others which were fast falling
into decay."
But the period culminating with the American Civil War was to 
have an impact beyond the immediate prosperity which it created; 
although prices do appear to have risen dramatically, with raw mater­
ial cost increases lagging behind those of finished goods.^ This 
was more than an era of immense new riches for the textile manufact­
urers: of "palatial mansions and handsome villas" referred to in the
local press. Not surprisingly, given the boom market, it was at 
this time that backward vertical integration within the industry began. 
The Cox firm established its own jute presses near Calcutta in 1863; 
and in 1862 both Cox and Gilroy had become shipowners. This enabled 
these firms to avoid the direct impact of high shipping rates (insofar 
as these were the result of a high level of profits for shipowners 
rather than increased operating costs); and the beginnings of direct 
importation of raw jute from India rather than through London merchants
as previously meant that "the price of raw jute could not be subject to
17the evil machinations of London speculators." This period was
also characterised by forward vertical integration as yarn spinners
moved into the weaving and finishing trades; and in retrospect this
was also seen to have been one of the greatest periods of technical
18advance in the industry. To the extent that the mid-century wars
brought about some over-expansion and collapse on the part of weaker 
firms, they also contributed to a trend of concentration in the market 
and the recognition of the advantages of size and stability. One of 
the benefits for the city's commerce as a whole stimulated by the
7
textile boom was improved harbour facilities. The Victoria Dock
19was opened in 1861, and the Camperdown Dock in 1864.
Set against this trend of expansion in Dundee, however, was the
gradual development of jute spinning and weaving in India itself.
This began in 1855, and it was only the war-time demands of the mid
1850's to mid 1860's which delayed its impact upon the Dundee 
20industry. In fact the Franco-Prussian war of the early 1870's
provided only another temporary military fillip to the industry which
was by then beginning to feel much more strongly the impact of the
Calcutta jute mills. Just how rapid these sudden expansions of the
industry could be may be illustrated by the fact that although the
major period of continuous growth of the jute industry had passed,
between 1870 and 1874 the number of spindles increased from 94,520 to
185,419, the number of power looms more than doubled, and employment
21rose by almost 150%. However, Alexander Monfries noted that "a
considerable period of wonderful prosperity" had come to an end by
1875; and "from being a paying business the making of jute goods
became a losing one and a good deal of machinery was stopped. This
was caused in great measure by the erection of mills for the spinning
22of jute in Calcutta." Calcutta goods were making serious inroads
into Dundee markets in America and Australia; and the Dundee trade 
was finding it difficult to compensate for this in a Continental 
trade characterised by both the establishment of home jute industries 
and increased protectionist tariffs. One area of expansion for the 
Dundee industry, however, was the Scottish linoleum industry based at 
Kirkcaldy. Nairn's of Kirkcaldy, which dominated the Scottish mar­
ket, was firmly established in this field by the mid 1850's. It
8
seems to be generally agreed, nonetheless, that the jute trade was
much less profitable from the third quarter of the nineteenth
century onwards; although once again military conflict (the Boer War
followed by the South African War, and conflict between Russia and
Japan in 1904-5) provided oases of prosperity, and there were, as was
typical of the jute industry, short periods of hectic demand and high 
23profits.
D. The Early Twentieth Century
Lenman et al. paint a truly unhealthy picture of the industry in
the years leading up to 1914. The Dundee industry's share of world
raw jute consumption had by 1913 dropped to 13.6%; and by this stage
was dwarfed by Calcutta's 53.8%, while it was almost half that of
24Continental Europe as a whole with 25.7%. In Dundee long-lived 
jute barons who had made or inherited the fortunes of the 1850's and 
1860's appeared unwilling to introduce much change into the industry. 
These manufacturers, with interests in supplies of raw jute and 
shipping services, and something of a monopoly of business and social 
standing in the city, performed the function of a barrier to new 
competition and new ideas in the industry. Thus in addition to the 
large size of the major firms in the industry, the existence of both 
internal and external economies of scale, vertical integration, geo­
graphic concentration, and the cyclical nature of demand inevitably 
constituted traditional barriers to entry to the industry. Accom­
panying this there is some evidence that by the early years of the 
20th century the major entrepreneurs in the industry were no longer 
as concerned with reinvesting profits in modernising their facilities
9
as they had at one time been, but were instead significant contrib­
utors to the growth of Scottish-based unit trusts whose funds were
25invested in the United States. Despite a fairly high degree of
26production concentration in the market, the industry appears to 
have exemplified typical "cobweb" characteristics of vast over­
expansion during the short-lived boom periods, followed by low prices 
and the industrial conflict of reduced wages and unemployment in the 
succeeding period. Much of the "profit" in the industry, Lenrnan
points out, came in fact from judicious buying of raw jute, and manu-
27facturing or processing costs were a small proportion of total.
Indeed the peak of capital investment in the jute industry appears to
have occurred in the late 1860's. Thereafter, as mentioned above,
Dundee merchants seem to have considered that the return on invest-
28ment was greater on the other side of the Atlantic.
The hostilities of 1914-18 once again produced conditions of high
demand for the jute industry. By 1915 70% of the Dundee industry's
output was for Government Departments: it was boasted that Dundee was
producing one million sand bags per day at this time. But although
World War I was a period of high, if temporary, profits for the
industry, it produced certain trends which were to be of less long-
29term advantage to the industry as a whole. War-time demand was
a demand for coarse jute goods; and Dundee's production geared it­
self to this for the period, away from the trend of the previous de­
cades of counteracting competition from Calcutta by moving into finer 
jute goods markets. This meant not only the use of existing plant 
in these "coarse" markets, but also an element of "technical retro­
gression" as possibilities for manufacturing improvements were
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ignored. Also ignored were foreign markets; and this resulted in 
local industries being established overseas to serve purely domestic 
requirements. Not only were these markets protected by high tariff 
barriers after 1918; in some cases they appear to have exhibited a 
level of technology superior to that of Dundee.
Despite government restrictions on the industry by the end of 
World War I (exports were controlled, and there was a system of re­
stricted allocation of raw jute to spinners by 1918), prices had 
risen markedly since the pre-war years, and there were fears of 
corresponding reductions in the post-war period. Increased compet­
ition from India was also feared. It was estimated that half of 
Dundee's output was in direct competition with that of Calcutta, and 
that the cost of production of standard Hessian cloth in 1919 was £45 
in Dundee and £15 in Calcutta. Interestingly enough, in the light 
of the more significant 1948 Board of Trade Report, a Board of Trade 
working party was established in 1919 to look into the question of 
trade protection for the Dundee industry. Contrary to policy some 
30 years later, the Report of 1919 rejected import controls and 
suggested that the Dundee industry should concentrate its efforts in 
those areas where it could compete with the Indian mills and 
factories. Its recommendations in this respect were couched in un­
equivocal terms.
"If jute goods capable of being manufactured in India cannot 
be made in Dundee and marketed at prices which permit of 
the payment of an established minimum rate of wages to the 
workers employed, it appears inevitable that such trade 
must be lost to the United Kingdom and the industry in this 
country will find its level in the manufacture of goods 
which cannot be more economically produced in India. The
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Committee are unable to recommend artificial means to 
enable the United Kingdom to compete with another 
portion of the Empire and are of opinion that the 
industry should be informed as soon as possible that 
action in the direction of protecting the jute industry 
against the competition of India is impossible, and that 
it rests with the manufacturers engaged in the industry 
to take the necessary steps to economize working expen­
ses to the uttermost and to develop the production and 
sale of the kind of jute manufactures which are not at 
present manufactured in India and which are unlikely to 
be produced there in future.-*0
Because of problems of sea losses of raw material, and general 
difficulties over supply, the industry had experienced some fluctu­
ations of fortune throughout World War I; and although there was a 
temporary post-war boom in 1919-20 the remainder of the decade wit­
nessed a resumption of the earlier problems of the industry. These 
centred around reduced overall demand for jute, and continued compet­
ition in many markets from the output of Calcutta mills. The Board 
of Trade Report of 1948 spoke of the short-lived boom after 1918
being followed by "tumbling prices and a declining demand", with un-
31employment in the industry by the early 1930's exceeding 50%. The
jute industry was not even given much protection from imported goods
as India was exempted from the general round of import duties imposed
in 1932 by the operation of Imperial Preference. In common with
much of the remainder of British industry, rationalisation occurred
in an attempt to bring productive capacity into line with reduced
demand. In October 1920 a number of old established businesses
32were brought together to form Jute Industries A few years later,
in 1924, a similar arrangement resulted in the establishment of Low &
33Bonar; and these two firms dominated the Dundee jute industry.
Thus although there were isolated areas of prosperity in the
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industry in the immediate aftermath of World War I, the slump of the 
late 1920's closed a large part of the industry. And despite hopes 
that a slimmed-down industry characterised by improved productivity 
and concentration upon the quality end of the market would generate 
higher returns, this did not materialise. In total, employment in 
the industry fell from 41,220 in 1924 to 27,980 in 1938: a fall of
32%. There was an even more rapid decline in female employment over 
this period - 39% - brought about by the use of new machinery demand­
ing more male operatives. Another index of the industry's declining 
fortune was its diminished international trading performance. At the 
end of the nineteenth century the U.K. industry was exporting 75% of
its output. This figure never reached 20% in the 1930*s; and in
341937 the industry for the first time recorded an import surplus.
E. Conclusions on the Early History of the Jute Industry
The Dundee jute industry, it is agreed, is one which can only be 
fully understood in its historical context. The city had already, by 
the early decades of the last century, become a centre for linen manu­
facture - particularly of the coarse type used for making cotton bags 
and other forms of packaging. The traditional flax industry progress­
ed with mechanisation, generally high demand for the product and the 
operation of a linen export bounty. But the continued need to search 
for cheaper materials, the possibility of spinning jute on flax­
spinning machinery, the growing acceptability of jute by former users 
of flax or hemp, the attractiveness of a raw material (jute) which was 
free from the risk of interrupted supplies dependent upon Britain's 
political relationship with Russia, and, in time, the competition which
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flax bagging was beginning to experience from Indian jute goods, all
35stimulated the foundation of a Dundee-based jute industry.
From this period on the industry expanded to a peak of prosper­
ity in the early 1870's. The years of the Crimean War and American 
Civil War were of major significance in shaping the industry, and
Dundee raw jute imports rose from 16,590 tons in 1854 to 71,000 in 
361865. This period saw the beginnings of some of the major charac­
teristics of the industry in the twentieth century. Optimistic over­
trading on the part of some smaller firms, followed by financial 
collapse, emphasised the value of size in an industry subject to 
cyclical sales booms and slumps. The industry also appears from 
this time to have become more concentrated and more highly integrated. 
But what was in more than one sense an Indian Summer for the Dundee 
jute trade was coming to an end; and Lenman suggests that the large
orders of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-73 represented the last
37period of easy profits. This is not to say that the industry did
not continue to grow. In 1873 Dundee jute imports were 139,923 tons;
38a figure which expanded to 392,025 in 1895. Employment also ex-
29panded: from 14,911 persons in 1870 to 43,360 in 1895. The jute 
industry also appears to have continued its dominance of Dundee employ­
ment. The figure for the textile employment as a proportion of the
total remained at 48-49% in 1881 and 1911. In 1931 it was still 41%;
40and only by 1951 had it fallen to 23%. By this time, however,
competition was reducing the profitability of the Dundee trade. The 
difficulties of the jute trade in the last decades of the nineteenth 
century were brought about by the very rapid expansion of the Calcutta 
industry (to whom Dundee lost her Australasian and South African
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markets and some of her American trade), and the increased protection­
ist tariffs in Europe. For a time Dundee was able to maintain a 
technological lead over Calcutta, and to move ahead of that centre 
into finer jute goods. Profitability may also have been maintained 
by continued concentration of the Dundee market into larger units, and 
the decline in the general competitiveness of Dundee goods prior to 
1939 may have been disguised by the channelling of Government orders 
to Dundee rather than overseas, and stipulation of the use of Dundee
jute for some users such as beet sugar which was Government subsid-
. . 41ised.
The starting point of the main part of this study is nonethe­
less the demise of a traditional textile industry from its 19th 
century heyday. It is a study, therefore, of how firms heavily 
committed to that industry reacted to continued overseas competition 
and to new technologies such as paper bagging and containerisation.
It involves an examination of how and why a relatively small number 
of firms in a highly localised traditional market, far away from 
many potential sources of demand for alternative products, reacted to 
this situation and moved, with a creditable degree of success, into 
new market areas.
F. Prospects for the Jute Industry in 1945
The immediate background period of the major part of this study 
commenced with the jute industry emerging from another period of arti­
ficially stimulated demand, and with capacity geared to the coarse 
end of the market. Once again the industry appeared to be
15
doomed to a consequent period of over-capacity and further loss of 
neglected markets. As two observers of the contemporary scene 
wrote :
"There is little doubt that, if the prospects of the jute 
industry seemed gloomy before the war (1939-45), they have 
become even more gloomy since. ... outside Europe as well 
as inside it, there is a very real danger that the war will 
have considerably speeded up India's encroachment on Dundee 
markets ... It seems also very probable that the war will 
again have stimulated the development of substitutes.
Some part of these gloomy prognostications was based upon a phen­
omenon encountered by the industry immediately after 1918, and which 
has already been referred to as "technical retrogression". During 
World War II Dundee had been very largely geared towards providing 
basic jute goods for war-time needs. This situation continued for 
some time after 1945 due, in the first instance, to Indian independence 
and Partition (see below) which disrupted supplies of raw jute and 
basic jute goods, and secondly to the outbreak of the Korean War in 
1950 which again put the Dundee industry on a war footing. The 
result of this was that Dundee lost further ground in those specialist 
export markets which it had been trying to build up prior to 1939: 
markets in which it avoided direct competition with the Calcutta mills. 
This problem was reinforced by export quotas from the U.K. which 
applied until 1952. Thus on the one hand Dundee was losing its 
place in world export markets through quota restrictions, while on the 
other the home industry was forced, as a result of the difficulties 
of the Partition, to expend most of its energies on basic jute goods. 
For example, prior to 1947 India had supplied two-thirds of U.K. cloth 
and bag requirements. With the drying up of this source of supply
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three quarters of the output of yarn from Dundee mills in the early
431950's was for Hessians.
Not only was this the situation in Britain, but from the early 
1950's the Indian mills began a period of modernisation and market 
reorientation which involved some of the owners and managing agents 
in what has been referred to as "some fairly ruthless rationalisation" 
Faced by considerable wage increases, difficulties in obtaining 
certain supplies of raw jute from East Pakistan, and the growth of 
jute industries in other east Asian countries, the Calcutta mills in­
stalled modernised spinning capacity and automatic weaving machines, 
and moved into more sophisticated markets such as tufted carpet
backing for American customers, and also laminated bags - a sandwich
44of jute and paper.
Of even more immediate significance to the U.K. industry, however
was the partition of the Indian subcontinent into two independent
states - India and Pakistan. The major problem so far as jute was
concerned was brought about by the creation of a separate state of
East Pakistan which had the effect of dividing the jute growing area
of Bengal (in East Pakistan) from the merchanting and production
45centre around Calcutta (in India). By this event 80% of the jute
growing area of Bengal was divided from India, and although economic 
relations between the two states were initially fairly harmonious, 
trading and political differences arose which culminated in Pakistan's 
failure to follow the British 30% devaluation of 1949 which India did. 
Restrictions on supplies followed; and Britain was faced with a 
scarcity of finished jute goods from Calcutta (because their mills
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lacked raw jute from Bengal), and a reduced supply of raw jute from
46Pakistan because of handling difficulties. These events, com­
bined with the increased demand occasioned by the Korean war, not 
only quite obviously forced prices up and thereby endangered jute's 
competitiveness with other materials, but also meant that Dundee 
continued to produce basic jute goods rather than diversify away 
from inevitable Indian competition. The long term effect has been 
for Pakistan herself to develop a jute manufacturing industry; and 
most of the jute goods now imported to Dundee are from Pakistan - or 
Bangladesh as it became in 1970. This latter country enjoys wage 
levels lower than India, and Bangladesh prices for jute goods may be 
two-thirds those of India.
G. The Board of Trade Report
In April 1946 a committee was constituted to look into the oper­
ation of the U.K. jute industry. The committee's task, in the words 
of its own terms of reference, was as follows :
"To examine and inquire into the various schemes and 
suggestions put forward for improvements of organis­
ation, production and distribution methods and processes 
in the jute industry, and to report as to the steps 
which should be taken in the national interest to 
strengthen the industry and render it more stable and 
more capable of meeting competition in the home and 
foreign markets."
In general terms the Committee saw its job as being to recommend 
the degree and form of protection appropriate to safeguard the Dundee 
industry from competition from the Calcutta mills. The Committee 
saw protection as being necessary in the light of the lower level of
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Indian wages; and it foresaw no other means of alleviating the 
growing incursion of Indian goods into Dundee markets traditionally 
safe from such competition. The Committee was thus aware that 
even in such markets as quality sacking or in short runs of quality 
Hessian, where Calcutta had previously not competed with Dundee, 
there was a risk of the latter losing ground to the former. Further­
more, although the Committee was to be concerned about the structure 
of the U.K. industry it did not feel that restructuring alone would 
offer adequate protection from overseas competition. The Committee 
was thus sympathetic to the need for some degree of general protect­
ion for the home industry; and it felt that such protection had to 
be applied to "standard lines" of jute goods, where there was Indian
competition, if the Dundee industry was to expand on a healthy basis
47of producing both standard and quality lines.
The quid pro quo, as it were, from the industry for this protect­
ion was to be re-equipment and reorganisation (i.e. consolidation) on 
its part, so that long production runs could be achieved, using 
modern spindles and looms efficiently laid out, and which, the 
Committee evidently felt, could only be afforded by more substantial 
enterprises. In other words the Committee saw it as being essential 
that the company consolidations of the early 1920's, and the concen­
tration of capacity brought about by wartime exigencies, should be 
48continued. Without such means the Committee foresaw a further
contraction of the industry, and a vicious circle of lost trade and
competitiveness: "high costs, little if any profit, and no reserves
49available for improvement and development". The Committee did
not, however, view the position of the Dundee industry as hopeless;
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and a number of manufacturers were at the time of the Report install­
ing new machinery. Indeed paradoxically, in the light of the future 
contraction of the industry, one of the Committee's worries was over 
a potential labour shortage.
The major part of the Report's summary and recommendations 
relates to the disadvantages which the Dundee industry experienced 
vis-a-vis India in manufacturing or conversion costs. The problem 
to be solved was how the home industry could cope with this situation; 
and the major part of the solution was protection. With regard to 
standard goods (e.g. hessians), there seems to have been no doubt in 
the minds of Committee members, first, that Dundee should continue to 
supply these goods, and second, that protection was vital. Thus, 
"the gap (between conversion costs in India and in the U.K.) is so 
wide that it is clear that ... the (home) industry, however extensive­
ly re-equipped and re-organised, cannot hope to compete with India in
50the standard lines of hessian unless protection is afforded".
From its base in the standard lines the Committee in fact noted that 
Indian competition had extended to quality sacking etc., and was 
likely to make further inroads upon carpet yarn and hessian linoleum 
backing - market areas in which Dundee had hitherto enjoyed some 
degree of protection by virtue of the high quality standards demanded. 
It was possibly this further encroachment by Calcutta into Dundee 
markets which made the Committee feel that if the home industry was 
to survive at all it had to operate across the whole of the market; 
and that in turn this was possible only behind some form of trade 
protection. The Report, therefore, in its conclusion committed it­
self to a Dundee jute industry producing a wide range of goods (in
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fact a complete range other than coarse heavy bags), and which could 
simply not exist without some form of protection. The Committee 
finally recommended the continuation or introduction of import 
duties, ad valorem or specific, to cover the difference in manufact­
uring costs between Indian and locally produced goods.
It is interesting to note that the Committee's view on the need 
for and appropriateness of trade protection was contingent upon signi­
ficant reorganisation of the industry. This was to include both 
amalgamation and re-equipment, which the Report saw as going hand in 
hand. Indeed, so far as concentration was concerned, the Report 
clearly specified the proportion of the industry which it saw as being 
made up of firms of a minimum size; and this was based upon the 
possibility and need to secure economies of scale which were available 
in production of, for example, standard hessians. The largest part 
of the formal Recommendations of the Report were in the area of re­
grouping and modernisation, and the offer of Government financial 
assistance in this context. The remaining Recommendations dealt 
largely with the need for improvements in the utilisation of capital 
and labour.
The acceptance of the feelings expressed in the Report thus gave
the Dundee jute industry a degree of protection - largely operated
through the continuance of Jute Control (see below) - which undoubted-
51ly slowed down its rate of decline. Although the contingent amal­
gamations among producers did not take place, it has been implied that 
the stability afforded by Control did encourage modernisation of 
plant. For example, between 1945 and 1951 an estimated £4 million
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was spent by the industry on re-equipment; and this appears to 
have been a period of considerable modernisation in spinning and 
weaving, including improved plant layout etc. Furthermore, 
although the system of protection may have become of diminishing 
importance over time, the continuing need to discuss the issue prob­
ably gave the industry an oligopolistic cohesion which may have mili­
tated against severe competition among domestic producers. This is 
particularly likely in view of the precise form in which Jute Control 
"equated" or "marked up" prices of imported Indian goods - a system 
which involved arriving at a consensus as to the appropriate or fair 
price for Dundee goods. The Government-sponsored system of 
protection through Control was also accompanied by (or, more 
questionably, required the support of) a series of restrictive trading 
agreements which were practised by the industry until struck down by 
the Restrictive Practices Court in 1963. The Report of the Working 
Party thus to a not inconsiderable extent contributed to the post-war 
economic environment of the Dundee jute industry.
H. Jute Control
Some mention must be made of the function of Jute Control because 
of the influence of this organisation on the post-war industry. Tech­
nically it was a means of protecting the U.K. industry from Indian
competition. It may also, as mentioned above, have served as a
53focal point for discussions about pricing m  the market.
Originally Control was established in September 1939 and covered 
raw jute, yarn, waste etc. In 1940 the regulations were extended to
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imported jute goods; and although the policy was originally designed 
to interfere as little as possible with existing arrangements - and 
to operate through a system of licences for existing merchants - 
Control eventually became the sole importer of raw jute and jute goods 
in 1941 and 1942 respectively. Even so, Control still purchased 
through brokers and shipping agents. A fairly comprehensive system 
of regulations was established; and this included not only licensing 
of spinners and weavers, but also licensing and controls over the 
uses to which finished jute goods could be put. Prices at each 
stage of the manufacturing process were also laid down.
What distinguished Control from other war-time regulations is 
that the system was not wholly abandoned after hostilities ceased. 
Certainly in September 1952 internal controls were relaxed: i.e. the
licensing and control of end-use of jute goods were ended. Moreover 
in 1954 trading in raw jute was returned to private hands. The 
Government of the day, on the basis of the Board of Trade Report, 
nonetheless felt that in respect of finished goods the Dundee industry 
required continued protection. Jute Control thus continued to ad­
just prices of imported jute goods so as to protect Dundee producers 
from Indian competition. Imported goods were adjusted on the basis 
of "equated prices" (by reference to the cost of raw jute) or "mark­
up prices" (by reference to landed prices of imported jute goods).
From 1954 to 1957 the system of protection was largely based upon 
equated prices; but from 1957 onwards standard markups became the 
more common method, until by 1963 this latter system accounted for 
90% of Control goods. The general trend over the years was towards 
a reduced markup; and while the equated prices of the 1954-57 period
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appear to have constituted a markup of some 47%, the formal markup in 
July 1957 was set at 30%, and was reduced in January 1960 to 20%. 
Further reductions in the markup on some goods, and return of others 
to free trade occurred during the early 1960's; and in May 1969 all 
imported goods previously subject to Control were returned to private 
hands, although quotas were retained in some cases. Although the sig­
nificance of this form of protection may have diminished with time as 
Dundee firms moved into market areas which did not attract Indian com­
petition, there were products such as Hessian cloth and bags where a 
significant output from Dundee was matched by large imports from Cal­
cutta. One report indeed purports to show that a reduction in the 
level of protection in respect of one category of goods resulted in a
73% reduction in the output of these goods by U.K. producers despite
54satisfactory levels of overall demand. Nonetheless the proportion
of trade affected by such controls directly, i.e. by markups, gradually
diminished. This is borne out by studies across the total industry,
55and also by reference to the situation by individual firms. The
changes in technology of the late 1960's greatly altered the situation,
and the Joint Textile N.E.D.C. later emphasised in forecasting changes
in the industry's fortunes that "any increase in imports following
quota revisions is likely to be small compared to the inroads into
• 56the domestic market made by polypropylene."
However, the importance of Control was probably greater than is 
implied by the proportion of the Dundee trade affected at any one 
time. Prices of non-protected goods may have borne a fixed relation­
ship to those of protected goods; or manufacturers of more specialist 
goods, where competition among local producers was keen, may have
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relied upon goods where prices were effectively set by Control for an 
element of stability in their profits. Control also maintained a 
more stable structure in the industry than would otherwise have been 
the case by a "fair" allocation of raw materials over the period 
1939-52, by setting profit margins during this period which allowed 
less efficient firms to survive which might otherwise have been elim­
inated by competition, and by ensuring reasonable supplies of material 
to the industry as a whole during the difficult period of Partition. 
Indeed the interrelationship between the influence of Control and of 
the restrictive trading agreements in the industry, and of its geo­
graphical concentration, has made it difficult to assess the impact of 
each independently. What one can say is that each combined with the 
others to limit the extent of overt price competition in the market.
Control was, therefore, an important part of the economic environ­
ment of the jute industry post 1945. It certainly must have given 
the industry a greater cohesion than would otherwise have existed; 
and, although latterly its direct impact may have been small, it must 
have made a contribution to slowing down the rate of contraction of 
the industry, and perhaps also contributed to the temporary survival 
of some smaller firms.
I. Markets
With regard to end-use markets, the jute industry in 1945 was 
still dependent to a very large extent upon relatively unsophisticated 
uses of its output. Packaging was still the major end use to which 
jute was put - accounting for about 70% of total output of made-up
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jute according to one estimate. This was to be of some dis­
advantage to the Dundee industry. In the first place it was an un­
stable market - dependent very much upon the volume of domestic and 
international trade. This was a derived demand which jute enjoyed 
only because of its cheapness. Second, the packaging market for 
jute was the one in which it was most susceptible to Indian competit­
ion, being a fairly unsophisticated product. Third, this was to be 
a market into which new products such as paper and polythene, and new
methods such as containerisation, made considerable inroads on the
58basis of efficiency and marketing appeal.
In its second most important market, however, - namely lineolum
backing - jute in 1945 enjoyed considerable advantages. The greater
widths and higher quality demanded in this market protected Dundee
from Calcutta. An additional advantage in this sector was the near-
_ 59ness of the U.K. linoleum manufacturing centre of Kirkcaldy m  Fife. 
The disadvantage which Dundee was to incur in this market was the 
rapidly decreasing popularity of linoleum itself. Output reached 
a peak annual output of 51.6m. sq. metres in 1955, and thereafter 
rapidly declined to a corresponding figure of 8.9 in 1969 and to 4.0 
in 1975.
Other uses of jute in the period after 1945 included carpeting, 
cordage, and a number of minor uses such as cable insulation, uphol­
stery foundations, padding and stiffening of clothes, and linings for 
boots and shoes.
An approximate idea of the total situation may be gained from
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data provided in the Board of Trade Working Party Report, although 
the figures relate to 1939 - the last year when output was not in­
fluenced by the pre-war buildup of military requirements.
Table 1.2
U.K. Jute Production (tons)
Yarn : Carpet backing, twines,
cordage etc. 50,150
Jute carpets 3,050
Webbing 600 53,800
Cloth and Bags :
Cloth: Hessian 28,200
Sacking etc. 7,050 35,250
Bags 32,400 67,650
121,450
Source : Report of Board of Trade Working Party on Jute
(H.M.S.O.: London, 1948) pp.17-19.
The same Report went on to warn the Dundee industry:
"India had for many years supplied the home market for 
heavy bags made from low quality sacking and bagging; 
had made such heavy inroads in the hessian bag trade 
that there was every indication that as time went on 
the balance of that trade would gradually be lost to 
India; had made a start in the manufacture of linol­
eum hessian and brattice cloth; was encroaching more 
and more on the trade in other widths of hessian up to 
72 ins. for non-bag uses; and was beginning to parti­
cipate in the trade in better quality sackings and 
tarpaulings. Thus virtually no normal home use for 
jute cloth and bags is likely to remain free from 
Indian competition in the future."6°
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The years immediately after 1945 therefore saw the Dundee jute
industry at something of a watershed with regard to markets for its 
output. There was no doubt that India was poised to make further 
encroachments upon Dundee's traditional markets, and that the total 
situation was likely to be aggravated by changes in technology such 
as containerisation and the development of new forms of packaging.
J. Market Structure
Market structure is one of the most important areas of analysis 
in industrial economics. Not only are some of the dimensions of
structure - most obviously concentration - open to quantitative 
analysis, but both economic theory and the results of empirical 
research lead one to anticipate that structure in any market is an 
important determinant of the conduct or behaviour of firms, which in 
turn influences the performance of the industry. This section 
looks at the data on market structure in the jute industry around 
1945.
It was noted earlier that some circumstances had encouraged con­
centration of production in the industry: for example, the rapid
changes of fortune in the industry, and the incentive to vertical 
integration. It may also have been hoped that the "rationalisation" 
process, through which Jute Industries and Low & Bonar evolved in the 
early 1920's, would have provided for a more orderly contraction of 
the Dundee industry, and made for a more stable competitive environ­
ment for the firms themselves. However, the existence of a class of 
jute merchants who traded between spinners and weavers meant that
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vertical integration was not essential. Also, the advent of the 
electric motor for powering spinning machinery meant that there were 
not necessarily the significant economies of scale here that there 
were previously in the operation of a single large motor for a whole 
mill. Finally, in common with other industries, a war-time system 
of raw material allocation and centrally determined prices must have 
contributed to the survival of small firms.
With regard to the situation prior to World War II, it would
appear that firms employing more than 500 employees in 1935, although
accounting for only 11% of enterprises, were responsible for 33% of
employment and 32% of net output.^ Data on one conventional
measure of market power - the concentration ratio - suggest that in
respect of net output and employment the three-firm ratio in 1935 was 
6235%; while the Evely and Little comparisons of gross output figures
for 1935 and 1951 show that the concentration ratio had risen from 30%
to 38%, and that the jute industry therefore fell into the medium con-
63centration category. Prior to 1945, therefore, a number of sources
indicate that the industry was becoming slightly more concentrated.
This was occurring despite any obvious reason for an increase in the 
optimum size of firm; and much of the incentive may have come from 
the difficulties which the industry was being faced with in terms of 
increased Indian competition and loss of other markets to home produc­
ers of substitute goods.
Data relating to the immediate post-war period, prepared for the 
Board of Trade enquiry, indicate both the large number of firms in the 
market and the high degree of concentration. This data, which applies
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to the U.K., showed that in jute spinning there were 26 firms having 
38 plants or establishments. For weaving, the corresponding 
figures were 36 and 45. But within this data further examination 
reveals Jute Industries as having 24% of spindles and 20% of looms.
And although the second largest firm came some way behind, the 
figures show the four largest spinners accounting for 46% of spindles;
64with a corresponding figure for looms of 37%. The Board of
Trade Report data also reveal a degree of vertical integration in the
industry. Eighteen out of 44 firms, and 17 out of 66 establishments,
included spinning as well as weaving; and among the largest firms
bag-sewing and merchanting (i.e. selling) were also normally carried 
65on.
K . Conelus ions
The purpose of the preceding sections of this chapter has been 
to outline the state of the traditional jute industry in 1945 through 
both a brief economic history of the trade from its origins to that 
date, and a summary of the condition of the industry immediately after 
World War II.
In many ways this point in time represents a logical starting 
date for any consideration of the industry up to the present time. 
Despite the industry being well past its major period of growth, and 
in spite of the difficulties of the 1930's, the trade, for some time 
largely unchanged in its economic structure or technology, looked 
forward with hope to the post-War world. However, major changes
were about to occur over the next 30 years. Despite Government
30
and private efforts to modify the forces of import and domestic 
competition, these were to increase significantly. Domestic 
markets which at one time seemed large-scale and relatively immune 
from the pressure of Asian competition were to fall to technological 
change and import competition. These forces brought about consider­
able restructuring of the traditional industry over the period from 
the mid 1960's onwards. Finally, the industry was forced to adopt 
quite radical technological and product market change for its own 
survival into the 1970's. It is with an analysis of these changes
that the major part of this thesis is concerned.
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CHAPTER II
Analysis of Changing Markets and Industry Structure
A. Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to trace the principal changes 
in product markets in respect of what at the end of World War II 
constituted the Dundee jute industry, and also to indicate the major 
changes in industry structure. The material in this chapter 
following the Introduction is thus divided into four sections: 
analysis of changing markets, analysis of changing market structure, 
analysis of other changes in market conditions, and a concluding 
section.
With regard to markets we want to know how the jute industry 
and its constituent firms responded to the falling off of demand from 
previous users. Some part of the answer to this issue - indeed a 
major part - lies in diversification by former jute manufacturers in­
to other market areas altogether (analysed in more detail in Chapter 
III). Nonetheless, some part of this chapter is devoted to examining 
changed market areas within the jute industry itself, as well as to 
the movement by most firms from dependence upon jute to a broader 
industrial textiles base.
Changes in structure in a market, particularly a declining one, 
are interesting in that they show us how the constituent firms as a 
group reacted to external influences. Such changes may also enable
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one to say something about the degree of competitiveness in a 
market - a primary concern of industrial economists. At the 
level of individual businesses, it is also interesting to know how 
firms reacted to a sharp falling off in demand for their principal 
traditional product. Did firms move rapidly into other market 
areas; did they simply go out of existence; or were they acquired 
by other companies, either former competitors or firms based in 
other markets?
In order to make some of the following data and analysis easier 
to place in an overall context, a brief review is first given of the 
transition of the jute industry during the post-war period to 1977. 
This review identifies the major trends and the principal forces at 
work; and it is in this context that the remainder of the study 
should be placed.
The jute industry had undoubtedly benefited from the 1939-45 
war so far as stimulation of demand was concerned. Indeed, 
according to a number of people in the trade today looking back, it 
was only the enormous sandbag contracts of 1938 onwards that en­
abled the industry to survive the 1930's. These contracts were 
costed at local conversion rates ("real Dundee prices", as one indus­
trialist put it), and thus ushered in a period during which the 
local industry was freed from the full impact of Asian competition.
The Dundee industry emerged from World War II under the 
protection of Jute Control (outlined in the previous chapter); and 
this system, combined with the trading agreements operated by the
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industry itself, not only protected the domestic industry from im­
port competition, but also militated against the emergence of 
domestic rivalry. The late 1940's and the early 1950's were a 
period of adjustment for the Dundee industry. Manufacturing 
premises were gradually returned to the trade from war-time use 
following concentration. Caird's Ashton Works and James Scott's 
Mid Wynd Works had, for example, been used for light engineering and 
jerrican manufacture. Jute at this time was experiencing consist­
ent demand for yarn for woven carpets, and backing cloth for linol­
eum. In both of these areas the Dundee trade had a technical and 
transport cost advantage over India; and as will be seen in the main 
body of this chapter, a high proportion of the output of the Dundee 
industry went into floorcovering markets. By the mid 1950's however, 
changes were taking place in these markets. The system of import 
protection had started to price jute bags out of competition with 
multiwall paper bags. The latter were being developed by the major 
paper manufacturers such as Reed and Bowater; and as part of their 
marketing strategy these latter firms also produced bag-filling plant. 
From this time on, therefore, the markets for transporting animal 
feeds etc. were lost to paper bags, while grain, and in time other 
products, became subject to bulk handling. At this time too the 
linoleum market began its downward trend towards eventual near 
extinction, and this situation was one of potential severe loss of 
trade for the traditional jute industry.
The situation was saved by the advent, in Georgia in the United 
States, of a tufted carpet industry. Although the backing market 
for this product looked at one time as if it might be served by cotton,
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jute proved to have superior technical characteristics, and became 
adopted for both primary and secondary tufted carpet backing; that 
is both the (primary) fabric into which the tufts of a tufted carpet 
are locked, and the material which is finally placed on top of the 
latex binding the tufts into the primary backing and which is the 
(secondary) backing visible as the reverse side of a tufted carpet. 
The market situation was particularly fortuitous. Only in the 
early 1950's had U.K. export quotas been relaxed; and the tufted 
carpet backing market was originally an export one, as the U.K. and 
European public continued to prefer traditional woven carpets. 
Furthermore, tufted carpet backing could be made on existing jute 
looms used to produce linoleum backing. Only limited improvisation 
and re-equipment was therefore necessary to accommodate minor modi­
fications: for example, twill rather than plain weave was required.
In addition, the technical requirements (75% of the backing was 4 yd. 
width and a further 15% 5 yd.) limited, at least for a time, Asian 
competition; while transport distances for Indian and Dundee mills 
were about the same to American markets. Thus the tufted carpet 
backing market in the late 1950's and the early 1960's was an enor­
mous boon to the U.K. jute industry. For although the U.S. and 
Canadian markets were eventually lost to Asian competition, the 
early 1960's saw the beginnings and rapid expansion of a U.K. and 
European tufted carpet industry. Here was a source of rapidly- 
expanding demand for jute on Dundee's doorstep, relatively speaking; 
and the rate of expansion of the market gave the Dundee industry for 
a time something which it had not experienced for almost a century - 
a sellers market in jute cloth. On this basis the early 1960's 
witnessed considerable re-equipment in the industry - for example
4 1
The final phase of development covered by this study witnessed, 
however, the almost total disappearance of the local jute industry 
on any scale. The cause of this was a man-made fibre - polypropy­
lene - which could be woven into a cloth. It took over from jute 
both as a (primary) carpet backing material and also in container 
manufacture. Jute's periodical shortage of supply and unpredict­
ability of price caused it to be ousted by what is essentially a by­
product of petroleum refining. The tufted carpet industry in 
particular took up polypropylene in place of jute on price grounds; 
and most of the original jute manufacturers have now turned to 
polypropylene weaving, with some of the larger companies having also 
established facilities for extruding the polypropylene tape from the 
chemical chips or granules. Labour usage in particular has declined 
in the industry as the new looms for weaving polypropylene operate at 
something like twice the speed of the former jute looms, and can be 
supervised on the basis of one person for every five or six modern 
Sulzer looms compared with one person for every two or three jute 
looms.
Over this period, therefore, the former Dundee jute industry has 
been transformed into a broader industrial textiles one; and Dundee 
itself has become a centre of some importance in the new field, with 
an estimated two-thirds of polypropylene production being carried on 
in the Dundee and Forfar area. Thus, as mentioned before, this 
study is one of transition as much as one of decline. As the 
summary figures below indicate, nonetheless, the history is at least
with twill weave looms.
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to begin with one of decline, 
to indicate in more detail the 
structure associated with that
The purpose of this chapter is now 
changes in product markets and market 
decline.
Table 2.1
U.K. Jute Industry
Output ('000 tonnes) Employment* Number of
Yarn Cloth (’000) Firms**
1948 101.9 59.9 20.3 37
1956 144.5 90.1 19.1 39
1960 144.1 83.5 17.2 32
1966 122.8 73.1 17.1 30
1967 113.8 64.6 15.3 30
1968 111.5 59.7 15.2 29
1969 107.9 52.7 15.4 29
1970 87.5 40.9 11.9 25
1971 77.6 32.0 10.3 21
1972 74.7 26.5 9.4 16
1973 68.2 24.2 9.0 16
1974 57.5 20.9 9.4 16
1975 51.1 16.3 8.1 16
1976 52.7 16.1 8.1 15
1977 46.8 13.8 8.0 14
* employees in employment
** full members of the Association of Jute Spinners & Manufacturers
Sources : output - Annual Abstract of Statistics (London: H.M.S
employment - British Labour Statistics (London: H.M.S.O.)
firms - Association of Jute Spinners & Manufacturers
B. Analysis of Changing Markets
The history of changing markets in the context of this industry 
is essentially that of firms trying to find new uses for jute to re­
place the loss of traditional floorcovering outlets, and of the same 
firms going over to the manufacture of synthetic fibres - especially
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polypropylene. Difficulties arise in statistical analysis in this 
area because much of the yarn output of jute manufacturers is used 
by those firms to make jute cloth - i.e. a large proportion of the 
firms are vertically integrated; and there may be a danger of 
"double counting" here in allocating output to various market areas. 
Many statistics are fairly aggregated; and one study was only able 
to suggest that half of the yarn output of the industry went into bags 
and floorcoverings/furnishings.^
What does appear to be the case, however, is that many of the 
Dundee firms in the years immediately after 1945 became heavily 
committed to supplying the floorcoverings market, and that their 
fortunes became inextricably linked to the pattern of cyclical demand 
for floorcoverings in general, and to changes in technology or 
fashion as linoleum gave way to woven and subsequently tufted carpets, 
and more recently to tiles. Caird (Dundee) is one particular 
instance of a firm which became heavily orientated to the linoleum 
industry in the early 1950‘s; and this affected the firm's subse­
quent pattern of diversification (see Chapter III). But other films 
were often only slightly less so committed. William Halley & Sons,
for example, sold 75% of their yarn and cloth output to the floor-
2covering industry at this time; and the corresponding figure for
3Jute Industries - the largest firm in the market - was 60%. For
the market as a whole an estimate in the late 1950's put the propor-
4tion at around 50%.
The disappearance of traditional markets :
The first major change with which the industry had to contend
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was the rapid falling off in demand for linoleum from the early 
1960's. Output of linoleum built up after 1945 to an annual peak 
of 51.6m.sq.m, in 1955, and remained on a high plateau until the 
end of the decade. From then on, however, demand fell off very 
rapidly: from 47.8m.sq.m, in 1960 to 30.9 by 1963 and 11.2 by 1968.
By 1977 the figure had fallen to 3.6m.sq.m, per annum. In 
addition to this falling off in total linoleum sales there was a 
trend as early as the 1950's towards linoleum being backed with 
bitumenised paper in place of hessian. This process involved impreg­
nating a mixture of waste paper and rags with tar. Nairn of 
Kirkcaldy had a plant for this process in the 1950's, and used bitum­
enised paper for backing linoleum sheeting and also linoleum tiles, 
which constituted another growth area in the 1950's. There was 
nothing which jute manufacturers could do in the face of the loss of 
this source of derived demand as consumers moved to soft floor- 
coverings. But the loss was keenly felt by the Dundee industry as 
it was a market area in which competition from India and Pakistan had 
been held at bay by the high quality and modern technology offered by 
the Dundee trade.
Another major change which was to have a serious effect upon the 
jute industry was the growth of new methods in the bulk handling of 
primary commodities. This was a market in which jute had established 
a powerful position by virtue of the cheapness of the material 
(including the reusable nature of the ubiquitous jute bag), and its 
ability to "breathe", while also for some purposes being capable of 
being made proof against mildew or water. The bulk handling of 
goods such as wheat, maize, flour and sugar obviously became much
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more attractive relative to bagging in those economies where crops 
were grown on a large scale, where considerable transporting dis­
tances were involved, or where labour was expensive. Although some 
economies had begun bulk handling of crops prior to 1939, this 
process rapidly gained momentum in less developed countries during 
the 1950's; and the newer concept of containerisation of the 1960's 
further ate into market areas where jute sacking and packaging had 
once predominated. Other minor areas of jute usage which have now 
been transferred to other materials are twines, road haulage and 
building site tarpaulins, furnishings, cargo separators and, of 
course, jute carpets. The loss of these areas to more sophisticated 
products such as Scotchtape or P.V.C. added to the problems of jute's 
loss of its major end-use markets.
It is also worth mentioning at this stage that jute was not 
always competitive with other traditional fibres on a price basis; 
and that frequent price fluctuations and political uncertainty further 
diminished the attractiveness of jute in some market areas. Thus, 
although cotton bags do not normally compete with jute, high prices 
for the latter or a glut of the former crop have produced times when 
cotton was preferred: for example in the early 1950's. A more
serious problem for manufacturers and users of jute products has 
been the tendency for raw jute prices to fluctuate rapidly, depending 
upon crop conditions and the political climate in India and Pakistan. 
This is initially, of course, a problem for spinners and weavers of 
jute, who go "long" or "short" on raw material depending upon expect­
ations of future price movements. Thus the chairman of Thomson 
Shepherd commented in the mid 1950's that "raw jute supplies and
46
prices over the past year have, as usual, been a matter of constant 
5anxiety"; and one manufacturer was quoted as saying "you can be
technically as efficient as you like, but you lose money if you buy
6(raw jute) at the wrong time. With raw jute accounting for about 
50% of total costs, this is obviously an area of concern in manage­
ment. It has even been suggested to the candidate by someone of 
experience in the industry that one firm at least has survived in the 
market by buying raw jute (either for stockholding in Dundee, or 
simply "buying forward") and selling it at an advantageous price to 
competitor manufacturers. This uncertainty on prices may have fed
through to some jute goods users and hastened their adoption of a
7commodity with a more stable pattern of prices.
The growth of polypropylene:
Undoubtedly the major change in the jute industry over the past 
two decades has been the growth in this country, following their pop­
ularity in the United States, of a market for tufted carpets, and the 
further development of polypropylene in the market for floorcoverings 
and containers. In 1957, the first year in respect of which data 
are available, tufted carpets accounted for about 7% of U.K. carpet 
output by area. But from an annual output figure of 3.3m.sq.m, in 
that year, output of tufted carpets rose to 27.8m.sq.m, in 1964 and 
to 89.7m.sq.m, in 1972. The 1977 output figure of 123.4m.sq.m, 
means that tufted carpets now account for 73% of U.K. carpet output 
by area - a proportion which has grown from 59% as late as 1972.
These data are of some importance not only in indicating the extent 
of a market from which jute initially benefited, but also in high-
47
lighting a major market area where polypropylene has been substit­
uted for jute. The latter was used for wefts and for stuffer warp 
in woven carpets (the main warp being traditionally made of cotton), 
and for both primary and secondary backing of tufted carpets. Poly- 
propylene's first use was as primary backing on tufted carpets; but 
from there its use in floorcoverings has expanded to woven carpet 
wefts and also of course to producing carpet pile or face yarns.
Polypropylene has also taken the place of jute in other market 
areas; and this began happening to such an extent in the late 19601s 
that many of the traditional jute manufacturers moved significantly 
into polypropylene at that time. Such a dominant feature of the 
local industry has this been that the local business journal 
commented on the emergence of polypropylene that "no other develop­
ment in the long history of the jute industry has made such an 
0
impact". Because of the importance of the coming of polypropylene
onto the local scene the product deserves a brief technical and 
economic introduction before taking the market analysis further.
Polypropylene is a synthetic fibre as opposed to the general 
class of natural (vegetable or animal) fibres. It derives from a 
class of macro-molecular materials called polymers, which are known 
to be built up from simple chemical units, monomers. From the 
class of polymers referred to as linear (long and thin) chemists 
realised they could form fibres. Because polypropylene solution 
is made from a manufacturer material (as .opposed to those man-made 
fibres which, like viscose or rayon, contain a natural product and 
are therefore referred to as "regenerated") it is known strictly as
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a synthetic. Other synthetic fibres include Nylon, Terylene and 
Orion.
The class of synthetic fibres from which polypropylene derives
is known as polyolefins; and of these only polyethylene (polythene)
had by the late 1950's achieved commercial success. Polypropylene
was responsible for the commercial growth of the polyolefin class
from that time; and it owed its original success to the cheapness of
its raw material - propylene - available in very large quantities
9from the petroleum industry. Polymerised propylene can be melted
and extruded into tape form, the tape then being wound on to a
spool ready for weaving. The cheapness of the raw material and
the contour of the tape contributed to its success in yarn and woven
form in competition with jute after the first commercial production
of tape in the early 1960's; and jute from this period onwards began
to suffer from competition in the carpet backing and bag markets -
10the latter also being competed for by high density polyethylene.
With regard to the general economics of polypropylene production, 
the major contrast with jute lies in the capital-intensive nature of 
the total manufacturing process from the petroleum feedstock onwards. 
One estimate suggests that of total manufacturing costs of polypropy­
lene, capital investment represents 35% of the total as opposed to 26% 
for the basic feedstock, and 27% for power etc. This implies quite 
clearly that, unlike the jute industry, polypropylene manufacturing 
profitability is very sensitive to activity levels, and that raw 
material price changes have a reduced impact upon total production 
costs. In the case of jute direct costs (labour and raw materials)
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represent around 80% of total manufacturing costs. The other 
point about polypropylene production is that costs have been 
generally declining since the mid 1960's. In the U.K., for 
example, the list price of polypropylene resin fell by 38% in money 
terms in the decade to 1972; and, as emphasised in more detail 
below, there have been other factors exerting a downward pressure 
upon polypropylene prices. 1 1
With regard to its market impact, polypropylene use advanced
particularly with the adoption of tufted carpets in this country,
although latterly the fibre has also been used for woven carpet
backing. The rapidity with which the former use of polypropylene
took place may be gauged from the fact that its use for the primary
backing of tufted carpets rose from less than 10% in 1967 to some 
1295% in 1974. Not only has jute suffered in some of the more
sophisticated markets from the use of polypropylene as a substitute,
but even in traditional packaging areas the new fibre may have more
marketing appeal, or simply be more efficient. For example, it was
reported that in the late 1960's the Australian wool trade was moving
from the use of traditional jute wool packs to polypropylene: raising
13usage of the latter from 400,000 in 1968 to 1,500,000 in 1969.
Natural hard fibres such as sisal used for twines and other cordage 
have also become vulnerable to competition from polypropylene as 
prices of these have risen steeply. McDowall et al.estimate that 
for Western Europe as a whole the use of polypropylene for bags and 
industrial cloth rose from 2,500 metric tons in 1967 to 61,000 metric 
tons in 1974, and that by the latter date 45% of all sacks produced 
in the U.K. were made from polypropylene.1  ^ So far as competition
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for jute is concerned, further inroads into this last market have 
also been made by high-density polyethylene. The basic factors 
considered in choosing jute packaging are not only the relative 
price of jute vis-a-vis, say, multi-wall paper bags or products of 
the polyolefin class, but also product characteristics such as 
ability to "breathe" or to put up with rough handling or to be re­
usable (all of which jute possesses). In those market areas, for 
example, fertilizers, where reuse is uncommon, where presentation of 
the packaged commodity is important, or where the packaged product 
is hygroscopic - i.e. where it has the capacity to absorb water from 
the air and where this leads to a deterioration in the product's 
condition - other forms of packaging are competitive. It should be 
emphasised in this context that the adoption of polypropylene for 
carpet backing required considerable efforts on the part of producers 
to eliminate technical problems involved in polypropylene's use in 
this area. ' Not only did difficulties arise initially in cutting the 
woven polypropylene without producing fraying and thus waste of 
material, but there was also initially a problem of dimensional 
stability. Further problems encountered in the tufted carpet 
industry were those of poor bonding between the latex used to lock 
the face pile tufts into the primary backing and the polypropylene 
itself, and the shrinkage of the polypropylene during the curing or 
drying of the rubber latex: up to 20% initially. Finally, poly­
propylene does not easily accept dyes, and this can produce "grin" 
as the natural colour of the backing shows through the colours of the 
surface pile. This last problem was overcome by needling nylon into 
the primary backing - the former being a fibre which can easily be 
dyed. Thus in technical terms polypropylene has only come to
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compete with jute as a result of considerable investments of
effort and money. 15
With regard to the question of price competition between jute 
and synthetic substitutes, the first point to note is that bag 
making and carpet backing do not constitute a large part of total 
usage of polypropylene or polyethylene. Increases in demand from 
these areas are thus unlikely to have a major impact upon price.
That is, in comparison with jute, the use of polypropylene in its 
place is characterised by a highly price elastic supply. Further­
more, during the mid 1960's when polypropylene was first being market­
ed commercially in this context, it was felt that further technical 
advances, the achievement of production economies of scale 
together with beneficial "learning" effects, and general competitive
pressures would produce a situation such that, relative to prices in
16general, the cost would fall. That this expectation was borne
out may be seen from the fact that over the period 1959-1965 the
price of polypropylene fell from 45 pence per lb. to 24 pence per
lb., while that of H/D polythene fell over the same period from 42
17to 21 pence per lb. The comparative situation is emphasised
in a World Bank survey which compared selling prices of raw jute
and polypropylene polymer. Taking 1962 as lOO in each case, the
1975 index for polypropylene was 73 (and it had fallen as low as 46
in 1970), while that for jute had climbed steadily over the period 
18to 163 in 1975. Furthermore, with regard to the impact of oil
price increases on polypropylene, one has to bear in mind that the 
effect of such rises will be diluted as one moves along the manu­
facturing and selling chain from feedstock to final product. One
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estimate suggests that a 1 0 0% increase in oil prices might lead to
a 10%-15% increase in that of a polymer product such as polypropylene 
19film. What also has to be remembered in the price context is
that polypropylene production is characterised by a high ratio of
20fixed to variable costs. This not only offers considerable
scope for production economies; but also means that raw material 
cost increases have a reduced impact upon final product prices com­
pared with the case of jute where the raw material traditionally
21comprises around 50% of total costs. Finally, it may be noted
that although the market supplying the basic polypropylene polymer is
oligopolistic, the pressure of competition and the balance between
supply and demand in recent years has meant that raw material price
increases have frequently been absorbed by petrochemical manufactur-
22ers rather than passed on to feedstock users.
Finally in this section, it would have been useful to have been
able to trace the changing composition of jute industry output by
reference to different end uses. This would have indicated clearly
the decline of various jute end-use markets and the reaction to this
on the part of manufacturers in terms of moving into other areas.
Unfortunately such data over the period of this study are scarce and 
23unsatisfactory. One of the firms in the industry, Scott &
Robertson, has published in its Annual Reports a breakdown of end-
use markets. These indicate the upward trend in floorcovering uses,
a roughly similar pattern in agriculture, and a falling off under the
24headings of Building, Chemicals, and Food. This end-use analysis,
however, refers to the total product output of the firm - both jute 
and synthetics - and is thus of little value in tracing developments 
in jute alone when the proportions of jute and synthetics output were
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themselves changing significantly over the period. Only one 
reliable and relevant source in the area of end uses of jute 
appears to exist. This is reproduced below, and is derived from a 
World Bank survey. The first table below applies to the U.K., and 
the latter is given for purposes of comparison.
The most obvious feature of the data in Table 2.2 is the absolute 
and proportional reduction in the importance of packaging and sacking 
end uses for jute over the period; and in respect of the U.K. this 
extends to carpet backing cloth in absolute terms. Output in the 
U.K. in respect of the first three output classes in Table 2.2 declined 
by 54%, 52% and 28% over the period. More surprising is the 58% 
expansion in the use of jute carpet backing cloth within the 
"developed countries", which can only be accounted for by the contin­
ued use of jute as a primary backing cloth for tufted carpets in some 
economies, and the expansion of its use as a secondary backing. To 
this extent the experience of the U.K. appears to have differed from 
that of other jute manufacturing countries.
In summary, the traditional Dundee jute industry has seen demand 
for its output fall due to a rapid contraction of demand on the part 
of one major user in the 1950's and 1960's (linoleum), a more gradual 
erosion of its "transporting" use in the face of new products (paper 
and polyethylene containers) and techniques (bulk handling and 
containerisation), and a very rapid loss of its carpet backing (and 
even woven carpet yarn) market to polypropylene in the late 1960's 
and early 1970's. Competition for jute has been on the basis of 
price and technology, and as considered in the Conclusions of this
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Table 2.2
United Kingdom: Estimated Consumption of Jute and Jute Goods by 
Major End uses
1965 1968 1970 1971
'0 0 0
tonnes %
'0 0 0
tonnes %
'0 0 0
tonnes %
'0 0 0
tonnes %
Bags and sacks 35.0 2 1 31.0 20 2 0 .0 17 16.0 15
Other packaging, 
industrial etc. 
uses 52.0 31 44.0 28 36.0 30 25.0 23
Carpet backing 
cloth 23.0 14 26.5 17 18.0 15 16.5 15
Carpet yarn 48.5 29 45.8 29 38.0 32 42.0 39
Cordage, cable etc. 5.0 3 5.0 3 4.0 3 3.5 3
Felts and padding 4.0 2 4.0 3 4.0 3 4.0 4
167.5 10 0 156.3 10 0 1 2 0 . 0 10 0 107.0 99*
* due to rounding.
Source: Grilli, E.R. et al., Jute and the Synthetics, I.B.R.D.
Staff Working Paper, No. 171, 1964 Annex II, p.35.
Developed Countries : Estimated Consumption of Jute and, Jute Goods
by Major End Uses
1965 1968 1970 1971
'0 0 0
tonnes %
'0 0 0
tonnes %
'0 0 0
tonnes %
’ 000
tonnes %
Bags and sacks 578 42 566 40 445 35 360 32
Other packaging, 
industrial etc. 
uses 350 25 297 2 1 255 20 2 2 1 20
Carpet backing 
cloth 174 13 246 17 265 2 1 275 25
Carpet yarn 125 9 118 9 105 8 104 9
Cordage, cable etc. 88 6 84 5 84 7 78 7
Felts and padding 70 5 109 8 104 8 70 6
1,385 10 0 1,420 10 0 1,258 99* 1,108 99*
* due to rounding.
Source: Grilli, E.R. et al., Jute and the Synthetics, I.B.R.D.
Staff Working Paper, No. 171, 1974, p.6 .
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chapter and also in Chapter III the approach of the local industry 
as a whole has been quite complex. It appears to have accepted the 
long-term rundown of the jute industry as inevitable; and rather 
than offer price competition to new products, the profits of jute's 
last years were invested in the new competitive technology itself.
C. Analysis of Market Structure
Market structure is analysed here because of its importance in 
determining the conduct or behaviour and performance of the industry, 
and because changes in the structure of the industry are also the 
outcome of fundamental changes in the market.
With regard to the statistics, it should be emphasised in 
dealing with market structure below that the data are used to analyse 
the changes in market structure as a whole in the industry over the 
period studied, and are not designed to measure market concentration 
alone - although the latter is, of course, of considerable interest. 
It is for this reason, and also because none of the sources of 
information is itself entirely satisfactory, that a range of types 
of data has been used. Thus the Census figures (Tables 2.4 and 
2.5) give us grouped data on employment; while trade association 
data provide not only figures on the number of decision-making units 
in the industry over the largest part of the period studied, but also 
break these down into size classes by employment (Tables 2.6 - 2.8).
These points regarding the purpose of the data, plus the fact 
that the figures often do not lend themselves to any more powerful
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statistical analysis, explain why certain calculations have not
been made. Thus Adelman has criticised the use of "Lorenz type"
measurements in general to indicate changes in market concentration
where the number of firms in the industry is changing - as is
obviously the case in this study. This Adelman points out,
produces a situation where, using a Gini Coefficient for example,
market concentration appears to fall following the exit of a number 
25of small firms. Two more recent authors have also particularly
emphasised the misleading interpretation regarding market concen­
tration to which changes in the variance of the logarithms of firm
26sizes are open when the total of the population is changing.
Broad changes in industry structure:
With regard to aggregated data, Census of Production figures 
can be used to give a very broad idea of the most important changes 
in the structure of the jute industry since 1945. The most unfortun­
ate aspect of this data is the changes in the basis and classificat­
ion of the material over the period, and this leads to a lack of 
comparability between sets of figures.
The first interesting statistic is the decline in the number of 
large enterprises in the industry: defined as those employing 25
persons or more.
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Table 2.3
Number of Large Enterprises in the Jute Industry
1954 47 1971 28
1958 48 1973 30*
1963 32 1975 24*
1968 28 1976 25*
1970 25 1977 2 1**
* More than 20 persons ** More than 50 persons
Note : The data in this table are subject to the same problem as 
those in Table 2.5 below because enterprises are recorded 
in more than one employment size category if they have 
establishments in more than one such class.
Source: Department of Industry, Census of Production PA415.
Of themselves of course the above data may be an amalgam of a 
picture of decline in the industry and of increased market concen­
tration. However, further examination of Sales data from Census 
figures shows that these larger enterprises have accounted for a 
fairly consistent 95% of total industry sales over the period. To 
the extent that this particular size category of firm was not in­
creasing its share of a declining output further analysis within 
this group is necessary.
The data in the 1951 Census of Production reflect the position
27of the industry in the immediate post-war period. Unfortunately
the major data relate to "establishments", i.e. basically plants,
28rather than to firms or enterprises. The other major problem
with the 1951 data is that a large part of the industry is accounted 
for by those eight establishments which employed 500 persons or more. 
These eight establishments (under 10%) accounted for some 35% of 
employment, 30% of gross output, and 35% of net output. We do not
58
know from the Census data, however, the pattern of ownership of
these and other establishments; and establishment distribution or
concentration obviously underestimates economic market power in an
29industry of multiplant ownership. The data certainly under­
state the market power of Jute Industries, which at one stage in
the 1920's was estimated to account for half of the Dundee jute 
30trade. The Jute Working Party data relating to 1946 show Jute
Industries to account for 24% of spindles and 20% of looms, followed 
by another firm with corresponding figures of 10% and 6% This 
source gives three-firm output concentration ratios (measured by 
capacity) in spinning and weaving of 41% and 32% respectively.
Nonetheless employment distribution on an establishment basis 
are available with some consistency up to 1963; and these reveal 
the following situation.
Table 2.4
Establishment Distribution by Employment*
Establishments
Numbers
Employed 1951 1954 1958 1963
11 - 99 18 19 18 6
100 - 199 23 29 9 1 2
200 - 299 15 1 1 8 4
300 - 399 ) q 6 9 5400 - 499 ) 3 ) 9500 - 749 g** 5 )
750 -1499 - 5 17 28
73 78 74 64
* includes only larger establishments - employing more than ten
persons.
** 500+
Source: Board of Trade, Census of Production, 1951, Vol.6 , Trade G;
1954, Vol. 6 , Trade H; 1958, Part 80; 1963, Part 79.
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Not surprisingly the above data show the falling off in the 
number of small establishments. Those employing fewer than 200 
persons accounted for 56% of establishments in 1951, but only 28% 
in 1963. Correspondingly, those employing 300 or more persons 
rose from 23% in 1951 to 6 6% in 1963; and between 1954 and 1963 
the proportion of plants employing 750 persons or more rose from 6% 
to 44%.
From 1958 onwards Census data provided employment breakdown on 
an enterprise basis. These are presented in Table 2.5 below.
Table 2.5
Jute Industry Enterprise Distribution by Employment
Enterprises
Numbers
Employed 1958* 1963* 1968 1970 1972 1973 1975 1976 1977
1 - 99 18 5 25 22 19 23 22 24 24
100 - 199 9 1 0 1 0 9 8 1 0 1 0 7 8
200 - 299 6 4 1 1 9 7 7 5 5 3
300 - 399 6 3 4 6** 3*** 3*** g** 4** * 4***
400 - 749 6 5 C - - - - - -750 - 4999 3 5 o - 4**** 4**** _ 3**** 3****
48 32 55 46 41 47 43 43 42
(64) (44) (43) (43) (35) (38) (40) (39) (37)
* firms employing 25 or more persons
** 300+
*** 300-499
**** 500+
Note: The figures in brackets for each year represent in all cases
the total number of enterprises in the industry. The 
figures immediately above are larger for 1968-1977 because 
enterprises may classify themselves in more than one size 
group on the basis of having estab1 ishments in more than one 
size group.
Sources: Board of Trade/Department of Industry, Census of Production, 
1958, Part 80; 1963, Part 79; 1968, Part 102; 1970, Part 
C102; 1972-77, Business Monitor PA415.
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Enterprise data, as indicated above, enable us to say something 
much more meaningful about the economic power structure in the indus­
try. In general those in Table 2.5 indicate, within their limits, 
the reduction in numbers among the small and medium sized firms, and 
the possible growing dominance of the industry by the largest firms.
However, whereas it was useful to note previously the increased 
proportion of establishments above a certain employment size, this 
interesting statistic may be misleading so far as firms or enter­
prises are concerned, as one would expect the distribution of firm 
sizes in any industry to be characterised by a large number of small- 
to-medium sized firms and a very small proportion of large businesses 
accounting for a dominant share of the market. In fact the general 
finding is that in statistical terms the size distribution of firms 
is log-normal. ^
What one would wish to measure is the degree of homogeneity 
(low variance or standard deviation) of firm size or log of firm 
size, and so more even distribution of market shares or otherwise. 
Industries becoming more concentrated would thus tend to be charac­
terised by a rising standard deviation of the distribution of firm 
sizes. Unfortunately the Census of Production data above do not 
lend themselves to this analysis because of the changing size 
classes over the period of analysis, and the open-ended nature of 
the top size class.
Given the relatively unsatisfactory nature of the Census data, 
further investigation using trade statistics was carried out. These
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data are of two types. The former allows us to analyse the size
distribution of firms. The latter, although merely a measure of
the total number of firms in the industry, does have the advantage 
of covering the whole of the study period as well as telling us 
something of the number of individual decision-making units in the 
market.
In the first category (size distribution and concentration 
data) there are two pieces of data. The first of these merely en­
ables us to confirm the market concentration which was taking place 
in the industry from 1945 until the early 1960's. Further data 
provided by the international trade association, however, allow us 
to take the analysis somewhat further over a shorter period.
At the time of the industry's defence of its restrictive 
trading agreement before the Restrictive Practices Court in 1962 it 
was pointed out that over the period 1947 to 1962 the number of 
spinning firms in the industry had fallen from 26 to 18, and that of 
weavers from 36 to 24. With regard to market concentration, it 
was shown on the same occasion that the proportion of raw jute con­
sumed by the 7 largest spinners had risen from 63.8% to 70.7% over 
the period; and in weaving the proportion of looms owned by the 7 
largest weavers had risen over the same period from 49.3% to 58.6%. 
What is also revealed by the data at this time is the continued 
dominance of the industry by Jute Industries. This was still by 
far the largest firm in 1962 with an estimated 5,500-6,000 employees;
and was only followed at some distance by a group of five or six
33firms, each employing 750-1,500 persons.
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Table 2.6
U.K. Jute Industry: Size Distribution of Firms by Employment
Size
-50 51-100 101-500 501-1,000 1,001+ Total
1957 2 9 23 5 3 42
1958 2 12 16 5 2 37
1959 2 12 16 5 2 37
1960 2 10 15 5 2 34
1961 3 9 15 5 2 34
1962 2 8 15 5 2 32
1963 2 6 16 5 2 31
1964 2 7 15 5 2 31
1965 2 6 15 4 2 28
1966 2 6 14 4 2 28
1967 2 6 14 4 2 28
1968 2 6 14 4 2 28
1969 2 4 14 4 2 26
1970 2 3 13 4 2 24
1971 2 2 11 3 2 20
1972 1 2 11 3 2 19
1973 1 2 11 3 2 19
1974 1 2 10 3 2 18
1975 1 2 8 3 2 16
1976 1 2 7 2 3 15
1977 1 2 6 2 3 14
Data refer to members of the Association of Jute Spinners and Manu-
facturers.
Difference between the Total column of this Table and that in
Table 2.8 may be accounted for by the ■timing and definition bases
of the two sets of data which are from slightly different sources.
Source : Association of European Jute Industries Statistical Year-
book. (Paris: A.E.J.I.).
Unfortunately even these data are not perfect. There appears 
in particular to be some confusion over the identity of the firms in 
the 1 ,001+ employment range. From 1968 to 1977 (1968 was the first 
year for which individual company employment data were revealed in 
company Annual Reports) four firms would appear to qualify for in­
clusion in this category: Sidlaw, Low & Bonar, Scott & Robertson,
and Don Bros. Buist. Low & Bonar may have been excluded on the
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grounds that jute was only a small part of its total output (around 
10% in the mid 1960's according to a senior executive), although the 
company was a member of the A.J.S.M. until 1975, and had an esti­
mated 10-15% of the industry's output in the mid 1960's. The 
employment position of the four firms was as follows.
Table 2.7
Employment
Sidlaw*
Low & 
Bonar*
Scott & 
Robertson**
Don Br< 
Buist*
1968 5,104 2,788 2,573 1,140
1969 4,963 2,702 2,414 1,103
1970 4,625 2,519 2,124 1,097
1971 3,721 2,295 1,758 1,088
1972 4,669 2,209 1,490 1,070
1973 4,618 2,319 1,530 1,064
1974 4,315 2,283 1,702 1,061
1975 4,177 2,067 1,555 1,053
1976 3,844 2,474 1,287 1,049
1977 3,445 4,112 1,276 1,096
* total U.K. employees 
** excludes "associated" companies .
Source : Company Annual Reports & Accounts.
What the data in Tables 2.6 and 2.7 do, however, illustrate is 
not only the dominance of this particular industry by a small group 
of relatively large firms, but also the way in which the industry 
was restructured and the impact upon different size classes of 
firms of the decline of the traditional market for jute. Most 
obviously the middle size classes appear to have been worst 
affected by the market decline. Those firms which in 1957 had 
51-500 employees suffered by far the greatest drop in their number 
- and in the case of those in the 101-500 employees group the drop 
was particularly rapid during the time of the industry's transition
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to polypropylene after the late 1960's.
Relating purely to the number of firms in the industry, we have
data on membership of the jute trade association from 1945 to 1977.
Membership of the Association of Jute Spinners and Manufacturers is
not comprehensive so far as the trade is concerned. Nonetheless it
was estimated that in 1962 membership covered 100% of spinning
capacity (apart from two small English spinners) and 90% of loom- 
34age. The data in Table 2.8 below refer to full (as opposed to
associate) membership of the Association. This is felt to be more 
appropriate, as associate members include textile machinery manu­
facturers; but it has had the effect of eliminating a few local 
firms which were acquired by larger concerns in the 1960's, and thus 
understates both the rate of contraction of the industry and also
35the extent of acquisition by larger firms of smaller competitors.
Table 2.8
Full Members of the Association of Jute Spinners & Manufacturers*
1945 39 1956 40 1967 30
1946 39 1957 40 1968 29
1947 39 1958 40 1969 29
1948 37 1959 38 1970 25
1949 38 1960 33 1971 21
1950 38 1961 33 1972 16
1951 38 1962 31 1973 16
1952 40 1963 30 1974 16
1953 40 1964 30 1975 16
1954 40 1965 30 1976 15
1955 40 1966 30 1977 14
* Data as at February of each year.
Source : A .J.S.M.:, Association Yearbook.
The figures above confirm our picture of an industry whose
65
decline set in during the mid 1960's and accelerated by the early 
1970's. Apart from a sudden increase in the number of dis­
appearances in 1959, when three firms were acquired by other 
members of the industry and two simply went out of business, the 
number of independent firms fell quite steadily by almost 25% from 
1945 to 1967. From this latter date onwards, however, the number 
of firms halved in a decade. It is thus during this latter period 
that there has been the greatest adjustment. Some of the reduction 
in Association membership over this period reflects continuing 
firms leaving the jute industry. Low & Bonar, Caird, and Thomson 
Shepherd all fall into this category. Ignoring for a moment the 
merger of Unijute and James Scott, dealt with below, this leaves a 
total of twelve firms which actually went out of independent 
existence between 1967 and 1977. Of these firms seven were family 
businesses which ceased to exist due to a combination of the im­
pact of the rapid falling off in demand in the industry and the 
absence of family succession. The remaining five were acquired by 
other larger firms within the industry, with no single firm playing 
a dominant role in this process.
Mergers and acquisitions:
There are broadly two types of change which are responsible for 
movements in market structure over time: these are "deaths" and
"acquisitions". The former occur as firms cease manufacture; the 
latter are brought about by takeover. It is not always possible, 
however, to distinguish clearly between these two, as some 
businesses may be acquired and rapidly closed down by the new parent.
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In this case what appears to have been an acquisition may in reality 
have been a death.
The contraction of the jute industry has produced not only a. sig­
nificant merger, but also a series of acquisitions of smaller 
businesses by the larger existing firms in the market, as well as a 
number of deaths or disappearances by minor companies. Undoubtedly 
the major amalgamation of the period was the merger between Robertson 
Industrial Textiles (which traded as Unijute) and The Mid Wynd 
Holding Co. (whose two principal operating subsidiaries were James 
Scott & Sons and Thomas Boag & Co.). This merger took place in 
April 1965; and although Scott and Boag were the dominant concerns,
with a joint capital of £1,363,047 in contrast to Robertson's
36£552,989, the joint group became known as Scott & Robertson.
It has been estimated that a few years earlier the Mid Wynd Holding
37Co. was the second largest spinner and weaver of jute in the U.K.; 
and by the time of the presentation of the first set of combined 
asset figures for Scott & Robertson the total assets were in excess 
of £5m. compared with Jute Industries' £6.5m. These asset figures, 
however, may overstate the market position of Scott & Robertson 
relative to Jute Industries. The employment data in Table 2.7 
suggest a greater dominance by Jute Industries; and estimates within 
the trade suggest that by the mid-to-late 1960's Jute Industries 
still had some 45% of jute sales as against just over 20% for Scott 
& Robertson. This type of merger, nonetheless, and the growth of 
such firms as Caird (Dundee), H. & A. Scott and others in the middle 
range, meant that the very largest businesses were beginning to lose 
some part of their earlier hegemony, particularly as some of the former
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giants, in the industry - notably Low & Bonar - were becoming less 
solely committed to the jute industry.
The 1960's was also a time during which the larger spinners and 
manufacturers were buying up smaller firms. By some people in the 
industry this has been explained in terms of a shortage of good 
labour, and therefore the quest to find a suitable workforce rather 
than additional plant. There is no doubt, however, from the way in 
which these acquisitions have been subsequently "rationalised" or 
simply closed down that a process of takeover of small firms and their 
subsequent closure was felt to be a more "orderly" method by which the 
industry as a whole could contract its capacity into line with falling 
demand. The alternative might have been the continued existence of 
small mills and factories, offering goods at minimal prices on the 
basis of assets already fully depreciated, and forcing similar price 
concessions on the part of other firms. Sidlaw Industries, for 
example, acquired a number of smaller spinning and weaving enter­
prises over the period from the late 1950's to the mid 1960's, 
including D. & R. Duke of Brechin, John Lowson of Forfar, Alex 
Henderson & Sons, Tayport Spinning Co., and more recently South 
Mills (Textiles) in Dundee. Also into this category of adjustment 
fall James Scott's earlier acquisition of Mitchell Cotts, Caird's 
purchase of Alex Moncur, and J. & D. Wilkie's acquisition of fellow 
Kirriemuir spinner Ogilvie Bros, in 1971.
One interesting characteristic of the falling off in demand for 
jute in the 1960's was the acquisition by manufacturers of merchanting 
firms. In depressed times in the past these selling organisations had
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acquired a reputation for squeezing prices down to very low levels. 
Partly to avoid this situation, and more positively to try to cap­
ture additional outlets for yarn and cloth, a number of producers 
engaged in forward vertical integration. In the mid 1960's, for 
example, H. & A. Scott acquired Alex Laurie, Caird acquired Thomas 
Manning, and Wm. Halley acquired three merchants in one year :
Godfrey, Behrens, and Swinton in 1964. In one notable case the 
initiative for vertical integration came from the merchanting side.
In 1960 Low Bros., a firm of Dundee merchants, took the initiative 
in creating an enlarged group comprising one of their customers - 
the Forfar firm of Don Bros. Buist. The firm subsequently expanded 
horizontally in the jute trade by acquiring the Brechin firm of J. &
J. Smart. A further recent (1978) step in backward vertical inte­
gration has been the group's acquisition of Thiokol, the major local 
supplier of extruded polypropylene for tape weaving.
Vertical Integration :
This latter pattern of acquisitions outlined above has helped to
produce a situation where an increasing proportion of the jute trade
is in the hands of vertically-integrated businesses. The proportion
so covered in 1946 was put at around 77% in spinning and 65% in
38weaving by the 1948 Board of Trade Report. The Restrictive
Practices Court was informed in 1962 that 73% of Dundee jute product­
ion was accounted for by firms which had spinning, weaving and
39merchanting departments; and the fact that most of the company
deaths of the late 1960's and early 1970's were amongst non-integrated 
weaving firms contributed further to this trend.
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The data in Table 2.9 below show for the period 1954-1977 the 
number of firms falling into various categories of vertical inte­
gration.
Table 2.9
Vertical Integration in U.K. Jute Industry 1954-1977 (No. of Firms)
Spinner-
Spinner- Weavers/
Weavers Spinners Weavers Total Total
1954 16 12 22 50 32%
1955 16 11 14 41 39%
1956 18 10 14 42 43%
1957 17 9 14 40 43%
1958 15 7 13 35 43%
1959 15 7 13 35 43%
1960 15 6 11 32 47%
1961 15 5 11 31 48%
1962 15 5 10 30 50%
1963 15 5 9 29 52%
1964 14 6 9 29 48%
1965 13 5 9 27 48%
1966 13 5 8 26 50%
1967 13 5 8 26 50%
1968 13 5 8 26 50%
1969 13 5 6 24 54%
1970 12 5 5 22 55%
1971 11 4 3 18 61%
1972 11 4 3 18 61%
1973 12 4 3 19 63%
1974 9 5 3 17 53%
1975 9 4 2 15 60%
1976 8 3 3 14 57%1977 8 3 3 14 57%
Source : Association of European Jute Industries Statistical Year'
book (Paris: A.E.J.I.). It may be noted that for no
obvious reason the data in the Total column of Table 2.9
do not exactly correspond with those in Table 2.6 above.
The other piece of information revealed by Table 2.9 is the 
different death rates of various categories of firms in the Table. 
Analysis of this (although it does not fully take account of mig­
ration from one category to another in the Table) reveals the 
following.
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Table 2.10
Analysis of Death Rates of Firm Categories in Table 2.9
Spinner-
Weavers Spinners Weavers Total
1954-1977
1967-1977
50%
38%
75%
40%
86%
63%
72%
46%
Source: Table 2.9
The data in Table 2.10 confirm the considerably higher death 
rates among non-integrated firms (especially weavers) compared with 
integrated businesses, particularly over the period 1967-1977.
The company accounting data used for the statistical tests 
carried out in Chapters III and IV were also employed at this stage 
to measure changes in the degree of vertical integration among the 
surviving firms who were full members of the A.J.S.M. and for whom 
the necessary accounting data were available over the period 1968- 
1977. There were 15 such firms, and it is only over this shorter 
period that U.K. company law has provided for the disclosure of the 
necessary information to calculate the extent of vertical inte­
gration at this level. The measure of vertical integration used
40is the ratio of value added to sales; and the data were abstract­
ed from the company accounts. Value added was measured as wages
(including directors' remuneration) plus gross trading profits; that
• , 41is, the value added was calculated as sales minus raw materials.
The 10-year average ratios of value added to sales varied
i
considerably across the 15 firms. The 15-firm average was 31.0%;
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but the ratios varied from 16.2% (Low & Bonar Group) to 45.2%
(J. & D. Wilkie), reflecting possibly the merchanting and electrical 
engineering activity of the former, and the integrated jute spinning 
and weaving of the latter. For each of the 15 firms, and also in 
respect of the 15-firm average, the 10-year series of vertical inte­
gration ratios was measured against time and time squared in order 
to test on a parametric and nonparametric basis for any trend in
vertical integration over time. In order to gauge broadly the
2evidence of such a trend the coefficient of determination (R ) and
the rank correlation coefficient (Rho) between the ratios and both
time and time squared were calculated. The average proportion of
the variation in vertical integration accounted for by time across
the 15 firms on this simple univariate basis was 17.8%, although in
2only five cases was R greater than 0.25 (and in two of these cases
the correlation was negative while in three it was positive).
Applying the test of rank correlation there were only three cases
where the coefficient Rho was significant at 5%. Similarly in the
case of the regression of the vertical integration ratios and time
2squared the average R was 0.219. There was no evidence from the 
full regression analysis and the rank correlation of the 15-firm 
unweighted average vertical integration ratio against time or time 
squared that any change had occurred over the period 1968-1977.
The fate of smaller businesses:
As mentioned earlier, there has been a number of cases of indi­
vidual businesses going into liquidation. This happened towards the 
end of the 1960's, and affected in particular smaller, non-integrated
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weaving concerns. In order to examine this question of "deaths" etc. 
in the industry over the period of the late 1960's and early 1970's 
in a little more detail a search was undertaken at Companies House 
in Edinburgh in respect of those businesses which went out of
42independent existence over this period. There were 12 such firms.
As was noted previously a number of small firms was acquired by 
large businesses. These included D. & R. Duke of Brechin acquired 
by Sidlaw in 1959 and added to by John Lowson Jr. of Forfar in 1962, 
and Ogilvie Bros, of Kirriemuir acquired by J. & D. Wilkie in 1971. 
Both of these firms were quite small. In 1968 Duke & Lowson employed 
only 300 people, while in the same year Ogilvie Bros, employed 192.
Voluntary liquidation was, however, the most common form of 
corporate death. Most of those involved were small family 
businesses. W. G. Grant, for example, despite some attempt at 
diversification into the building products industry went into 
voluntary liquidation in 1972, having employed 380 people in 1970. 
Douglas Fraser & Sons of Arbroath, which in 1967 had a capital 
employed of over Elm. followed the same path at an earlier date in 
January 1968. These businesses were among the larger concerns to 
be eliminated during this period. Others were very much smaller 
non-integrated concerns specialising in weaving. T.L. Miller, 
for example, with capital employed in 1968 of only £47,458, ceased 
jute manufacturing in 1971. The firm continued in business with its 
merchanting activities, although making considerable losses, only 
until 1976 when it went into voluntary liquidation. A very similar 
situation applied in the case of R. G. Kennedy & Co. (Textiles).
The company had a capital employed of £60,000 in 1968; and while it
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had experienced losses for a number of years from the mid to late 
1960's it did not go into liquidation until 1971. Don & Duncan, 
another non-integrated weaving concern, was slightly larger with a 
capital employed of £157,773 in 1968. This firm, which had 
previously manufactured jute sacking, bagging and tarpaulins, went 
into liquidation in 1970. These few details would again seem to 
confirm the exposed position of the small weaving concerns during 
this period of change in the traditional industry.
In summary, the most obvious change in market structure has 
been that the number of firms originally in the local jute industry 
declined as the market as a whole contracted. This decline was 
especially rapid during the period 1967-1977; it affected partic­
ularly firms in the middle size category (employing 51-500 persons); 
and by far the largest "organisational" category of firms to dis­
appear were the non-integrated businesses, particularly weavers. 
Mergers or acquisitions were a characteristic of the industry. In 
one notable case this involved a coming together of two firms each 
previously in the middle-size category. In other cases smaller 
businesses were acquired by much larger concerns. Deaths in the 
industry occurred because of a failure to adapt to the new industrial 
textiles conditions, or an absence of family successors in the 
business. Despite case histories of individual businesses pursuing 
a policy of vertical integration, there is no statistical evidence 
that increased integration was a general characteristic of the 
industry over the period 1968-1977. The decline of traditional 
jute manufacturing thus produced a more compact and possibly concen­
trated industry as a number of smaller, non-integrated constituents
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of the market disappeared. The decline in the number of plants per 
firm also reinforces this impression of compactness. The ratio of 
establishments to enterprises in the industry, which in the 1958,
1963 and 1968 Census of Production reports stood at 1.41, 1.73 and 
1.72 respectively, fell to an average of 1.18 during the period 1970- 
1977, suggesting that even allowing for the incidence of smaller firms 
being taken over by larger ones, the industry was rationalising itself 
so far as eliminating multi-plant operations was concerned.
D. Further Changes in Market Environment
In addition to data on the formal structure of the industry and 
changes therein, it is important to be aware of changes in the struct­
ural environment of the market which were also taking place throughout 
the 1960's. There were two such elements in the industry over this 
period. First, the degree of import protection administered by Jute 
Control, and the issue of import protection in general. Second, the 
operation of the industry's restrictive trading agreements.
Jute Control ;
Jute Control functioned to protect the Dundee industry in three
ways. First, there was a complete ban on the import of non-standard
goods except for carpet yams - "excluded goods". This lasted until
1964; and in respect of 1962 it was estimated that the ban afforded
43absolute protection to 80% of total U.K. jute goods production.
Second, there was a system of full import price equation which raised 
the price of imported Indian jute goods to an ex-works level thought to
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be equal to that of an efficient Dundee manufacturer. Third, a 
system of partial protection was applied after 1957 to a range of 
goods thereafter known as the Depressed Range. Following represent­
ations by the Indian government and producers, certain imported jute 
goods formerly sold by Control at fully equated prices were sold at a 
fixed markup. This markup was originally set at 30% in 1957 - 
compared with the former equated price level equivalent markup of 47%. 
The Depressed Range largely comprised standard Hessians for bag 
making; and the markup originally set at 30% was reduced in 1960 to 
20%, and again in 1963 to 10%. The Dundee industry was also, of 
course, protected by means of a normal range of tariffs from non- 
Commonwealth jute imports, although these were of little significance.
So far as the degree of import protection was concerned, there 
was throughout the period of the 1950's and 1960's a general reduction 
in the shelter which Control was able to offer the industry from 
Indian competition. As outlined in Chapter I, the war-time system 
of Control was continued with only minor modifications until 1954, when 
trading in raw jute was returned to private hands. Imported jute 
goods, however, remained under Control and these were sold at equated 
or markup prices, which were held to represent prices with which an 
efficient Dundee manufacturer could compete. The actual markup 
depended upon the class of goods; and while for some categories held 
to be of importance to the continuance of the Dundee industry the mark­
up was maintained at 45% until the termination of the whole system in 
May 1969, there were some ranges where the markup had been reduced to 
20% in 1960, and some categories (e.g. heavy sacks) where the only 
protection was a very limited quota system.
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In August 1963, a major change was instituted by which previously
excluded goods, that is goods in respect of which the Dundee industry
had hitherto enjoyed complete protection, were to be imported by
Control and marked up by 50%. At the same time the markup on common
44Hessians was further reduced from 20% to 10%. A year later, in
September 1964, the markup on these Hessians was eliminated, and
arrangements were made for trade in them to be returned to private
hands; while, in respect of those goods previously marked up at 50%,
the markup was reduced to 45% in some cases, and to around 35% in 
45others. From May 1969 Jute Control's function of marking up the
prices of imported jute goods was terminated; and was replaced by a
quota system which placed purely physical limits on the import of such
- 46goods.
Following the entry of the U.K. into the E.E.C. in 1973 new Jute
Arrangements were concluded which preserved the position of India and
Bangladesh vis-a-vis Britain. The common external tariff applied by
existing E.E.C. members to such imports continued to apply, but at a
reduced rate. Absolute import quotas, however, also apply to the
remainder of the E.E.C. countries, and are the sole source of protection
for U.K. manufacturers. Currently the level of these is part of the
discussions within the context of the Multi Fibre Arrangement between
47the E.E.C. and the developing countries of the Far East.
Opinions have varied as to the impact of this protection and its 
removal on the Dundee industry. On the one hand it could be argued 
that other changes were taking place which had the effect of ousting 
jute from traditional market areas and which import restrictions
77
could do little to mitigate. Such, for example, may have been the 
case with the increased use of paper or polythene bags. There was 
also little which any form of import protection could do to reduce 
the trend to bulk transporting or containerisation of the 1960's.
On the other hand the trade felt it was necessary to maintain a degree 
of protection for Dundee manufacturers. What tended to happen, the 
industry feared, was that as protection was "lowered" in one range of 
goods so manufacturers of technically adjacent goods suffered. The 
final impact, it might thus be argued, of one reduction in markup 
would be felt across other grades of cloth where markup had not been 
altered.
Appendix Tables 2.4 and 2.5 indicate the level of import penetrat­
ion for jute yarn and cloth respectively for the period 1951-1977.
From these one might have expected to be able to detect some influence 
of the various changes in the degree of import protection offered by 
Jute Control. Looking at the 3-year moving average data in particular, 
for yarn these indicate an unusual pattern of a fall in import pene­
tration up to the late 1950's, a rise from this time until a peak of 
3.4% in the mid 1960's, after which the figures fall off to a slightly 
lower plateau of 1.5%-2.5% for the remainder of the period. With 
regard to jute goods, a more obvious pattern emerges, although not one 
which might have been expected in the light of Control regulations.
In the case of cloth, import penetration fell from its 1951 level until 
a low point in the mid 1960's, from which it rose significantly - a 
rise which could be explained by the 1963 and 1964 reductions in im­
port protection. A further trend which appears significant is the 
rise in the level of cloth import penetration as the whole U.K. jute
7a
industry declined (see Appendix Table 2.7). This does not appear 
to have arisen from any change in the level of exports, which, 
excluding 1976, averaged around 14% of production for the 1970's, but 
from a rapid rise in the volume of imports themselves. It may be 
that this is further evidence of a point taken up again later in this 
chapter, that as the traditional jute industry seemed bound to decline 
significantly sooner or later as polypropylene increasingly ousted 
jute from successive previous end-use markets, U.K. jute manufacturers, 
who had significant interests in polypropylene, did not necessarily 
seek to fight any rearguard action on the part of jute in the dimension 
of price competition, but rather enjoyed what were acknowledged in­
evitably to be jute's last years. This absence of more aggressive 
competition in jute by Dundee producers as the jute industry declined 
may be an important explanation for the historically high and in­
creasing levels of import penetration in the 1970's in respect of 
cloth.
In addition to the more concrete arguments concerning import 
protection, a further not insignificant effect of Jute Control was 
that the whole system contributed to a cohesiveness within the industry, 
which must have broken down as Control's function was gradually elim­
inated. Thus:
"One further, very important consequence of protection must 
be mentioned. The system of equated prices, involving as 
it did the calculation and publication of a price at which 
imported goods were to be sold, facilitated the construction 
of price agreements among home producers, so that for an 
important part of production there was an absence of price 
competition, not only between Indian and Dundee goods, but  ^
also between the goods of one Dundee producer and another."
7 9
It is, of course, in this last sense that Control performed a 
function similar to that of the industry's trade pricing agreements. 
Insofar as this is true, then it may also have contributed to what a 
former member of the industry referred to as a "management desensitis- 
ation" over the years from 1945 to the early 1960's. This was, by 
implication, a period over which management was protected from the 
full impact of foreign competition, when domestic rivalry was simi­
larly muted, and when many small firm managements were relieved of 
having to make any real decisions upon pricing at all.
Trade pricing agreements :
As mentioned above, the other major change in the industry's
structural environment was the ending of the network of domestic
trade pricing agreements in March 1963 following a Restrictive Prac-
49tices Court decision. These had grown up along the system of
Control; and the argument for their retention was largely based upon 
the inability of Control fully to carry out its functions without the 
existence of the industry's own network of delivered common price 
agreements. Control had produced a situation during the war in 
which it was necessary to have common prices of jute goods in respect 
of imports and Dundee-produced goods, so that any jute goods user 
possessing the appropriate Certificate of Approval to obtain jute 
cloth or yarn should pay the same price regardless of whether Control 
allocated to him imported or home-produced goods. This means of 
ensuring an equitable allocation of scarce wartime goods was, as we 
know, extended after 1945 to become a system for protecting the 
Dundee industry from import competition. Such imports were sold
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through Control at a price which was "equated" or brought into line 
with that of a nationally efficient Dundee manufacturer; and the 
mechanism was later simplified by adopting a standard markup for 
various categories of imported jute goods. In order to arrive at 
"fair" equated prices both Control and the jute trade association 
employed independent firms of accountants to determine prices and to 
monitor manufacturer profitability.
In the industry's view, it was necessary to have, as an adjunct 
to the formal system of Control, a set of price agreements among dom­
estic producers. These agreements, in the words of the Low & Bonar 
chairman, were "the necessary lubricating oil which makes the unusual
and somewhat involved form of protection (i.e. Control) work smoothly 
50and efficiently". The chairman of Jute Industries further re­
flected the general view in the trade in stating, "We feel strongly 
that these agreements play an indispensable part in the general
structure of protection for the U.K. industry as an essential support
51for the operations of the Jute Control". It thus appears to
have been the industry's clear view that the intention of Control, 
safeguarded by strict monitoring of producer costs and profits, was 
to eliminate import and domestic competition. All that the seven 
registered trading agreements among domestic producers did was to 
translate Control's supervision of spinning and weaving ex-works 
prices into a common price system covering delivered prices and 
merchanting activities such as folding and baling of cloth. Without 
these additional arrangements "improper" price competition would have 
occurred among manufacturers. Thus in the words of the industry's 
most significant witness at the Restrictive Practices Court hearing :
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"We say that this is the case because were there no such 
complex of agreements to ensure uniform delivered prices 
to consumers, then the system of import and release of 
jute goods from India and from Pakistan which the Jute 
Control operates would be incomplete as a protective 
measure, would be frustrated in its intentions or would 
have to be discontinued by reason of difficulties which 
would arise; for, in the absence of agreements, partly 
owing to market fluctuations and partly because of the 
detailed method of pricing used by the Jute Control, im­
ported goods would be available to consumers (against 
the Jute Control's intentions) at prices lower than those 
which the Board of Trade acknowledges as appropriate to 
efficient United Kingdom producers."^2
In terms of the Act under which the case was decided upon the 
industry also argued that in the absence of their pricing agreements 
there would be a considerable reduction in the size of the industry; 
and given the significance of jute industry employment in Dundee - 
35% of manufacturing employees in the city - there would be a consid­
erable increase in unemployment in what was regarded as being a one- 
53industry town. In addition to these major points the industry
also argued that in the absence of the trading agreements jute goods 
users would face a reduction in the range of specialist goods 
available and an increase in their price, that the flexibility of 
having an industry on one's doorstep would be lost, that the level 
of users' stockholding would have to rise, and that the system of 
common price agreements not only saved customers time in not having 
to "shop around" to find the lowest price, but was also responsible 
for creating an environment which had encouraged manufacturers to 
invest considerable sums of money in new capital equipment which had 
an impact in keeping down price levels.
These arguments were, however, opposed by the Counsel for the
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Registrar of Restrictive Trading Agreements. He argued that the 
presence of the registered agreements prevented the most efficient 
firms or specialist merchants from expanding through price compet­
ition, and that fixed-price trading agreements sheltered high-cost 
producers, maintained excess capacity in the industry, and reduced 
the incentive to firms in general to seek out low-cost methods of 
manufacture. Finally, on 26th March, 1963, the Court under Lord 
Cameron gave its judgement. It did not believe that the delivered- 
price agreements were a necessary adjunct to Jute Control to prevent 
an undue contraction of the industry. it did not accept that 
administratively Control would find it impossible to arrive at correct 
equated or markup prices without the trade association agreements; 
nor was the Court convinced that the abandonment of the agreements 
would necessarily bring about a significant increase in unemployment 
in the area. As a result of this finding by the Court the agree­
ments ceased to operate from that date.
What should not be lost sight of in the midst of the detailed 
material above is the potential impact of these changes on the indus­
try. The relaxation of import controls and the abolition of the 
trading agreements obviously increased the degree of international 
and domestic competition faced by Dundee producers. One would, 
therefore, expect pressure upon smaller marginal firms - often non- 
integrated concerns - to increase. These businesses could either 
cease production altogether or accept an offer of acquisition by a 
larger company. Either alternative would lead not only to a slimming 
down of the industry but also to increased market concentration.
Such increased concentration might also follow from the freedom for
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competitive pricing among domestic producers in the absence of trade 
pricing agreements. Given the larger financial resources, and 
possibly also the greater efficiency of the larger as opposed to the 
smallest firms, the former would benefit from any increased price 
competition in terms of improved market share. Finally, the un­
certainty of the new competitive environment of the early 1960's 
might have been expected to lead to more forward integration in the 
market, to a reduced commitment to long-term capital projects in the 
jute industry, and, for some businesses, to a positive plan to 
diversify into market areas offering more profits, growth or 
security.
Assessment:
Very little work has been done by way of assessing the outcome
specifically of the ending of protection or the trading agreements
in the industry. The view of McDowall et al. was that "It is
probably no exaggeration to say that only the Jute Control with its
import bans and markups stood between the British jute industry and
54virtual extinction in the 1950's and early 1960's". Regarding
the outcome of the ending of the trading agreements, spokesmen of
the trade feared that "their rejection by the Court would create a
55difficult situation"; while the feeling in the industry after
the Court's decision was that a considerable strain had thereby been
placed upon individual firms by each having subsequently to make
56economic decisions within its own commercial environment. With
regard to import protection, although the total withdrawal of the sys­
tem by 1960 may well have had a considerable impact upon the Dundee
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industry, the fact is that the system was very gradually dismantled
over more than a decade from 1954 to 1969. This was a decade, too,
during which there were other significant changes taking place within
the industry. This was particularly the case in respect of technical
substitution in former jute end-use markets; and this situation led
the industry's N.E.D.C. to conclude that "any increase in (jute)
imports following quota revisions is likely (in its impact) to be
small compared to the inroads into the domestic market made by poly- 
57propylene". In respect of the ending of the manufacturers'
common pricing agreements in 1963, more research has been carried out. 
The results, however, are inconclusive as regards attributing any sub­
sequent events specifically to this cause. Hamilton, in his thesis 
on this aspect of the industry, points to the geographical concentrat­
ion of the market, the continuation of the function of Control after 
1963, the healthy state of demand from carpet manufacturers up to
1967, the general absence of excess capacity among producers, the
58operation of an informal information agreement, and the role of the 
largest firms as price leaders. All of these conditions, the author 
concludes, served to dilute the pro-competitive impact of the Restrict­
ive Practices Court's decision; and his "principal conclusion" was
that the Court decision "had little or no impact upon the jute 
59industry". These two events must, however, be seen as contribut­
ing to the generally changed environment of the jute industry over the 
1960's; and although it is recognised that it would be difficult to 
ascribe particular consequences to either of them alone, this does 
not mean to say that their impact upon the industry can be ignored.
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E. Conclusions
This chapter has dealt with the two principal changes in structure 
in the traditional Dundee jute industry over the past 20 or 30 years.
These were analysed under the headings of changing markets (Section B), 
and changes in structure - narrowly and broadly defined - (Sections 
C and D) above.
The context of this whole study is one of the decline of a tradit- 
itonal fibre market as the data in Table 2.1 indicate. One can see the 
causes of this in three distinct areas. Declining use of products with 
which jute was associated, and upon which it was at one time heavily 
dependent (linoleum); displacement of jute from use in a market where 
the jute-user product has continued to be successful (tufted carpets, 
where woven polypropylene has taken over as the primary backing 
material and where polypropylene is also displacing jute in woven 
carpets); and elimination of jute itself as a means of directly ful­
filling certain functions (the case of jute bags and wrappings being 
displaced by bulk handling and containerisation). These changes 
came about at different times, at different speeds, and for different 
reasons. The response of the jute industry has necessarily been differ­
ent in each case.
The "derived" demand for jute in the linoleum market was the first 
to go. It began to disappear from the late 1950's onwards; and the 
speed of decline may be gauged from the fact that U.K. linoleum output 
declined from its post-war peak of 51.6m.sq.m, in 1955 to 20.8m.sq.m, 
in 1965 - a decline of 60% over this period. This market was lost to
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jute fairly rapidly on the basis of changed consumer tastes away from 
hard floor-coverings, and as, with the advent of tufting, carpets came 
within the household budget of an increasing part of the population. 
Under these circumstances, the members of the jute industry lost a 
market which was beyond their control. The one fortunate aspect 
of this particular transition was that, at least initially, the new 
growth area of tufted carpets supplied the jute industry with a signi­
ficant replacement for its lost linoleum market.
More dramatic in scale and speed was the elimination of jute from 
the highly attractive market for the primary backing of tufted carpets. 
This was a phenomenon of the later 1960's; and from still possessing 
71% of this market in 1968 (representing an output of 35.1m.sq.m.), 
jute's share fell to 12% in 1972 (9.2m.sq.m.) Here the dis­
placement of jute occurred for a mixture of technological and price 
reasons. With respect to basic developments in man-made fibre tech­
nology, the jute manufacturers cannot, of course, be held responsible 
for these. There does seem to be a general feeling, however, that 
high prices for jute goods (including the role of Jute Control in the 
U.K.) did stimulate the fibre applications of polypropylene. Thus 
according to a United Nations F.A.O. study,
"Fears about the long-term future availability of jute and 
jute goods, and the present inconveniences of short-term 
fluctuations in supplies and prices, have led jute users 
to welcome the development of domestic substitutes which 
are free from these drawbacks. And the high price of 
jute goods in developed countries has made the develop­
ment of such a substitute economically feasible. In 
addition to these general factors, there are several 
specific factors in the bag and the carpet backing 
markets which have encouraged synthetic substitutes for 
jute, but these are of less importance than the general 
considerations outlined above.
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On the question of price disparity, the World Bank study con­
cluded that "In general, price differentials between jute and poly­
propylene replacement fabrics widened substantially in the late 
sixties and early seventies, to the point where direct price compet- 
ition between jute and synthetics became almost impossible".
In this instance of displacement the manufacturers in the trad­
itional Dundee market, realising the trend of events which set in 
during the late 1960's, have largely moved into the displacing tech­
nology. The speed with which this move was accomplished, and the 
degree of involvement in polymer technology, have each varied from 
firm to firm. Some of the original jute businesses realised fairly 
rapidly that polypropylene was to be the fibre which would replace 
jute in many areas, and that it was the one to which they should turn 
for commercial survival. A number of these firms thus not only 
used polypropylene tape, but actually extruded polypropylene film 
from "chips" or granules themselves - slitting the film to produce 
tape. Thus Low & Bonar and Sidlaw established Polytape in 1966; 
and other local firms such as H. & A. Scott also established extrud­
ing facilities. At the other extreme there were businesses which 
hung back from entering the new market on such a large scale, and 
which only entered the weaving sector, using tape produced by special­
ist extrusion facilities established locally by Thiokol (formerly a 
subsidiary of W.G. Grace of America, but now owned by the local firm 
of Don Bros. Buist) and Filtrona (owned by Bunzl Pulp & Paper Co.).
In all, however, Dundee appears to have exerted such a locational 
force in the provision of polypropylene for weaving into a variety of 
uses that an estimated two-thirds of polypropylene production is now
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It has been pointed out in the context of other research that 
the involvement of the traditional Dundee jute industry in polypropy­
lene may even have contributed to the rapid succession of the latter 
to the markets of the former. That is, Dundee jute producers, being 
involved in the expanding polypropylene market, did not have the 
incentive which specialist jute producers would have had to fight a 
determined rearguard action on the part of jute by means of keen 
pricing. Rather they were willing to enjoy what were inevitably 
the last years of profits of jute in the knowledge that they had 
safely entered the market for polypropylene which was replacing the 
traditional fibre. Thus McDowall et al. point out that in the late 
1960's and early 1970's polypropylene replaced jute more rapidly in 
Europe than in the United States, although as polypropylene cloth 
was slightly more expensive in Europe than America one might have 
expected the opposite to be the case. Thus despite polypropylene 
cloth being more expensive in Europe than in the U.S., its price 
advantage against jute (the proportion by which the price of polypropy­
lene was less than that of jute) was 45% in the U.K. in respect of 
primary carpet backing cloth compared with 23% in the U.S. in 1972. 
British jute producers thus seem not to have made any efforts them­
selves by way of price competition to stem the tide of polypropylene; 
and the result was that for primary tufted carpet backing jute's
share of the market in 1976 in the U.K. was 3% while in the U.S. it
„ 64was 20%.
carried out in the Dundee area, including Forfar.
The market for jute bags, wrappings and other minor end uses
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(such as the household furnishing trade) fell away rather less dram­
atically to new technologies and substitute products. The trend 
towards bulk handling and containerisation - essentially the result 
of new materials-handling engineering, and a response to higher wage 
costs involved in traditional systems - affected different commodit­
ies and different economies at varying times. In this area too, 
however, a major change occurred over the period from the late 
1960's to the early 1970's; and again polypropylene was a significant 
cause of jute's reduced markets. For example, over the period 1968- 
1971 jute's share of the free world bag and sack market fell from 88% 
of the total to 67%. Even this apparently modest proportional
reduction in market share resulted in a virtual halving of jute output
65to this area - from 31,000 tonnes per annum to 16,000 tonnes. The
response by the jute manufacturers in this market area has correspond­
ingly been to enter the market for polypropylene bags - a strategy 
which Scott & Robertson among the local producers have particularly 
followed.
Regarding changes in market structure, the data here are fairly 
informative. We can trace the slimming down of the size of the 
traditional industry by total numbers and with reference to the size 
distribution of firms; and on the basis of local knowledge we can 
distinguish among disappearances between "deaths" and "acquisitions", 
and also identify the acquiring firms in respect of the latter 
category. As one might expect, the number of firms in the industry 
has fallen dramatically over the period 1945-1977 - particularly over 
the last decade of the period. The firms which have disappeared 
altogether (as opposed to simply leaving the jute industry to engage
90
totally or largely in synthetics) have predominantly been small and/ 
or non-integrated concerns. At the level of casual observation 
(in contrast to the basis of statistical testing employed in 
Chapter IV) size would appear to be an important determinant of sur­
vival .
Of concern to the industrial economist, one might want to know
what happened to competition among firms over the period studied.
Undoubtedly this was muted by the existence of Jute Control and the
industry's domestic trade pricing agreements described in Section D
above; and it was noted there that the effects of these continued
until the mid to late 1960's. One would suggest therefore that,
ceteris paribus, growth of the more efficient firms at the expense
of the less so was restricted, and marginal firms survived in the
industry which would otherwise have been eliminated. It was also
undoubtedly the function of these arrangements to allow the industry
to sustain a higher level of profitability than would otherwise have 
66been the case. The demise of these arrangements coincided with
the occurrence of technological market competition from polypropy­
lene. That the synthetic fibre was so rapidly adopted by a large 
proportion of the trade is one indication of its competitive 
potential vis-a-vis jute. At the same time this mixture of natural 
and synthetic output by most firms in the industry prevents one from 
using aggregated profitability data (rates of return on capital 
employed) to measure the extent of competition. One can imagine 
that with the continuance in business of a number of older firms, the 
downturn in total demand for yarn and jute goods from the late 1960's 
onwards created a buyers market. As in most markets, however, the
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extent to which firms experienced increased competition varied from 
one sector of the jute market to another. Thus while demand for 
woven carpets remained strong the spinning of high quality carpet 
yarns continued to be profitable, and those firms which specialised 
in this more demanding sector and which enjoyed something of a tech­
nological barrier to entry (Sidlaw, Scott & Robertson, and Thomson 
Shepherd) enjoyed success beyond the end of the 1960's. This sit­
uation may be contrasted with the view of the chairman of Craiks, a 
small Forfar business now owned by Low & Bonar, who complained by the 
late 1960's "Not only have we had to contend with a steady falling 
off in demand, but with a serious and widespread wave of price
cutting, resulting in the whittling away of already slender profit 
6 7margins". This sort of comment, together with the exit from the
market of an increasing number of smaller, marginal firms at the 
turn of the decade, suggests that competitive pressures were in­
creasing - although it should again be emphasised that the source of 
these was technological change which originated outwith the tradit­
ional jute industry. It is with the way in which the firms in
general dealt with this outside source of pressure to which we now 
turn in the following chapter under the heading of diversification.
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Appendix Table 2.1
U.K. Jute Industry Output C'000 tonnes)
Raw Jute
Yarn Cloth Consumpt
1945 75.1 49.2 73.1
1946 90.4 52.8 89.1
1947 96.8 57.7 96.4
1948 101.9 59.9 101.6
1949 90.1 51.6 89.9
1950 107.1 64.5 108.9
1951 116.4 69.0 113.7
1952 108.0 65.0 106.7
1953 133.8 77.8 132.2
1954 139.8 82.2 137.7
1955 146.8 87.5 145.6
1956 144.5 90.1 142.1
1957 140.0 82.0 139.6
1958 127.2 73.1 124.0
1959 139.8 81.2 137.2
1960 144.1 83.5 141.4
1961 117.4 69.9 116.7
1962 131.9 78.2 130.7
1963 135.9 81.4 134.7
1964 132.9 78.8 131.1
1965 129.5 75.7 128.9
1966 122.8 73.1 122.4
1967 113.8 64.6 113.8
1968 111.5 59.7 110.8
1969 107.9 52.7 107.7
1970 87.5 40.9 86.7
1971 77.6 32.0 77.7
1972 74.7 26.5 77.2
1973 68.2 24.2 68.9
1974 57.5 20.9 59.3
1975 51.1 16.3 52.5
1976 52.7 16.1 51.9
1977 46.8 13.9 46.3
* Home 
Note: all
s consumption.
years are 52-week periods.
Source: Annual Abstract of Statistics (London: H.M.S
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Appendix Table 2.2
Comparative Prices of Jute and Polypropylene Cloth
Polypropylene Cloth 
36" 12 x 9
Prices: cents/sq.yd.
Jute Hessian 
40" 10 oz.
1967 12.8
1968 12.3
1969 13.5
1970 14.2
1971 16.0
1972 19.0
1973 21.5
1974 21.5
1975 24.0
20.0
18.0
13.5
11.0
11.3
12.0
12.0
13.0
14.0
Source : S. McDowall et al., Trade Adjustment and the British
Jute Industry: A Case Study (Unpublished monograph, 
University of St. Andrews, 1976) p.42.
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Appendix Table 2.3
U.K. Manufacturers' Sales of Carpets and Rugs and Linoleum
Carpets and Rugs,
Linoleum*
Woven
Wool Tufted Other
1945 4.0 0.3 15.3
1946 13.0 1.3 22.9
1947 19.2 1.9 25.1
1948 24.8 2.5 35.9
1949 28.4 2.8 43.1
1950 32.9 3.4 42.8
1951 31.5 4.3 38.8
1952 31.4 4.1 31.1
1953 34.7 6.6 38.6
1954 38.5 7.5 49.2
1955 37.7 6.9 51.6
1956 33.9 7.6 46.4
1957 37.1 3.3 8.1 46.5
1958 38.2 4.9 8.4 47.2
1959 38.1 7.5 7.8 48.7
1960 38.5 9.8 9.0 47.8
1961 35.7 11.1 9.0 42.4
1962 34.9 12.8 12.0 38.0
1963 34.9 •  « 13.7 30.9
1964 36.1 27.8 16.1 29.2
1965 33.7 32.2 18.6 20.8
1966 32.8 36.0 17.6 16.7
1967 29.8 44.1 18.2 13.5
1968 33.4 49.7 20.0 11.2
1969 32.8 52.9 25.3 8.9
1970 31.8 60.7 26.8 7.2
1971 31.4 70.7 29.7 6.1
1972 33.4 89.7 27.7 5.2
1973 32.6 102.2 27.8 5.6
1974 27.1 102.8 27.3 4.6
1975 25.4 109.7 26.1 4.0
1976 24.1 127.8 24.9 3.9
1977 23.1 123.4 22.7 3.6
* million sq. metres (1 sq. yd. = 0.836 sq. metres).
not available.
Source : Annual Abstract of Statistics (London: H.M.S.O.)
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Appendix Table 2.4
U.K. Jute Yarn Imports and Exports ('000 tonnes)
Imports Imports/Production Exports Home Consumption (%)
1951 4.9 116.4 3.2 4.11952 0.3 108.0 2.1 0.3 2.6*1953 4.7 133.8 2.1 3.4 2.61954 5.9 139.8 2.2 4.1 3.11955 2.8 146.8 3.0 1.9 2.11956 0.5 144.5 2.8 0.4 1.21957 1.7 140.0 3.9 1.2 1.01958 1.6 127.2 2.9 1.3 1.51959 2.8 139.8 2.7 2.0 1.81960 3.0 144.1 2.7 2.1 2.21961 2.8 117.4 3.4 2.4 2.31962 3.8 131.9 4.1 2.4 2.41963 3.2 135.9 4.1 2.4 2.51964 3.8 132.9 3.3 2.8 3.11965 5.3 129.5 3.0 4.0 3.41966 4.2 122.8 2.4 3.4 2.91967 1.5 113.8 1.8 1.3 1.91968 1.2 111.5 1.5 1.1 1.51969 2.2 107.9 1.8 2.0 1.51970 1.3 87.5 1.8 1.5 1.81971 1.5 77.6 1.4 1.9 2.41972 2.8 74.7 2.7 3.7 2.61973 1.5 68.2 3.0 2.2 2.41974 0.8 57.5 3.0 1.4 1.31975 0.2 51.1 2.4 0.4 1.51976 1.3 51.7 3.7 2.6 2.71977 2.3 46.8 3.0 5.0
* 3-year moving average.
Source Association of European Jute Industries Statistical Year­
book (Paris: A.E.J.I.).
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Appendix Table 2.5
Imports/
Imports Production Exports Home Consumption (%)
U.K. Jute Cloth Imports and Exports C'000 tonnes)
1951 94.9 69.0 12.8 62.8
1952 56.8 65.0 11.8 51.6 53.7*
1953 59.5 77.8 9.9 46.7 51.1
1954 87.7 82.2 10.3 54.9 50.1
1955 71.2 87.5 12.5 48.7 49.4
1956 60.9 90.1 14.2 44.5 44.7
1957 49.7 82.0 10.9 41.0 43.8
1958 54.3 73.1 9.2 45.9 44.9
1959 64.5 81.2 10.5 47.7 47.1
1960 65.8 83.5 11.5 47.8 46.5
1961 47.1 69.9 10.1 44.1 45.2
1962 51.9 78.2 11.4 43.7 43.1
1963 49.0 81.4 12.1 41.4 41.8
1964 50.8 78.8 11.0 40.4 37.6
1965 43.3 75.7 8.7 30.9 37.5
1966 46.3 73.1 7.3 41.3 40.7
1967 50.3 64.6 5.5 50.0 47.3
1968 54.9 59.7 6.2 50.6 49.8
1969 43.6 52.7 6.7 48.7 50.5
1970 39.1 40.9 5.0 52.1 51.8
1971 32.1 32.0 5.3 54.6 54.0
1972 27.7 26.5 4.1 55.3 56.3
1973 29.7 24.2 3.6 59.0 57.3
1974- 25.4 20.9 2.2 57.6 58.9
1975 20.9 16.3 2.3 60.0 62.5
1976 23.1 15.8 5.9 70.0 66.3
1977 26.2 13.8 2.1 69.0
* 3-year moving average.
Source : as in Appendix Table 2.4
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Chapter III
Diversification
A. Introduction
As mentioned in the Introduction to this thesis, the term Diversi­
fication has been adopted to refer to the conduct or behaviour of firms 
in the industry. As such the term covers a wide spectrum of strate­
gies and attendant issues raised in analysing the behaviour of firms in 
a market, demand for whose traditional product was under attack both 
from cheap traditional imports and from new technology in the U.K. it­
self.
The plan of this chapter is to analyse broadly the response of the 
former jute firms to the competitive forces mentioned above, to offer 
short case studies of the progress of a few individual companies, to 
conduct some statistical tests on company accounting data as they relate 
to the performance in diversification of the firms, and finally to 
attempt to draw some conclusions.
The term diversification refers to a strategy on the part of a 
business firm which takes the company into market areas not obviously 
or directly related to its existing business. Thus, some of the more 
obvious forms of business expansion such as manufacturing what was 
previously bought in, or cases of manufacturers moving into distribution, 
are referred to as vertical integration; and the term diversification 
is normally reserved for corporate strategies which involve entering 
totally new markets.
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There appears to have been a trend towards diversification over a
large part of British industry during the past twenty years; and
"diversified" enterprises now account for a large part of industrial
output.^ What is more interesting are the reasons for this general
trend throughout the economy, and for the policy of diversification on
the part of individual businesses. The economist must also of course
be concerned with the implications of such policies for resource allo-
2cation in the economy as a whole.
In respect of individual firms, diversification is normally pur­
sued as a means of achieving a higher growth rate than may be attained 
within a single market, as a means of reducing the riskiness of 
earnings associated with dependence upon a single product range, or as 
a means of escaping from total dependence upon a market which is facing 
decline. Diversification in this last case may obviously be a prelude 
to complete exit from a market; and it is with precisely this general 
situation of diversification in the face of market decline that one is 
confronted in the case of the Dundee jute industry.
It is recognised in studies of the "jute" industry during the 
1960's that a major effort was even then being made by firms to diversi­
fy in some broad sense. Leveson, for example, refers to diversification 
as "perhaps the most important post war development", and instances both 
the trend towards manufacturing jute products not in competition with 
the Calcutta mills, and also the adoption of man-made fibres - pre­
dominantly polypropylene - to fulfil needs traditionally met by jute. 
More recently some of the textile manufacturers have been building up 
their interests in engineering (some of it geared to North Sea oil 
exploration and drilling), and in activities ancillary to textiles,
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such as space dyeing. The result of the former type of diversification 
within the jute industry, again using Leveson's estimates, was that the 
Dundee industry moved from a situation in 1950 where it was predominant­
ly dependent upon packaging and sacking to one by the mid-1960's -
3where such end uses accounted for only about 6% of total output.
This change meant that the local industry was much more able to with­
stand competition from Indian goods; and this was particularly so in 
respect of the floorcoverings market, where broad cloth of consistently 
high quality was required for tufted carpet backing. More recently of 
course the trend has been for former jute businesses to diversify out 
of this area altogether.
B. Industry Response
Over the period 1945-1977 the total number of firms in what was 
traditionally the Dundee jute industry fell from 37 to 14. Thus, 
although the predominant response to the industry's decline has been 
"death" (i.e. firms ceasing to remain as independent businesses either 
through total demise or as a result of takeover), a number of firms has 
survived. Indeed the number of continuing businesses is greater than 
suggested above on the basis of A.J.S.M. membership, the resignation 
of some continuing firms from the Association reflecting the diminished 
importance of jute in their total activities rather than the complete 
demise of the businesses. Thus, for example, to the 14 full A.J.S.M. 
members of 1977 one should add back three former full members which 
continued in business, though without having any jute interests.
Concentrating on continuing businesses, and examining the period 
from the mid 1960's onwards, it is possible to categorise the response
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of these firms to traditional market decline as follows.
Table 3.1
Response of Continuing Firms to U.K. Jute Industry Decline
Continuation of traditional business
Partial adoption of new technology
Full adoption of new technology
Seeking of new outlets for traditional product
Diversification into "related" fields
Diversification into "unrelated" fields
Traditionalism
Hesitancy
Reorientation
Diversification
Conglomeration
Innovation
Although these categories include most of the policies followed by 
the original jute manufacturing firms, many of the businesses involved 
have, often simultaneously, followed more than one policy. The cate­
gories are, therefore, not mutually exclusive, nor has it been possible 
to measure realistically the proportion of the total industry at any one 
time falling into any particular category. The titles in the right- 
hand column of Table 3.1 are adopted for "shorthand" purposes in the 
following paragraphs. The problem with trying to measure in any exact 
way this type of behaviour is not simply one of devising watertight 
compartments into which firms can be placed, but also that of putting 
accurate dates upon events and measuring the significance within a 
firm's total business of certain ventures without the aid of data 
breaking down company sales or turnover.
Within these limitations, however, and in terms of the 17 firms 
which continued in independent existence from the early 1960's to 1977, 
one can suggest the following breakdown into the categories outlined 
in Table 3.1.
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Table 3.2
Responses of Individual Firms
Category Number %
Traditionalism 4 24
Hesitancy 1 6
Innovation 7 41
Reorientation 1.5* 9
Diversification 2 12
Conglomeration 1.5* 9
17 101**
* The response of Sidlaw has been equally divided between these two
categories
** Error due to rounding.
Perhaps surprising is the proportion of firms (around a quarter) 
which have continued in the traditional business of jute spinning and 
weaving - either spinning woven carpet yarns or weaving sacking. The 
explanation, however, is that one of these firms is a subsidiary of a 
larger enterprise which provides the Traditionalist with a captive 
market (the Victoria Spinning Co. is a subsidiary of woven carpet 
makers B.M.K.). Of the other three firms in this category, one is in 
a state of decline resulting from a reduction in orders from established 
sources, competition in the traditional fibre from more aggressive firms 
which still produce jute carpet yarn, and displacement by polypropylene. 
In fact this firm (Buist Spinning Co.) closed down in 1979 and its 
premises were acquired by Scott & Robertson. The second of these three 
firms, Wm. Cleghorn, employs some 30 people very largely in preparing 
jute waste for use as roofing felt. The third enterprise is the Tay- 
bank Jute Works of the C.W.S. In common with the remainder of the 
industry in general, the scale of operations at Taybank has contracted
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over recent years. Employment, however, has fallen by only around 
25% in the decade to 1977; and in that year the firm employed 415 
persons in spinning and weaving. Although the firm was at one time 
heavily vertically integrated with the Co-operative movement (with a 
large output of coal and flour bags), 98% of turnover is now accounted 
for by non-Co-operative sales. Of spinning capacity, two-thirds is 
for woven carpet wefts, in which market Taybank is estimated to be the 
third largest producer after Sidlaw and Scott & Robertson. The remain­
ing one-third of spinning output goes to weaving: half to the firm's
own looms, half to weavers with none or insufficient spinning capacity. 
Taybank's own woven output goes overwhelmingly (around 75%) to the 
roofing felt trade, with smaller amounts going to car-assembly, brattice 
cloth and minor packaging end uses. This unit has thus survived with­
out adopting polypropylene technology by modernising its spinning 
capacity to serve the woven carpet industry, and concentrating woven 
jute output in non-standard markets for which the scale of demand does 
not attract Indian competition, and in respect of which polypropylene is 
not presently a substitute. This strategy could not, of course, have
been followed by all firms. Traditionalism has, nonetheless, allowed
one or two units, including a relatively large employer such as Taybank, 
to survive in a rapidly contracting market.
The category of Hesitancy includes only one firm; but is of more 
than passing interest. The situation is one where the firm concerned 
has undertaken weaving of polypropylene bags on jute-weaving machinery. 
This has obviously minimised the commitment (financial and technological) 
of the firm to the new fibre; and although it is possible only to 
produce unsophisticated goods using this approach (mail bags and coal 
sacks etc.) this partial adoption of the new technology has allowed
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one firm to survive.
The vast bulk of the former jute spinning and weaving firms which 
have survived have done so by fully adopting the new technology of 
polypropylene. These are firms which weave polypropylene, tufted carpet 
backing and bags on wide looms designed for this purpose, and which in 
a number of cases also extrude polypropylene in tape form from granules 
or chips supplied by the petrochemical industry. It should not be 
forgotten that such firms may also continue to spin and weave jute.
Some of the Innovators, in our terminology, did in fact cease jute 
spinning and weaving shortly after making a major investment in poly­
propylene extrusion and weaving. Low & Bonar is the best example of 
this. Other Innovators, however, such as Don Bros. Buist and Scott 
& Robertson, continue to spin and weave jute as well as extruding and 
weaving polypropylene. Such businesses, therefore, continue to com­
pete against the Traditionalists above; the foamier usually having 
much more sophisticated jute operations, and therefore limiting the 
scope for survival of the latter.
Under the heading of Reorientation have been placed the smaller 
firm of Craiks of Forfar, and also half of the strategy of Sidlaw 
Industries. These two firms have spent considerable efforts in enter­
ing the market for Hessian wall coverings. In the case of Sidlaw the
sum is estimated at around £2m. over the five years to 1977. This 
involves making a fairly high quality of cloth for use as a wall 
covering, either in its natural or "loomstate" form, or following the 
application of a pattern or dye. This is a market where jute has 
taken over from flax on the basis of price; and in general the appeal 
of Hessian wall coverings is based upon cheapness and the fashion
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element of a natural fibre. So far as the jute manufacturers are 
concerned, this market has two significant characteristics. First, 
the product is very largely sold loomstate to the decorative wall­
covering firms such as Sandersons, so that the final marketing of 
the goods is not in the hands of the jute firms themselves. Second, 
although the market for the goods has expanded considerably over the 
past four or five years, it is overwhelmingly an export one (to Europe 
and the U.S.) with all the attendant risks of fashion change and 
dependence upon the external value of Sterling.
Diversification, as the term is used in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, has
been a strategy adopted by two firms, both having used their previous
experience of the spinning of woven carpet yarn to move into the carpet
manufacturing industry. One firm has moved into woven carpets, the
other into tufted carpet printing and backing. In both these cases
the firms appear to have acknowledged that competition was too great in
the traditional jute market, that economic forces appeared to favour
the continued survival in the traditional market of the large firms
4rather than smaller concerns, and that carpet manufacture or printing 
represented a means of survival involving relatively limited capital 
outlay and again a limited amount of new technology.
Into our category of Conglomeration fall one small firm and part 
of Sidlaw's strategy. Again it is worth repeating here that there is 
an element of judgement involved in placing companies into the various 
categories, and conceivably other firms could have been classed as 
Conglomerates. Low & Bonar, for example, has had a very significant 
heavy electrical engineering subsidiary (Bonar Long) since the immed­
iate post-war period, and has recently developed its own floor­
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covering interests (Flotex). The predominant feature of the group 
has, however, been innovation through Polytape in extrusion and S.F.S. 
in tape weaving. H. & A. Scott, likewise, has an engineering subsid­
iary, Lomax & Smith; but again the dominant feature of the firm's
5strategy has been polypropylene extrusion and tape weaving. Thus 
Sidlaw and Malcolm, Ogilvie have been formally categorised as Conglom­
erates because the expansion of their interests unrelated to industrial 
textiles has been a significant and characteristic part of their 
strategy for survival. In the case of Sidlaw (detailed in Section C 
below) this has taken the firm into hardware wholesaling and operations 
ancillary to North Sea oil exploration and drilling (another area in 
which Low & Bonar also have interests). As regards Malcolm, Ogilvie, 
which in 1968 had fewer than 500 employees, although diversified 
interests (basically Fibro spinning) have not been successful, the 
"conglomeration" into continuous casting of high quality bronze alloy,
begun in the early 1960's, has taken over the company's jute interests
6with much success. In both of these cases the firms appear to have
been prepared to branch out into markets quite unrelated to textiles; 
and it is interesting that such a policy has been followed by two 
firms at the opposite ends of the size spectrum within the group of 
traditional jute manufacturers.
In Chapter II it was noted that firms in the market covered by 
this study had died either as a result of being acquired by competitors 
or simply through closing down from a lack of traditional jute spinning 
or weaving business. This process halved the number of independent 
businesses formally in the industry in the decade from 1966-1976.
This chapter has concentrated upon the surviving firms, and in this 
section a general view has been presented of how firms used the
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strategies of diversification for survival. That the adoption of 
some strategy was essential may be seen if one is reminded of the 
decline of the industry up to 1977. Taking 1967 as a base year (100), 
output of yarn and of cloth had fallen by 1977 to an index level of
41.1 and 21.4 respectively, employment on a similar basis had fallen 
to 52.3 (although, as noted earlier in Chapter II, the employment stat­
istics probably underestimate the decline in the market), and the 
number of firms in the industry had (by our formal measure) fallen by 
53%.
The predominant response of the surviving firms has been fully to
adopt polypropylene technology, although it should again be emphasised
that this had not precluded some firms from continuing with jute
spinning and weaving at the same time; nor has it precluded such
firms from spinning other fibres such as nylon or rayon, or having
7some non-textile operations. Innovation has fortunately been a
strategy open to firms of markedly different size. There appears to 
be no particular entry barrier to the new market either in terms of 
large initial capital expenditure, nor in the form of loss of economies 
of scale by operating with a small number of looms for tape weaving, 
or "lines" for extruding. (The statistical relationship between 
firm size and growth is examined in Chapter IV.) It may then be 
asked why the other firms in the industry did not follow a path of 
"innovation"; and this question should be applied both to surviving 
firms and to those which died. With regard to non-surviving firms, 
much of the answer to the question lies in individual, often family, 
circumstances. As mentioned in Chapter II, the majority of the 
firms which failed to survive the 1960's were small, family owned/ 
managed, non-integrated weaving concerns. Their market for tufted
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carpet backing and packaging disappeared so quickly to polypropylene 
that a very rapid decision was forced upon them. To many, the un­
tried technology and additional finance required for entry into poly­
propylene may have appeared as considerable barriers. Coinciding as 
these issues did for some firms with additional problems of family 
succession, such factors may simply have hastened an already largely 
inevitable decision to terminate the business operations. Among 
surviving firms, entry into polypropylene was rejected for more posi­
tive reasons; although among the firms classed as Traditionalists 
(and even the single Hesitant) above one either has to recognise 
exceptional circumstances or to regard the current survival as tempor­
ary rather than long-term. Those firms which have chosen a strategy 
of reorientation, diversification or conglomeration have rejected poly­
propylene either because there have been forces in their background 
pulling in another direction (Thomson, Shepherd, for example, had a 
strong carpet background having been one of the original jute carpet 
manufacturers), because they felt that they had a special advantage in 
relation to a unique product (as in Caird's space-dyeing operations, 
or Malcolm, Ogilvie's continuous bronze casting), or because they felt 
that by the early 1970's manufacturing capacity in polypropylene tape 
weaving was becoming almost excessive relative to carpet backing and 
other demand.
Thus an account of the strategy of diversification across the 
industry as a whole reveals a situation where, although most firms em­
braced the new polypropylene technology wholeheartedly, other 
directions for diversification were found, and where some continuing 
firms have so far avoided diversification altogether. In the 
following section a series of short case histories is presented whose
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aim is to allow one further to analyse the economic process of diversi­
fication, and, together with the results of the statistical analysis 
in Section D. below, to allow one to arrive at more detailed conclus­
ions in the final section of this chapter.
C. Case Histories
Although the diversification of jute firms is often thought of as 
being a fairly recent phenomenon, some firms were clearly anticipating 
a declining future for jute even in the mid 1950's. Leveson's data <ref. 
3 above) indicate the results of earlier policies. Thus the chairman 
of Low & Bonar warned in 1956:
"During the past year it has become clear that at present 
price levels in the U.K. jute's position as a packaging 
material for certain commodities is being more and more 
challenged by competition from substitutes such as paper 
and from bulk handling. ... Spinners in the United 
Kingdom ... are now faced with having to fight off the 
competition of substitutes by ever-increasing cuts in 
profit margins, and possibly even by cutting into actual 
production costs.
Among the smaller companies at this time, Caird (Dundee), for
example, recognised that its acquisition of James Prain constituted a
9valuable non-jute expansion in the current climate.
What these examples indicate is that the recognition of a need 
to diversify away from an undue dependence upon traditional jute end- 
use markets was something which had existed for some time in the 
Dundee industry prior to the late 1960's. It is also a reminder 
of the fact that diversification of a kind had been going on over 
this period insofar as Dundee firms had left the cruder jute markets
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for sacking and packaging (which Jute Control was gradually opening up 
to Indian competition throughout the 1960's) and were concentrating upon 
woven carpet yarns and tufted carpet backing by the mid 1960's - the 
latter market being in its early years largely an export one to the 
United States. It was the rapidity of the loss of this latter market to 
polypropylene in the late 1960's which introduced the need for a much 
wider strategy of diversification; and it is upon this wider strategy 
that the analysis in the case histories concentrates. What this 
section does is to trace the history of diversification in some of the 
individual firms, and note the motivation, direction and success or 
otherwise of such a strategy in individual cases.
Low & Bonar Group :
The experience of Low & Bonar exemplifies many of the issues in 
this area. On the one hand it appears to have been quite far-sighted 
in recognising the need for moving away from dependence upon jute.
On the other, the firm does not always appear to have fully anticipated 
the "teething" problems of entering new markets and adopting new tech­
nologies. Frequently there appear to have been delays in bringing new 
plant into operation. A final problem faced by many diversifiers was 
that of moving into a new market area only to find competition there 
much more severe than anticipated; and in some cases this type of 
situation was aggravated by a cyclical downturn in demand for such 
products.
Low & Bonar's diversification has involved the development of new 
fabric in packaging, and also operations in engineering. Thus in the 
mid 1950's it developed a plastic proofed tarpauling - Flaxtite - and
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also entered into a joint venture to produce transparent packaging 
made of cellulose film. These policies continued through the develop­
ment of more sophisticated heavy-gauge polythene sacks - Lobosacks - and 
by the late 1960's into polypropylene and the company's new product,
Plotex - a synthetic floorcovering produced through electrostatic 
flocking.
The major non-engineering diversification venture has of course 
been that of polypropylene. Low & Bonar commenced production in 1967 
on the basis of two subsidiary companies jointly held with Sidlaw 
Industries (which in 1977 sold its share to Low & Bonar which then be­
came the sole owner of the two firms). The principal market, to begin 
with, was tufted carpet primary backing. Since then, however, the 
Group's subsidiaries Polytape and Synthetic Fabrics (Scotland), operating 
respectively as extruders and tape weavers, have expanded into other 
markets for polypropylene. A distinguishing feature of Low & Bonar, 
however, has been its additional interest in engineering. After World 
War II the company acquired a controlling interest in Bonar, Long - a 
transformer manufacturer; and by the mid 1950's had pushed further in 
this direction by the formation of Sturrock Power Installations in the 
electrical contracting field, and -through Bonar, Long's expansion into 
switchgear and, later, capacitors. The latest developments in this 
general area have included the formation of component engineering subsid­
iaries both to service Bonar, Long and to sell outside the Group 
(Dudhope Engineering, Logan Engineering, and Haddingtonshire Fabricators), 
and also the establishment of a service company for North Sea oil explor­
ation and drilling operations. In addition to these the company also 
has its own subsidiary for producing printing cylinders for the packaging 
market - Gravure Cylinders. This last company also sells to outside
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customers.
Low & Bonar's diversification has not, however, been without its 
problems. In engineering in particular the problem has been that of 
operating in markets where output has been subject to a cyclical 
pattern of demand. In the case of transformers, for example, home 
new orders rose from around £33m. in 1959 to a peak of almost £70m. in 
1963, and then fell again to under £45m. in 1968.^° The result of
this was severe competition and low prices in the late 1950's and very 
early 1960's, an e^qpansion of earnings up to about 1964, and a subse­
quent downturn of profits and prices. Thus although Bonar, Long's 
pre-tax profits expanded from £163,222 in 1959 to £671,007 in 1963, the 
years which followed witnessed, in the words of successive Annual 
Reports, "very intensive competition and depressed prices", "minimal 
profit margins", and again prices which were "wretchedly low". Some 
idea of the impact of this swing over the 1960's may be gained from the 
following data.
Table 3.3
t Bonar Ltd.: Share of "Engineering" in Pretax Earnings (%)
1960 10.7 1965 27.5
1961 23.7 1966 27.0
1962 27.0 1967 25.5
1963 40.4 1968 10.2
1964 38.9 1969 (7.6) i.e. loss
Source : Annual Reports & Accounts
To some extent the Group has suffered similarly in the field of 
transparent packaging. Here the firm met increased competition and
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narrowing profit margins in the early years of its expansion into this 
market; and competition appears to have remained keen throughout the 
1960's. Again, as in the case of jute and heavy electrical equip­
ment, demand for packaging, being a derived demand, is heavily depen­
dent upon the general climate of demand in the economy and, in the case 
of packaging, the volume of international trade. Thus the packaging 
subsidiaries' results during the 1970's were disappointing; and the 
Group's expansion in this area has most recently been by way of 
acquisition - through the purchase of Bibby & Baron (Holdings) in 1976*
Table 3.4
Low & Bonar Ltd.: Share of "Packaging1* in Pretax Earnings (%)
1973 46.5 1975 31.5 1977 23.3
1974 66.3 1976 26.5
Source: as in Table 3.3
The other characteristic of diversification apparent from Low & 
Bonar's experience is the longer-than-expected time scale involved in 
bringing some diversification projects on stream. Such new operations 
often appear, in addition, to have taken longer than anticipated 
originally to make a contribution to the company's profits. This 
latter phenomenon is possibly due to the former plus the adoption of a 
"conservative” depreciation policy in respect of risky capital-intensive 
projects. It may be claimed that this is a phenomenon well recognised 
in business circles, and that "outsiders" adopt an unrealistically short 
time horizon in expecting new business ventures to generate returns. 
Indeed the chairman of Low & Bonar warned shareholders in 1955 that
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"New developments and new businesses do not become worthwhile profit- 
earners overnight". Nonetheless, one feels that by any standards the 
gestation period of some new ventures has been protracted. For example, 
the transparent packaging interests of the company in the mid 1950's 
seem to have encountered technical difficulties as well as poor prices 
before making a contribution to profits. More recently the company's 
Flotex project, which began in 1972,»does not yet (1977) seem to have 
contributed any profits to the Group. The company earlier admitted in 
the case of polypropylene that "a good deal of know-how and technical 
expertise are required to produce a suitable fabric"; but Flotex 
appears to have presented more intractable problems. Thus, in addition 
to the inevitable starting losses in 1972, the company admitted in 1973 
that "teething troubles ... were taking longer than had been antici­
pated"; and despite progress in 1974 (Flotex was still making losses), 
1975 was a year in which this division "experienced serious technical 
problems". In 1976 losses approached E^m. on a turnover of just over 
£2m., while in 1977 sales increased by about 10% but losses remained at 
around 1976 levels.
Sidlaw Industries :
Low & Bonar's experience has been dealt with at some length because 
it represents not only a more complex form of diversification in the 
industry, but also because it highlights some of the significant 
problems for firms in this policy. The other major company in this 
market - Sidlaw Industries - has pursued a much more cautious and limited 
policy of diversification. This company continued for some time into 
the 1960's to base its activities upon jute; and some 60% of output was 
geared to floorcovering markets. This covered both jute yarn and cloth
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for carpets and linoleum. Thus despite isolated references to the
possibility of using spare factory capacity for non-jute goods, the
firm continued to demonstrate its faith in its traditional market by
re-equipment with technologically advanced jute plant.^ Even by
the early 1970's the company's view was that it intended to remain "pre-
12eminent within the jute industry"; and on this basis was still
looking forward to "being able to maintain a profitable jute manufactur-
13ing activity for some years ahead".
Nonetheless the need to plan for a future in which jute faced a 
declining demand from traditional users seems to have been something of 
which Sidlaw was aware, according to discussions with senior executives. 
Indeed, at one stage a full-time director was appointed with the sole 
remit of seeking out appropriate acquisitions; and an American con­
sultant was employed for a similar purpose. As the senior management 
viewed the position, Sidlaw had only a limited range of options open to 
it. Acquisition of some of the more efficient of its smaller compet­
itors was on the face of it attractive as a short-term proposition, and 
was indeed, as noted in Chapter II, implemented to a small extent. But 
this was not regarded as a long-term solution; and even in the shorter 
term was felt likely to raise the question of monopoly power in the 
industry, with a possible response from the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission. Other options considered were those of investing abroad, 
or of integrating forward into carpet manufacture. The latter was, 
however, rejected on the grounds that existing customers would have 
been antagonised; a very large part of Sidlaw's yarn and cloth output 
was already going into woven and tufted carpets by the mid 1960's. It 
must also have been recognised that to the extent that the ups and downs 
of the jute industry's fortunes during the 1960's had largely been those
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of the floorcoverings market, there would be no escape from these 
through integrating into a section of the floorcoverings market itself.
Despite the above reasoning, Sidlaw's major diversification at the 
end of the 1960's was into the closely related polypropylene field; and 
it was achieved, at one remove as it were, by taking a minority stake in 
the two Low & Bonar subsidiaries Polytape and S.F.S. These develop­
ments were initially on a fairly small scale. By the end of the 1960's 
less than £.hm. had been committed - and more than two-thirds of the 
company's turnover and profits still at this time came from U.K. spinning 
and weaving of jute.
In addition to its associate investment in polypropylene, Sidlaw,
from the late 1960's onwards, acquired facilities for manufacturing other
man-made fibres. These were predominantly rayon and nylon, and were
designed to serve the markets for tufted carpet face yarns and children's 
15clothing. The final stage of Sidlaw's diversification programme
(coming in the view of one senior manager with the acession of Sir John 
Carmichael to the chairmanship of the company in 1970) has seen the 
farthest spreading of the firm's interests from its traditional jute base. 
In 1972 the company acquired both a hardware wholesaling concern (P. &
R. Fleming), and also a stake in the North Sea oil servicing industry 
through the acquisition of Aberdeen Service Co. (North Sea). Nonethe­
less the former venture cost £506,000 and the latter £72,000, compared 
with the expenditure of £1.5m. the same year in respect of South Mills 
(Textiles). Sidlaw's non-textile ventures have within the period of 
our study represented a small part of the company's expansion strategy; 
and while it may be suggested that P. & R. Fleming carried out a 
"merchanting" function with which Sidlaw was familiar through its jute
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operations, one senior executive at Sidlaw frankly admitted that the 
Aberdeen Service Co. venture was "a step in the dark".
From 1970 onwards Sidlaw began to reduce its dependence upon jute. 
But in doing so the firm entered into a situation in which it was 
faced with poorer returns on its traditional investment in jute while 
not yet reaping the full rewards of its diversified investment.
Speaking of the position in the early 1970's the chairman commented
"The company is in a difficult state of transition.
On the one hand, it is not easy to earn a satisfactory 
level of profits on jute manufacturing when competit­
ive products are becoming increasingly penetrative 
because of price advantages. On the other hand, 
profits from the expansion of other activities and 
entry into new activities have to bear not only 
development charges but also finance charges until ^  
new installations become commissioned and profitable."
Sidlaw's diversification appears to have been somewhat haphazard 
in its conception, and carried out without full commitment by the firm. 
The company sought to participate in the oil-related prosperity of 
north-east Scotland, not only directly through Aberdeen Service Co. but 
also through "associate" investments in offshore supplies, hotel 
services and property development (Seaforth Maritime, and Grampian 
Land); and a similar approach appears to have been adopted with regard 
to its general engineering and hardware/household goods business diversi 
fication. (The firm withdrew from the latter area in 1980.) This 
is an example, therefore, of a business which has diversified on a 
rather cautious basis. It has frequently remained close to its 
textiles/carpeting base? it has expanded principally by acquisition; 
and some of its diversified enterprises appear to be operated on a 
"portfolio" basis rather than incorporated into the main business.
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Caird (Dundee):
Some of the smaller businesses have followed a different path of 
diversification, and have moved with success away from their original 
dependence upon jute spinning and weaving into totally new areas assoc­
iated with man-made fibres. Caird (Dundee), for example, moved into 
rayon spinning in the mid 1950's, beginning with the acquisition of 
James Prain; and although there appear to have been initial diffi­
culties with new equipment, the company continued to pursue a policy 
of reducing its dependence upon jute, which it recognised could not
compete on a price basis with new synthetic packaging materials, and
17the use of synthetics in other traditional jute end-use areas. The
problems of the decline in demand for jute were aggravated in this
case by Caird's having committed itself after 1945 almost exclusively
to the linoleum industry. Considerable capital investment had been
made in the immediate post-war period in broad looms, and the company
had a large share of the market for quality backing for linoleum. Thus
in the 1960's in addition to cutting back its hessian output in adjust-
18ment to the rapid decline in demand for linoleum backing, and pro­
ducing wider cloths for tufted carpet backing, the firm significantly 
enlarged its synthetic fibre blending and spinning capacity geared to­
wards the production of carpet pile yarn. Caird, in common with 
other firms in the market, entered the polypropylene market in the 
late 1960's - in this case through a joint venture with Smith & Nephew, 
initially geared to sack and bag production. In the first instance 
Caird was in fact merely selling bags and sacking made from Smith & 
Nephew polypropylene.
However, a distinguishing feature of Caird's diversification
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programme was that in the long term it chose not to rely upon polypropy­
lene or other synthetic fibres in a direct sense. Indeed although, as 
mentioned earlier, one of the attractions of the James Prain acquisition 
of 1956 was the synthetic yarn capacity of the latter, production of 
this yarn ceased at the end of 1971, only 18 months after the firm had 
closed its jute works. Caird's new policy involved working on a 
commission basis for carpet manufacturers, initially in the space
dyeing of yarns which enabled tufted carpet manufacturers to produce a
19colour finish similar to popular woven carpets, and latterly through 
tufted carpet printing^0 - again initially on a commission basis.^
The space dyeing project began in 1969 with a capital investment 
of £500,000, and additional systems were installed in 1971 and 1972.
But in common with other firms' experiences of diversification, this 
did not prove to be an immediate panacea for the company's ills.
Despite the chairman being able to report in 1968 that "non-jute 
interests now form a substantial part of our business", a sterner 
warning about undue optimism was delivered to shareholders the 
following year.
"Rumours were circulating earlier in the year about 
the enormous potential of the space dyeing develop­
ment, which it was suggested would transform the 
company's fortunes in a relatively short period.
I think it is only right, therefore, that I should 
put this in its proper perspective. I would remind 
shareholders that your company is still primarily a 
jute manufacturing company and that the greater part 
of both the fixed and current assets are invested in 
this activity. While the newer developments, i.e. 
Polyweave, the spinning of synthetic fibres and space 
dyeing will represent an increasing proportion of the 
turnover in the future the limited capital available 
for their development will inevitably mean that it 
will be some time before they can grow to the extent 
necessary to carry the bulk of the overhead expenses 
and adequately remunerate the company's capital. We
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have no option, therefore, but to continue to be 
primarily a jute company for some time ahead and 
this is bound to be reflected in our profits."22
In fact the company suffered over this period from a downturn in 
demand for tufted carpets, from technical problems in bringing into 
operation space dyeing equipment, and competition in building up sales 
of polypropylene products. Rationalisation resulted in the company 
sinking the largest part of its resources into space dyeing - this 
venture constituting "by far the most important of our activities" 
according to the chairman in 1971; and by the early 1970's the firm 
had invested some £1.5m. in space dyeing, had sold off its polypropy­
lene interests, closed down its synthetic yarn spinning plant, and 
terminated its jute commitment.
However, 1973 saw the beginning of the second phase of Caird's 
expansion - tufted carpet printing. Caird realised that it had some­
what saturated the space dyeing market, and that carpet printing was 
in any case taking over from the space dyeing of carpet yarns. With 
space dyeing capacity working at only two-thirds of potential, the firm 
invested heavily in carpet printing plant - about £2.5m. having been 
spent in the first half of the 1970's. Developments over the past 
few years have continued to favour the carpet printing side of the 
business, and a natural expansion of this has been to move into carpet 
tufting. The final move into carpet backing (i.e. secondary backing 
with foam) was begun in 1976; and this, of course, brought the company 
back into closer contact with a business which it had left almost a 
decade previously. This latest phase of Caird's development has been 
encouraged by the high transport costs of its U.K. and international 
customers in sending "white" tufted carpet to Caird for printing and
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return. The company thus expanded initially into offering a tufting 
service, and in 1976 installed carpet backing capacity - still operating 
on a commission basis. One interesting further development of Caird's 
new total involvement in carpet manufacture is that carpet wholesalers 
can commission the firm to supply carpets to their specific require­
ments; and it has been suggested that this provides wholesalers with a 
product at much lower cost. Caird also sells a limited amount of its 
output through its own shops, and has added to its carpet range in
recent years by using the weft laying process to produce shag-pile
. 23carpets.
The case of Caird (Dundee) illustrates a number of interesting 
phenomena. First, the firm has gone through a series of stages in its 
diversification strategy. From a total dependence upon jute, the firm 
added synthetic pile yarn spinning and polypropylene weaving in the 
1950's and 1960's respectively. These, however, together with jute, 
were phased out by the early 1970's. Space dyeing was invested in 
heavily in the early 1970's, but suffered from problems of over­
capacity in the market as a whole and rapid market and technical obsol­
escence as carpet printing became a technically feasible way of satis­
fying changing tastes in the carpet market. The latest phase of 
investment (carpet printing), begun in 1973, was therefore necessary; 
and a final development, again caused by competition and capacity 
problems, has been vertical integration into tufting and backing, and 
to a minor extent forward into carpet retailing, with the result that 
the firm is now very largely a carpet manufacturer. Some indication 
of the phasing out of old interests and the introduction of new 
ventures can be gained from the following data.
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Table 3.5
Caird (Dundee) Ltd.: Disaggregated Annual Output.
Jute ('000 tons) Space Dyeing Carpet Printing
1964 13.4
('000 tons) (' OOO sq.yds
1965 14.5 - -
1966 12.8 - -
1967 7.8 - -
1968 6.9 - -
1969 6.1 - -
1970 1 . 0 0.8 -
1971 - 2.5 -
1972 - 4.6 -
1973 - 5.7 479
1974 - 4.9 2,191
1975 — 3.4 3,444
Source: calculated from graphs in J. Manson, The Major Changes
Undertaken by Caird (Dundee) Ltd, in their Diversification, 
Unpublished D.M.S. Dissertation (Dundee College of 
Technology, 1976).
Second, Caird has exhibited financial and technical problems of
diversification. The company found difficulty in raising the sums
necessary to finance the space dyeing project of the late 1960's; and
delays occurred in implementing the carpet printing project until
sufficient profits had been generated from the dyeing operations to
fund it. Like other firms too, the process of implementing new
projects was not without its technical problems. Manson speaks of
such ventures "not (being) accomplished without many teething 
24troubles". Specifically with regard to its new ventures in the
1970's, the company found that the space dyeing operation "had taken
25longer than we ancitipated to build up"; and in respect of carpet
printing that "the operation of a plant of this type calls for a high 
degree of skill and expertise and the running in period can be costly
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and can last for a considerable time 26
Scott & Robertson :
A roughly similar history, so far as reduced dependence upon the 
jute industry is concerned, was experienced by Scott & Robertson - the 
result of a merger in 1965 between James Scott & Sons and Robertson 
Industrial Textiles. By the time of the merger the group had already 
moved into paper packaging as well as the spinning of man-made fibres, 
in addition to its traditional broad-loom jute interests. The jute 
interests were very largely geared to tufted carpet backing, although 
circular loom capacity was devoted to sack manufacture. By the late 
1960's and early 1970's the firm was moving into new fibres: recog­
nising, in the chairman's own words, "the limitations and difficulties
27which bear upon the jute producing industry". in fact the
following year saw the closure of part of the group's jute weaving
capacity, and a further extension of the company's man-made fibre
activities. The company has nonetheless maintained a presence in the
jute industry through woven carpet yarn spinning - the chairman
commenting in 1973 that "we have every intention of continuing our jute
manufacturing business. I believe that despite the changes which have
taken place in the whole reformation of the jute industry in Dundee,
28there will be left a reduced but viable and profitable trade". The
company has, however, continued to expand its. commitment to man-made 
fibres - in common with other firms in the industry establishing sub­
sidiaries outwith the Dundee area nearer supplies of raw materials and 
major markets. Again in common with other businesses which have 
diversified into new technology, Scott & Robertson's new ventures have 
not been without their teething problems. One Annual Report speaks
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of the effectiveness of expanded operations being "severely impared
29by a number of mechanical and design faults in the new plant".
The company now, however, appears to have achieved a desired balance 
between its traditional fibre markets and those based upon new tech­
nologies .
Thomson Shepherd & Co.:
As a final example of individual-company strategy one may take a 
less obviously successful case of diversification, where the company 
has been acquired by a large international non-textile firm. Thomson 
Shepherd, which in 1946 added rayon spinning to its predominantly jute 
carpet business, ceased manufacturing furnishing fabrics in the mid 
1950's, and by 1963 had also ceased production of jute carpets after 
"heavy losses". The firm's other interests at this time continued 
to be the manufacture of jute yarn, and Fibro (rayon) spinning - the 
latter based upon raw material from Courtaulds. With the decline in 
its jute carpet business the company established an engineering sub­
sidiary. Bristol Tool & Gauge (Scotland) Ltd. was bought in 1960 
and renamed Seafield Tool & Gauge after the location of the firm's 
main works. At the same time the company moved into wool carpet 
manufacture. Production of quality Wiltons began in 1958, and the
acquisition of Darville Carpets of Monifieth in 1961 added Axminster
, . 30to the company s range.
The company's strategy was at that time based upon three broad 
interests: yarn spinning - Fibro and jute; carpets - jute initially,
and a wool at a later date; and engineering - Seafield was added to 
by Dundee Metal Spraying Co. in 1967. In carpets and yarn the
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company suffered from lack of size and an inability to enter the man­
made fibre industry on a sufficiently large scale. For example, in 
1970 it lost a regular Ministry of Defence contract for its own 
carpets because of the adoption by the Ministry of new contract pro­
cedures favouring large firms. The company estimated that at that 
time the loss cost it some 15-20% of its carpet turnover. Similarly 
in 1970, the company experienced "failure of a new product for which 
we and the trade had high hopes". In the late 1960's the firm
suffered from a downturn in woven carpets which affected its own 
woollen sales and also demand for jute yarn for woven carpet backing*; and 
in 1972 the firm closed down its own viscose rayon spinning unit on the 
grounds that it was being operated on too small a scale to be profit­
able. These factors, together with an unfortunate bringing on stream 
of new textile plant in 1967 just as demand in its various markets was 
falling off, contributed to poor profits.
Finally, the company's diversification into engineering failed
because of an overdependence upon subcontracted jobs. In the late
1960's some customers were lost through bankruptcy as the general
level of engineering activity fell; and other customers began taking
work back into their own shops which had previously been subcontracted
to Seafield. The engineering subsidiaries were thus closed down in
1971, the company having realised, in its own words, that "instead of
acting as an insurance against decline in our other activities, they
31had become a liability". The company then decided to concentrate
its efforts largely in woven and tufted carpets, and has recently in-
32creased tufted carpet making capacity significantly.
D. Statistical Tests on Diversification
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Sections B. and C. of this chapter analysed the conduct or 
behaviour of firms in the Dundee jute industry in terms of their 
diversification strategy in largely descriptive terns. Thus an 
analysis has been offered at an aggregated level of the extent and 
directions of diversification among the 17 surviving firms in the 
industry over the period 1965-1977 (Tables 3.1 and 3.2 above); and 
individual case studies of patterns of diversification within single 
firms have also been reported. In this section it is intended to 
use the knowledge of the firms1 diversification policies (by interviews 
with senior management in all of the businesses concerned, as well as 
by reference to other sources and journal articles) to analyse the 
impact of diversification at a statistical level.
The first requirement for this analysis was to produce two groups 
of firms, referred to as Diversified and Non-diversified. It has to 
be accepted that the basis of classification here is subjective and 
impressionistic rather than one which is statistically validated. The 
relevant factors involved in the classification are the extent of non­
jute interests, the extent to which firms have adopted new technol­
ogies (and so entered new end-use markets), and the relatedness or 
otherwise of new markets to traditional ones. Taking these criteria, 
the following classification was adopted.
Table 3.6
Classification of Firms for Analysis of Diversification
Diversified Non-diversified
Caird (Dundee) 
Don Bros. Buist 
Wm. Halley 
Low & Bonar
Buist Spinning Co. 
Craiks
Hardie & Smith 
Sidlaw
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Malcolm Ogilvie 
H. & A. Scott 
Scott & Fyfe
Thos. Thomson 
Thomson Shepherd 
J. & D. Wilkie
Scott & Robertson
This produces a categorisation of 8 Diversified and 7 Non- 
diversified companies, comprising those 15 firms for whom the necess­
ary information was available over the period 1967-1977.
The next part of the analysis involves deciding what it is that 
one expects diversified firms to achieve which would distinguish their 
performance from that of non-diversified firms. Three areas of 
performance are specified which permit of statistical analysis.
The a priori assumption is that diversified firms would have en­
joyed higher average profits than non-diversified firms, or would at 
least have maintained their earlier level of profits. It is also 
assumed that the variability of rates of return on capital employed 
over time would be lower for diversified than for non-diversified 
firms. Finally, it is assumed that the growth rates (of assets,
sales or employment) for diversified firms would be higher than in
33respect of non-diversified firms. In the following tests profit
rates are measured relative to the U.K. manufacturing industries 
average in any year, and growth rates are measured in real terms by 
reference to appropriate price indices. The first test comprised a 
simple comparison of means of the various measures, distinguishing 
between the two categories of firms, and applying a one-tailed t test 
in the a priori predicted direction. Because of the incidence of
1. Profitability levels (average over 10 years)
2. Profit variability over 10-year period
3. Growth of assets, sales and employment.
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losses and negative growth rates arithmetic rather than geometric 
means were used. The results were as follows.
Table 3.7
Analysis of Mean Performance of Diversified and Non-diversified Firms
Non—Diversified Diversified t
(8) (7)
i. Mean profit ratio 1968-77 (%) 11.7 7.1 1 0455Standard deviation 6.1 9.5
ii. Mean profit ratio 1971-77/1968--70 1.344 1.672 0 4706Standard deviation 1.124 1.387
iii. Average profit variability
(residual variance around linear
trend) 1968-77 41.8821 130.3715 1.4409*Standard deviation 36.7001 156.8743
iv. Average coefficient of
variation of profit ratios
1968-77 66.5 81.2 0.5385Standard deviation 55.9 40.0
v. Mean annual asset growth rate
1968-77 1.9 -6.5 1.9091**Standard deviation 8.5 7.3
vi. Mean annual sales growth rate
1968-77 2.4 -1.2 1.1250Standard deviation 6.0 5.3
vii . Mean annual employment growth
rate 1969-77 -0.7 -4.2 1.1290Standard deviation 6.3 4.8
viii. Mean opening size :
Assets (£'000 1967) 2,881 1,461 0 6320Standard deviation 4,924 2,703
Sales (£'OOO 1967) 6,155 3,002 0.7146Standard deviation 9,406 5,820
Employment (number 1968) 1,098 1,008 0.1119Standard deviation 1,021 1,813
ix. Mean income per employee
1968-70 (£’000) 0.699 0.630 1.3529*Standard deviation 0.058 0.120
* difference significantly different .at 10% (one tailed)
** significant at 5% (one tailed)
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The differences in the mean values between the two groups were all 
in the expected direction with the exception of indicator ii. above 
relating to profits maintenance. This measure was used to try to 
determine if, regardless of the actual level of profits, diversifi­
cation had allowed firms to maintain their existing level of profit­
ability. On this basis the answer, perhaps surprisingly, appears to
34be no. With regard to the other indicators, iii. was significant 
at 10%, and the sign of the difference indicates that diversification, 
although apparently not significantly contributing to increased 
profitability, can reduce the time variability of profits. Indi­
cators v., vi. and vii. above present an interesting contrast, and 
also reinforce the need to use different measures of size in this area 
of statistical testing. The difference in the mean annual asset 
growth rates was significant at 5% in the expected direction. However, 
the sales growth rates were not significantly different, and neither 
were those for employment. The most plausible explanation for this is 
the more capital intensive nature of the activities of the diversified 
companies; and it would thus be rash to conclude that in any other 
sense diversification had contributed to growth. Thus the results 
relating to diversification and growth in respect of this sample of 
firms do not confirm the general impression gained in other studies 
(ref.33).
It was also decided to test at this stage the hypothesis that 
diversification and size might be related. The assumption of a 
relationship between size and diversification seems fairly plausible. 
Large firms are likely to have the professional staff expertise and 
access to new capital with which to plan and finance diversification. 
The divorce between control and ownership in such firms may not only 
result in as great if not a greater emphasis upon growth than in
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smaller firms, but also widen the area of perceived market opportunit­
ies beyond the confines of a single industry, giving such firms in
35 '•Penrose terms an enlarged "productive opportunity". The results
for this group of firms on diversification and size are presented as 
indicator viii. in Table 3.7 above, and show quite clearly that there 
was no difference in opening size between the diversified and non- 
diversified companies. While in respect of each size measure diversi­
fied firms were indeed larger than non-diversified (in terms of assets 
and sales they were twice as large), there was such a diversity of size 
within each group that one cannot argue that the two groups were signi­
ficantly different in size.
Finally in Table 3.7 (indicator ix.) the average incomes per 
employee in the opening part of the period 1968-1977 (1968-1970) were 
compared between the two groups of firms. This was done in order in­
directly to test the hypothesis that a high technical personnel ratio 
or quality of staff might be conducive to a policy of diversification 
on the part of a firm. That is, as in the case of firm size, the 
diversification variable is dependent upon a high technical personnel 
ratio as suggested at ref.38. below. For our purpose the independent 
variable is the average income per employee in each firm over the period 
1968-1970 expressed in 1967 terms by reference to the index of 
earnings for employees in the jute industry given in Appendix Table 
4.2 of Chapter IV. The case for adopting this variable is that higher 
incomes per employee may indicate either that the workforce as a whole 
within the firm is more highly paid than that of others, or that if 
shopfloor wages are similar between firms then companies with higher 
incomes per employee have a greater proportion of their total work­
force accounted for by more highly paid managerial staff. In either
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case, but more particularly the latter, one would assume that such a
higher level of average incomes per employee would be associated
with a higher quality of staff which may in various ways assist the
36firm in following a policy of diversification. In fact the data
on this variable in Table 3.7 indicate that there was a significant 
difference in the levels of incomes per employee between our two 
groups of firms.
Multiple linear regression was also used to try to establish the 
contribution of diversification to profitability, profit variability 
(as measured in Table 3.7) and growth (of sales). Three linear 
multiple regression equations were used.
1. Profitability = f(Size, Growth, Diversification)
2. Profit variability = f (Size, Growth, Diversification)
3. Growth = f(Size, Profits, Diversification).
Using this analysis, and incorporating diversification as a dummy 
variable having a value of 1 for Diversified firms and 0 for Non- 
diversified firms, yields the following results.
Table 3.8
Linear Regression of Profits, Growth, Size and Diversification
Dependent variable: Profitability
Constant b* t r*
Size (average) 
Growth
Diversification
7.8
(1.2581)
0 .0 0 0 1 1
0.91244
0.74073
0.6958
2.9965**
0.2130
0.2054
0.6704
0.0641
Multiple R2 0.5164 F = 3.916** DW = 2.2261 (37)
* *
partial coefficient 
significant at 5%
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Table 3.9
Linear Regression of Profit Variability, Size, Growth and Diversification
Dependent variable : Profit Variability
Constant b* t r*
Size (average) 
Growth
Diversification
130.89
(1.1934)
-0.00236
-6.05879
-56.04758
0.8149 -0.2384 
1.1318 -0.3230 
0.9170 -0.2665
Multiple R2 = 0.2897 F = 1.496 DW = 2.4951
♦partial coefficient.
Table 3.10
Linear Regression of Growth, Size, Profits and Diversification
Dependent variable : Growth
Constant b* t r*
Size (opening) -4.5 -0.00016 0.6928 -0.2045
Profitability (0.9889) 0.50194 3.1157*** 0.6847
Diversification 1.70579 0.6900 0.2037
2Multiple R = 0.5255
* partial coefficient 
** significant at 5%
*** significant at 1%
F = 4.061** CMIIS .5715
With regard to the contribution of diversification in the multiple re­
gression in Tables 3.8 to 3.10, although again the signs of the b co­
efficients are in the expected direction, none of them is significant 
at 10%.
Table 3.11
Zero Order and Partial Correlation Coefficients with Diversification
Partial 
Zero Order
Profits Profit Variaoility Growth Size (average)
0.2733 -0.3730 -0.1387 0.0028
0.2474 -0.2784 0.3093 0.4949
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The data in Table 3.11 emphasise the need for the use of
partial correlation coefficients. These correlation coefficients, 
relating diversification to profits etc., do so (in our case) on the 
statistical basis of the other variables being equal among all firms. 
This is particularly necessary when some of these other variables are 
related both to each other and to diversification. For example, size 
is fairly closely related to both profit variability and to diversifi­
cation: the (zero order) Spearman rank correlation coefficients of
average size (by sales) with profit variability and diversification 
are -0.5321 and 0.4949 respectively, which are signficant at 5% and 10% 
respectively. The partial correlation coefficient table above gives 
one a measure of the relationship between diversification alone (and 
not size) and profit variability. It is particularly interesting to 
note the contrast between the zero-order and partial coefficients in 
respect of growth and size with respect to diversification.
Finally with regard to linear regression, diversification was 
treated as the dependent variable, and profitability, size, growth 
and employee income were chosen as independent variables. The total 
degree of explanatoriness of these four independent variables was low 
and the DW statistic revealed signs of autocorrelation. This 
latter finding is not of course surprising given the dichotomous 
nature of the dependent variable. The detailed results were as 
follows.
Table 3.12
Linear Regression of Diversification, Profitability, Size, Growth and 
Employee Incomes
140
Dependent variable: Diversification
Constant b * t r*
Profitability -0.51
Opening Size (Sales) (0.9273)
Growth (Sales)
Average Wage (1968-70)
0.00532
0.00000
0.01683
1.43670
0.1983
0.1993
0.4544
0.8024
0.0626
0.0629
0.1422
0.2460
Multiple R2 0.1979 F = 0.6166 DW = 0.8586
* partial coefficient.
These results indicate quite clearly that factors economic or
managerial other than those included in the present analysis appear
to have a much greater impact upon diversification than those chosen
above. Indeed interestingly if one analyses the data for Table
3.12 in terms of stepwise regression, then of the degree of explanat-
2oriness of 19.79% (R ) offered by the independent variables taken 
together, 13.70% out of 19.79% is contributed by the fourth independent 
variable relating to employee incomes. Also from Table 3.12 there 
appears, perhaps surprisingly in the light of the circumstances of this 
individual industry, to be no indication that firms which wished to 
grow found it necessary to diversify.
Nonparametric tests are particularly suitable for investigating a 
phenomenon such as diversification where we are concerned with a 
variable which can be measured only on a nominal or classificatory 
scale (in our case firms are either Diversified or Non-diversified), 
and where the number of observations is small. We therefore tested 
for the impact of diversification upon profitability, profit variability 
and growth, using nonparametric tests relating to two independent 
samples, and applying one-tailed tests of significance in the directions 
indicated in the foregoing analysis using parametric tests.
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The results of the nonparametric tests were as follows.
Table 3.13
Nonparametric Tests of Diversification
Association of Fisher's Mann- Randomis­
Diversification Exact Whitney ation Rho
with: D U* t**
Profitability 2 0.198 1.0455 0.2474
Growth (Sales) 3 0.232 1.1250 0.3093
Profit Variability 5 0.168 1.4405*** -0.2784
Opening Size (Sales) 2**** 0.036**** 0.7143 0.4021***
Average Wage 1968-70 2 0.095*** 1.3529*** 0.3712***
* results given in terms of probability of observed U under H , one- 
tailed test.
** this t is to be interpreted on a nonparametric basis. On this 
and on these tests in general see S. Siegel, Nonparametric Tests 
for the Behavioural Sciences (Tokyo: McGraw-Hill Kogakusha, 1956) 
Ch. 6. These results correspond to the parametric t test in 
Table 3.7.
*** significant at 10%, one-tailed. 
**** significant at 5%, one-tailed.
The results of the range of nonparametric tests confirm our earlier 
univariate statistical conclusions on both the "causes" and the impact 
of diversification. There appears on the basis of the nonparametric 
tests to be evidence at this level of a relationship between diversifi­
cation and profit variability in the expected direction, and in partic­
ular between diversification and opening firm size, and between diversi­
fication and our measure of the quality of labour.
E. Conclusions
The bulk of the material in this chapter has been concerned with 
reporting the results of an analysis of diversification strategies at a
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number of levels. The final section affords an opportunity to knit 
together a number of themes which has emerged. Rather than summaris­
ing the findings of Sections B., C., and D., the purpose of the 
conclusions section is to draw simultaneously upon those approaches 
to analysing diversification conduct. The themes which have emerged 
in this chapter are the need for diversification in a declining market, 
the directions of diversification, the characteristics of diversifying 
firms, the contribution of diversification to company performance, and 
the problems encountered by firms in pursuing diversification 
strategies.
No market which contracted so rapidly as that for traditional 
jute products could do so without imposing the need for considerable 
adjustment on the companies involved. Company deaths on a fairly 
significant scale followed the onset of technological competition from 
polypropylene in the late 1960’s. However, diversification has not 
been totally necessary for survival in the market. Some three or four 
companies (including one fairly large unit) have survived without the 
adoption of new technology. It must also be remembered that jute 
continues to be a fairly significant part of the operations of firms 
such as Don Bros. Buist, and Scott & Robertson, as well as Sidlaw and 
Craiks who have sought new markets for jute in the area of decorative 
wallcoverings. Thus despite diversifying firms continuing with jute 
operations, spinning and weaving of jute alone has for some businesses 
been a viable strategy for survival.
So far as directions of diversification are concerned, the 
product which displaced jute from many of its end-use areas - polypropy­
lene - has not been adopted by all firms. For some businesses carpet
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manufacturing and engineering operations have taken the place of jute 
with success in the longer term.
Obviously, however, the major strategy followed by continuing
firms in the market has been diversification into polypropylene -
either weaving slit tape into cloth or also undertaking the extrusion
of polypropylene film. One question which arises is whether those
surviving firms which have diversified can be identified by any
particular statistical characteristic. Firm size is one such variable
which suggests itself; either in terms of the effect of the size
variable itself or other company characteristics which may accompany
size, such as a separation of professional management control from
38hereditary family ownership. Existing share of the traditional
jute market may be another important variable regarding the extent of 
diversification. Family management, however, is such a pervasive 
characteristic of this industry that one cannot use its incidence as a 
means of distinguishing between diversifying and non-diversifying firms. 
In particular, some of the most successful diversifying firms of all 
sizes over the period from the mid 1960's to the mid 1970's were 
controlled and led by shareholding entrepreneurs. One thinks here of 
the Tough family at Scott & Fyfe, the Low family at Don Bros. Buist, 
and the Low and Bonar families in the Low & Bonar Group. Company 
size, as brought out in Table 3.12, is not a significant determinant of 
diversification; although the results of the nonparametric tests 
contradict this. In some respects the finding of the parametric 
tests is surprising, as one might have thought that in respect of a 
diversification strategy requiring adoption of a new technology which 
was not only more definitely "science-based" than jute, but also sig­
nificantly more capital intensive, size would have been a considerable
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advantage, or even something of a prerequisite for successful diversi- 
39fication. But despite the need for large capital sums for
investment in polypropylene weaving (around £32,000 per 5-metre loom
in 1977), neither large initial capital requirements nor economies of
scale (or diseconomies through operating at a relatively small scale
or low degree of vertical integration) seem to have constituted barriers
to entry to smaller firms to the league of diversifiers. So far as
the influence of existing market share of the traditional jute industry
is concerned and its influence upon diversification policy, those firms
which were dominant in the former market - such as Sidlaw, and Scott &
Robertson - appear to have put more effort into remaining in the market
than other businesses, large or small, whose dependence upon jute was 
40less. While in one sense this is not surprising, it does on the
other hand suggest that even where a firm is otherwise well equipped 
for diversification, a high market share in the traditional industry 
may act as a brake upon necessary adjustment to new technologies and 
markets.
An obvious question in this analysis is, did diversification 
help firms to grow, to increase profits or reduce profit variability? 
None of the results of the tests gives conclusive positive evidence on 
this. Although the results in Table 3.7 and the nonparametric tests 
in Table 3.13 suggest that diversified firms did achieve lower profit 
variability, no such result appeared from the regression analysis in 
Table 3.9. Likewise Tables 3.8 and 3.10 revealed no relationship on 
a multivariate basis between diversification and either profitability 
or growth (of sales) when other factors such as size, growth and 
profitability were taken into account. These results could be the 
outcome of misclassification of the firms in Table 3.6. This,
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however, is not felt likely to be a major factor. It may more likely
be the case that the results of diversification among firms following
this policy have taken some time to come through - much longer than the
41
10-year period analysed; or that not diversifying may in the short
run produce not dissimilar results from diversifying, i.e. poor or 
variable profitability, or low growth (of sales). Furthermore, if the 
strategy of diversification was commenced by our Diversified population 
at different times within the 1968-1977 period, and if the results of 
such policies came on stream with different speeds, this would tend to 
produce very heterogeneous responses by those diversified firms - for 
which hypothesis there is some evidence in Table 3.7.
A final theme which has persisted through the case studies has 
been that of the difficulties of managing some diversified interests, 
the encountering of unexpected problems, and the much-longer-than- 
expected time for the emergence of profits from new ventures. Engin­
eering, interestingly, is an area into which many traditional jute 
firms have entered, but in which few have been successful in the long 
term. Don Bros. Buist, Halley, Thomson Shepherd, and H. & A. Scott 
are examples of companies which have either entered and left the engin­
eering industry within the last 15 years, or whose engineering subsid-
42iaries have remained relatively unsuccessful.
In general, management of diversifying firms appear to have en-
43countered a number of unforeseen technical problems in diversifying; 
and a further common experience among such firms has been the failure 
of diversified areas of business to generate earnings sufficiently 
quickly to compensate either for the large amounts of invested capital 
or to cover declining profits in traditional textiles. The prospect
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of this hiatus may have discouraged or precluded smaller firms from 
following a policy of diversification. Although this situation has 
been commented on in the case studies by the chairmen of nearly all of 
the major firms, the data which perhaps best illustrate the problem are 
those of a smaller company.
Table 3.14
William Halley & Sons Ltd.
Spinning, Manufacturing Distribution of Motor
and Merchanting of Cars, Agricultural and
Textiles* Horticultural Implements
Sales Margin** Sales Margin**
(E'OOO) (%) (£’000) (%)
1968 2,420 6.4 1,632 1 . 2
1969 2,159 6 .2 1,708 1.0
1970 1,946 2 .2 1,955 1 . 8
1971 2,536 (3.0) 2,017 1 . 6
1972 3,707 1 . 6 2,816 2.3
1973 4,601 1 .8 3,379 2.8
1974 5,294 6 .0 3,359 2.8
1975 4,181 0 .6 5,405 2.9
1976 4,994 6.5 6,750 2.5
1977 5,773 7.1 9,021 4.4
* In the case of Halley this includes synthetics as well as jute
** Profit Margin 
proportion of
is the pre-tax profit 
turnover.
in each sales area as a
Source: Company Annual Reports & Accounts.
In the absence of data for capital employed in each area, one can 
only note the gradual buildup of non-textile sales: from some 40% in
1968 to around half in 1971, and to about 61% in 1977. In respect of 
average profit margins, the 10-year arithmetic mean for Textiles was 
3.5% compared with 2.3% for non-textile activities; although the 
variability is greater with respect to Textiles, and there is a more 
distinctly upward trend in the non-textile area. The chairman of the
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company himself in this case emphasised the long-term nature of the 
rewards from diversification, and the short-term pressures on profits 
and liquidity. Such problems were due "in the main to the time lag 
between building up profitable diversifications, which utilise much 
capital, whilst at the same time maintaining the capital employed in
44our jute manufacturing activity, which is declining in profitability".
As a final point, it may be noted that, although this study has
not been able to shed any light on some of the more sophisticated
45hypotheses regarding diversification, so far as the results of the 
multivariate parametric tests relating to firm size, profits or profit 
variability and diversification, or the tendency for an inverse relation­
ship to exist between industry growth and the extent of firm diversifi­
cation, the findings of this study are largely consistent with those of
more specialist analyses in the field insofar as these are directly 
46comparable.
The material in this chapter, dealing with the market conduct or 
behaviour of firms, has allowed us to indulge in few generalisations. 
Admittedly there have been some common features relating to the firms 
in the industry over the period from the mid 1960's to 1977. Most, 
but by no means all, of the surviving firms from the traditional jute 
industry have entered the polypropylene field. For most of the 
diversifying businesses, but again not for all, diversification has 
been a difficult policy to implement, and for a variety of reasons 
which this study has not been able fully to investigate. Beyond this 
few generalisations are possible. Variables such as the size of the 
firm, the quality of its workforce (and perhaps especially of its 
management);, or the attachment of a business to the traditional jute 
industry may also have had an influence on market conduct at the
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company level. We can only conclude here that with respect to their 
response to the rapid contraction of the jute industry local firms 
behaved in a variety of ways with varied outcomes. The following 
chapter seeks to examine these outcomes at the industry level in more 
detail under the heading of market performance.
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Chapter IV
Economic Performance
A. Introduction
The major concern of any economic study of an industry must be 
the way in which the market has operated over a given period. In more 
formal terms one is examining the resource-allocation and welfare as­
pects of the market mechanism in a particular area. The concern of 
the industrial organisation economist is both less formally stated and 
more open-ended. Bain, for example, defines market performance as 
"the composite of end results which firms in any market arrive at by 
pursuing whatever lines of conduct (or behaviour) they espouse".^  Thus 
one purpose of presenting the material in this chapter is to bring to­
gether data on such "end results" which can be used in arriving at more 
general conclusions in the final chapter. In this particular case the
market performance has been analysed in terms of dimensions reflecting
2company "financial" performance, the use of labour, investment and 
modernisation, and research and development. In the final section of 
this chapter conclusions are offered on the findings detailed in the 
earlier sections.
As usual in economics studies a severe limiting factor in the 
analysis is the availability of raw data. None of these below is per­
fect for the purpose for which it is used; but the data are believed 
to be the best available. This situation with regard to raw data 
often means that the economic conclusions cannot be as strongly drawn 
as one would like. As the advice of R.G.D. Allen below indicates, the
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whole issue is one of judgement and balance: perhaps nowhere more so
than in the area of economics.
"The job of the statistician is to get material of the 
greatest possible accuracy and then to make the best 
use of it. He should not, however, discard imperfect 
data if nothing better is available. Not even the 
most subtle and skilful analysis can overcome completely 
the unreliabilitv of basic data, but the best can always 
be made of a bad job. Some material, so rough as to 
be insufficient for fine analysis, may still support 
particular conclusions. The skilled statistician knows 
where he can proceed and where he must stop."
The analysis of market performance in this chapter is carried out 
at a number of levels. The first function of the data is simply to 
present measures of economic performance, the characteristics or var­
iables being chosen on the basis of what microeconomic theory regards 
as being the relevant and salient factors in exploring market perform­
ance. The variables chosen here are "financial" measures of perform­
ance, measures of labour usage, measures of investment, and of research 
and development. The data under these headings have been drawn from 
both primary and secondary sources.
The second purpose of measuring market performance is to use the 
data gathered as a basis for testing hypotheses based upon microeconomic 
theory, and for establishing statistical relationships. Thus in 
addition to simply measuring company profitability, growth, labour 
productivity, and levels of investment or research it is desirable to 
measure the trend of the variables against time, to measure the degree 
of association or explanitoriness between variables, and so arrive at 
conclusions regarding the relative importance of the range of variables.
The third purpose of measuring individual aspects of market
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performance in this study is to formulate conclusions both with regard 
to performance overall and also in the context of the study as a 
whole.
Although the individual statistical tests used in each case will
be discussed in their specific context, a word needs to be said here
about statistical tests in general. First, the statistics used here
are to be interpreted as a summary of what the data tell us. Since
we are dealing with a relatively small number of observations in each
test, and since these constitute our population rather than a sample,
the underlying conditions for statistical inference are not necessarily
present. Any such findings are of course valid only in respect of our
group of firms over our restricted time period. Second, the type of
statistical test required in this area of inquiry is one which will
measure trends, differences and association so as to allow one to infer
economic relationships from the data. There are broadly speaking two
types of tests available: parametric and nonparametric. The former
require that certain assumptions be made about the population from
which the sample statistics are drawn. The most significant for our
purpose is that the data in the populations are normally distributed;
the other principal one is that populations being compared have equal
variances. There is evidence to suggest that the former of these two
conditions does not hold for many economic data of the type being 
4analysed here. Thus for our purposes nonparametric or "distribution 
free" statistical tests are appropriate, and have been used along with 
the more traditional parametric tests. It is also the case that non­
parametric tests are more appropriate where the number of observations
is fairly small, as is certainly the case in this study. 5
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B. Company Financial Performance
The function of this first section is to appraise the financial 
economic performance of those firms falling into the jute industry cate­
gory: performance here being defined by reference to standard accounting
ratios, and thus reflecting only these aspects of a firm's performance.
One of the major difficulties here is that of linking company 
financial performance as analysed below, and economic efficiency, at 
either the firm, market or national level. In some respects our addit­
ional analysis under other market performance headings will enable us to 
qualify and extend the results of the accounting analysis. One must 
nonetheless bear in mind certain qualifications in assuming any corres­
pondence between company and economy performance. These two phenomena 
have been separated under the respective titles of "business efficiency"
and "economic efficiency" by Amey; and only under very restricted con-
6ditions, it is argued, can the latter be equated with the former. In 
most microeconomics studies a firm's profits (expressed as a ratio of 
its capital employed) are accepted as a measure of the efficiency or 
surplus created by the excess value of output over the value of the 
resources used. However, this acceptance, when translated into market 
terms, ignores such issues as whether the firm is operating at the most 
efficient scale or point on its cost curve (technical efficiency), or 
whether the best technical methods or market opportunities available 
are being used or sought out (X-efficiency). It also fails to recog­
nise the value to society of the resources which the firm has consumed 
(their opportunity cost); and also the fact that the product or product­
ion process employed by the firm (or the act of consumption by users of 
the product) may have wider spillover effects, in the form of costs or
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benefits, on the rest of society (the problem of externalities).
Finally, such acceptance also assumes that firms are operating in 
structurally competitive markets - where conditions of perfect or 
near perfect competition obtain. Further "upsetting" conditions to 
this equating of business and economic efficiency include the existence 
of taxes or subsidies, import or export restrictions etc. Nonetheless, 
the approach used here is to analyse company accounting data over as 
great a proportion of the major period of the study as possible in order 
to study business efficiency as a proxy for economic efficiency.
It is also recognised, of course, that company accounting data them­
selves are in many respects imperfect for purposes of economic analysis. 
For example, not only is there little correspondence between the 
economist's and the accountant's concepts of business income and asset 
valuation; but within the standard conventions of accounting practice 
there may be a serious lack of comparability of data over time or between 
the data relating to small firms and large businesses. It is considered, 
however, that an examination of such data is indispensable in arriving at 
a view on company performance. Furthermore, as one author has commented, 
and whose work is largely based upon the use of company accounting data, 
these figures are the results of considerable labour by internal company 
accounting staff, are verified by the auditing profession which itself 
ensures a degree or standardisation of company final accounts across the
economy (or at least within a single industry), and are anyhow the
7accepted basis of much national income accounting data. Thus despite
the widely recognised pitfalls involved in using company accounting data
for economic analysis, it was felt that such analysis is indispensable as
a basis for broader conclusions on the performance of this particular 
8market.
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The analysis of industry performance in terms of company 
accounting data is perforce largely limited to the period 1968-1977, 
since it was only with the coming into force of the 1967 Companies Act 
that company accounting data became statutorily available in respect of 
smaller (private) companies; and it is also only since that time that 
turnover and employment data have had to be revealed by firms in their 
annual reports. Data on profits, assets and sales (turnover) as well 
as on employment have been used. These were obtained in respect of 16
firms which continued in existence from 1967 to 1977; and data were 
abstracted directly by the candidate from the annual returns made by the 
companies concerned and filed at Companies House in London (prior to 
their remove to Cardiff) and Edinburgh. It has thus been possible to 
adopt with accuracy the desired definitions of the data outlined above, 
and these definitions are discussed in more detail below.
Finally it should be emphasised that because of the above- 
mentioned pitfalls involved in using company accounting data it is not 
a simple matter to formulate a model of the expected behaviour of such 
data. What one is basically looking for are changes in the behaviour 
of profitability, asset, sales and employment data. In analysing 
profitability data one can examine the average and variability of 
profits over a period; and with respect to assets and sales one can 
measure growth and variability. So far as the breakdown of the profit­
ability ratio of rate of return on capital employed into sales margin 
and capital turnover is concerned, there is no single interpretation of 
movements in these subsidiary ratios. Increased sales margins, for 
example, might be taken to reflect greater market power, as against the 
increased efficiency implied by faster capital turnover. However, 
sales margin increases may alternatively simply reflect greater customer
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preference for the firm's products and so a degree of improved
9marketing efficiency. For this reason these subsidiary ratios have 
not been analysed.
Profitability:
Although there is a number of flaws in its computation, the most 
widely accepted measure of aggregate company performance remains the 
rate of return on capital employed. In this study the ratio was de­
fined as the profits in any one year after deduction of the usual 
business expenses (including directors' fees and depreciation) but 
before deduction of interest on preference shares, debentures, or long­
term loans (including bank borrowing), expressed as a ratio of the net 
assets of the firm, defined correspondingly as total assets less non­
bank current liabilities. The ratio adopted here is a measure of the 
return on the total invested capital in the business without regard to
the individual sources of finance. This is felt to be the definition
10appropriate to the purpose of the study.
Turning to the data on profits (i.e. the profitability ratios) for 
the 16 firms over the period 1968-1977, three separate areas of investi­
gation suggest themselves. The first basic question asked is, was there 
a trend of the profit ratios over time? Second, was there any change 
in the Drofit performance between the two sub-periods 1968-1972 and 1973- 
1977? Third, what are the major explanatory variables (both on a uni­
variate and on a multivariate basis) with regard to the profit perform­
ance of the 16 firms over the ten-year period?
The initial attempt to answer the first question, on the trend of
1 6 1
profits, involved an analysis of the linear regression of the un­
adjusted profit ratios of each of the 16 firms, and also of the 16- 
firm average, against time. In this case the significance and explan­
atory power of the linear equations were so low that no conclusion as to 
the trend can be drawn. Thus, using the standard parametric test for 
trend (the b coefficient of this regression of profitability and time) 
one cannot establish any discernible trend of the unadjusted profit 
ratios over this period. So far as nonparametric tests are concerned, 
the Spearman test for rank correlation indicated a significant relation­
ship in the case of only two firms out of 16.
The above analysis was carried out very much as a "trial run" in 
order to determine whether any meaningful results arose using unadjusted 
profits data. More interest centres around the behaviour of "real" 
profit rates, i.e. adjusted for changes in the general level of profits 
in the economy. The conversion of the unadjusted to "real" profit 
rates was carried out by constructing a time series of profit ratios for 
"Manufacturing Industries" from Business Monitor MA3 "Company Finance". 
This time series, covering listed and unlisted companies, was converted 
into index form (1967 = 100), and the unadjusted profit ratios for each 
firm were multiplied by the reciprocal of the above index for the 
appropriate year. The result of this computation is a set of profit 
ratios for each of the 16 firms which tells us how the firm was perform­
ing "relative to manufacturing industry as a whole". To look at it 
another way, changes in the general macro business environment have 
been eliminated; and it may also be claimed that the general tendency 
for inflation to increase "historic cost" rates of return on capital 
employed has also been allowed for. This type of correction, therefore, 
although not without statistical flaws, is highly desirable in measuring
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profit ratios over time, and is indeed absolutely essential if compari­
sons of individual sub-period profit performance are to be carried out 
(see below). The results of regressing such data against time are 
little different from those using unadjusted data. In all but two 
cases the slope of the regression coefficient was not significant at 
10%. The Spearman coefficient of rank correlation likewise failed to 
suggest any relationship with time.
The final, and admittedly rather crude, approach in measuring the 
trend of profits was to use the sign of the b coefficient in the linear 
regression equation for each of the 16 firms as a means of measuring 
whether across the board there were, say, more increases than decreases 
in profit rates over time. On this basis nonparametric tests were 
adopted to indicate whether for the 16 firms as a whole over the ten- 
year period there was a generally upward or downward trend in profita­
bility. The raw data were as follows.
Table 4.1
Sign of b Coefficient in Regression Equations
Positive Negative Total
Profits Data: Unadjusted 7 9 16
Adjusted 6 10 16
The one-sample tests used were the binomial test and chi-squared. These 
are nonparametric tests designed to measure the extent to which an 
occurrence deviates from the expected: in our case the null hypothesis
being that there was no trend - that one would expect from our group 
of 16 firms 8 increases and 8 decreases in the trend of profit rates 
over the period.
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Table 4.2
Probability of Observed Results Under Null Hypothesis
Binomial
Test
Chi
Squared
Unadjusted
Real
0.454
0.804
0.3
0.5
These results confirm, as did analysis of the 16-firm average of the 
profit ratios using the Cox-Stuart test for trend, that neither on a 
parametric nor on a nonparametric basis is there any indication of an 
upward or downward trend in profits for those 16 surviving firms in the 
jute industry over the decade to 1977.
The conclusions regarding economic performance which one can 
draw from this analysis of profit trends must be tentative. Nonethe­
less, even allowing for the omission from our analysis of those firms 
which "died" within the period, we can conclude that those 16 continuing 
films, which at the beginning of the period accounted for about 85% of 
Dundee jute spinning and weaving activity, did not as a group suffer 
any reduction in profitability during a time when output of their trad­
itional product fell by around 65%. As was noted in Chapter III a 
major response to the decline of the traditional jute market was diversi­
fication. This strategy, although it was not pursued bv all firms, was 
adopted by the majority, and may thus have contributed to the maintenance 
of profit levels over this period.
Finally on this aspect of profitability, the data on adjusted 
profit ratios were used to calculate the intragroup variability of 
profits. A simple time series of the variability of profits among 
the 16 firms in each of the ten years was calculated and measured
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against time. This measure tells us whether over the period the 
group of firms was becoming more or less homogeneous with regard to 
profitability.
Table 4.3
Linear Regression of Intragroup Profit Variability and Time
Dependent Variable b t 2R Rho DW*
Standard deviation 
Coeff. of variation
-0.1242
-1.5832
0.3493
0.2374
0.0150
0.0070
-0.1273
-0.0303
1.3793
1.1937
* the Durbin-Watson statistic designed to test for serial correlation 
among the residuals in O.L.S. regression. See W.C. Merrill & K.A. 
Fox, Introduction to Economic Statistics (New York: Wiley, 1970) 
pp.415-16. For all data in this study serial correlation was 
tested for using a two-tailed test. In this particular case the 
statistic was not significant at 10%, but within the indeterminate 
range in respect of the coefficient of variation.
Table 4.3 above shows that the slope of the linear regression
equation in respect of both the standard deviation and the coefficient
2of variation was negative but not significant. The figures for R 
are very low, and the Spearman coefficients of rank correlation are 
negative but not significant. The conclusion is that the variability 
of profits among the group of firms did not change significantly over 
the period, telling us that as a group the firms became neither more 
nor less homogeneous with respect to profitability over the period 
1968-1977.
Turning to the second major question under the heading of profit 
performance, that of the performance of the firms over the two sub­
periods 1968-1972 and 1973-1977, the first question being asked is: 
assuming that we can break down the total 10-year period into a first 
subperiod of initial adjustment to the demise of the market for jute 
and the rise of polypropylene, and a second subperiod of consolidation
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of diversification strategies where appropriate, is it possible to 
identify these periods by reference to the profit performance of the 
firms? Comparison was made of the means of the real or adjusted 
profit ratios in each of the two subperiods for each firm and also in 
respect of the 16-firm average. It should be noted that in respect 
of all measures of mean profit rates it is the arithmetic rather than 
the geometric mean which is used. This is necessary because of the 
incidence of negative rates of return, i.e. losses, in a number of 
instances. Using the normal (two-tailed) t test, in no single case 
among the 16 firms were the subperiod average profit ratios significant­
ly different at 5% (no more were significant at 10%). Additionally 
the two subperiod means of the 16 firms were treated as 16 paired ob­
servations. The appropriate t test applied to these date likewise 
failed to yield significant results (t = 1.2353 where df = 15)
Table 4.4
Probability of Observed Results Under Null Hypothesis
Sign Test 0.804
Wilcoxon T = 51.5
Table 4.4 gives the results of the nonparametric tests applied to the 
subperiod profitability data. Neither the Sign Test nor the Wilcoxon 
Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test suggest that the null hypothesis 
that there was no difference between the adjusted profit ratio means 
for the two subperiods can be disproved. It must therefore generally 
be concluded that for the continuing firms in the industry over this 
period there was no significant change in the mean profit levels from 
one subperiod to another.
A second, closely related issue under this general heading of sub-
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profit levels relative to one another, and also that of whether
profitability in the latter subperiod is in any sense the outcome of
profitability in the former. The first issue was examined by means
of the Spearman coefficient of rank correlation. Rho was calculated
in respect of the 16 pairs of subperiod rates of return. The value of
the coefficient was 0.5559, which on a two-tailed basis is significant 
12at 5%. This suggests that there was considerable relative
stability of profit levels within the group over the two 5-year sub­
periods .
Looking at the question of the linear relationship between profits 
in the latter subperiod (as the dependent variable) and profits in the 
former, one is not necessarily suggesting a causal relationship between 
the two. This could only be hypothesised if, for example, profits in 
the earlier subperiod created growth which transferred a firm into a 
higher size class, which in turn was associated with increased profit­
ability. What any linear association may, however, suggest is a 
persistency in a later period of the factors which determined the level 
of profits in an earlier one. The linear regression in respect of 
the two subperiods for our group of firms was as follows.
Table 4.5
Linear Regression of Average Profit Ratios in Two Subperiods
2Constant b t R DW
6 .0 0.5361 3.7359*  0.4991 2.0193**
* significant at 1%; ** not significant at 10%.
Table 4.5 indicates a significant positive relationship between
period profit analysis is that of the maintenance by firms of their
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profits in the two subperiods, with around 50% of the variation in 
average profitability in 1973-1977 being explained by relative profit­
ability 1968-1972. The b coefficient of less than unity suggests a 
degree of regression in profitability over the two periods. Companies
which performed well 1968-1972 also performed well 1973-1977 but not to
13the same extent, and similarly for poor performers.
These two pieces of analysis again suggest that there was little 
disturbance in the profit position of the firms over the two subperiods; 
and therefore reinforce our earlier conclusion that in terms of relative 
(i.e. adjusted) profitability the period 1968-1977 was not a particularly 
upsetting one for the industry.
The third question to be answered in the context of the analysis
of profitability is, what appear to have been the major determinants of
14profits and profit variability in the industry? Using data in res­
pect of the 15 firms for which all the necessary information was 
available, and taking firstly the 10-year average level of profitability 
(1968-1977) as the dependent variable, size (in terms of opening and 
average assets and sales) and growth (also in terms of both assets and 
sales) were used as possible independent variables. Table 4.6 below 
presents the results of the regression analysis.
Table 4.6
Linear Regression of Profitability, Size and Growth 
Dependent variable: 10-year average profit ratio
Independent Variable Constant b t 2R DW**
Average assets 9.8 0.00023 0.7907 0.0459 1.5068
Opening assets 9.9 0.00037 0.6667 0.0330 1.4948
Average sales 9.7 0.00013 0.8565 0.0534 1.4980
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Opening sales 9.7 0.00022 0.7658 0.0432 1.4866
Asset growth 4.6 0.5691 3.4936* 0.4844 2.1250
Sales growth -0 . 1 0.9587 3.8846* 0.5371 2.0903
* significant at 1 %; ** in no case significant at 10%.
As the data in Table 4.6 indicate, the signs of the b coefficients
were all in the "expected" direction. In the case of the size variables,
however, on no occasion was the t statistic relating to the b coefficient
2significant at 10%, and the,values of R (the coefficient of determin­
ation) were low. The effect of growth on average profits over the period 
was much more pronounced. The t statistic in respect of the b co­
efficient was significant at 1% with regard to both asset and sales 
growth, and the coefficient of determination in each case was around 50%.
A similar distinction in impact was brought out using multiple linear re­
gression and including size and growth simultaneously as independent var­
iables . This multivariate analysis is essential if one is to distinguish 
clearly the separate impact of more than one independent variable where 
there is a strong relationship among the independent variables themselves.
Table 4.7
Multiple Regression of Profitability, Size and Growth 
Dependent variable: 10-year average profit ratio
Independent Variables Constant b* t r*
Size (average assets) 4.3 0.00011 0.5186 0.1481
Growth (assets) 0.55533
2
3.2724***
**
0.6866
Multiple R = 0.4957 F =5.897 DW = 2.2465****
Size (average sales) -0.7 0.00009 0.7959 0.2239
Growth (sales) 0.93690
o
3.7193*** 0.7318 
***
Multiple R = 0.5603 F = 7.646 DW = 2.0903****
* partial coefficients; ** significant at 5%;
*** significant at 1%; **** not significant at 10%.
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For this particular group of firms over this period we can con­
clude that size was not a significant determinant of profitability, but 
that there was a significant positive linear relationship between 
growth and profits. In this latter case we must, however, accept that 
the analysis so far does not make it clear whether it is growth which 
is conducive to profitability, or whether it is only profitable firms 
which are, for example through the generation of internal finance, able 
to grow. This latter issue is examined below as part of the analysis 
of growth.
The general findings in this area of the impact of size and
growth on profitability so far as U.K. data are concerned are still a
matter of some dispute. We may conclude, however, that our findings
on the profits-size relationship are not in conflict with those of most 
16U.K. studies.
With regard to profit variability over the period, this was■ 
measured in terms of the simple time variability of profits (the stand­
ard deviation about the 10-year mean), the time variability relative to 
the mean (the coefficient of variation) , and also variability around the 
linear trend of profits as measured by the residual variance about the 
trend.
Table 4.8
Linear Regression of Profit Variability and Size
Independent Variable Constant b t 2R DW**
Dependent variable: standard deviation of 10-year profit ratios
Average assets 8.9 -0.00028 1.5984 0.1642 1.6795
Opening assets 8.9 -0.00052 1.5409 0.1545 1.6711
Average sales 9.0 -0.00015 1.6498 0.1731 1.7026
Opening sales 9.0 -0.00027 1.5864 0.1622 1.7076
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Dependent variable: coeff. of variation of 10-year profit ratios
Average assets 86.2 -0.00293 1.8363* 0.2059 1.8986
Opening assets 85.9 -0.00529 1.6935 0.1807 1.9333
Average sales 88.0 -0.00162 1.9742* 0.2307 1.8928
Opening sales 87.7 -0.00288 1.7504 0.1984 1.8904
Dependent variable: residual variance about 10-year linear trend
Average assets 101.9 -0.00457 1.1505 0.0924 2.0867
Opening assets 102.3 -0.00863 1.1227 0.0884 2.0758
Average sales 104.6 -0.00251 1.2137 0.1018 2.0426
Opening sales 104.7 -0.00459 1.1837 0.0973 2.0185
* significant at 10%. ** / not significant at 10% .
These results show that, using parametric tests, size had the effect
of reducing profit variability at any level of significance only if this
was measured in terms of the coefficient of variation with size measured
in terms of average values. As in the case of the profits-size analysis,
17this finding is not out of line with those of U.K. studies generally.
Finally in this analysis of profitability, the relationship between 
profits and size or growth, and profit variability and size was checked 
using a number of nonparametric tests. Of such tests available for test­
ing hypotheses about two independent samples, four were chosen which were 
appropriate for testing differences in central tendency among populations
of our size. These are the Fisher Exact Probability Test, the Mann-
18Whitney U Test, the Randomisation Test and Spearman's Rho. These non­
parametric tests were used to duplicate the analysis of the impact of 
size upon profitability and profit variability, the fuller analysis of 
the profits-growth relationship being delayed until the next subsection 
on growth. The results of the nonparametric tests are presented in 
Table 4.9 below.
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Table 4.9
Nonparametnc Analysis of Profits, Profit Variability and Size
Fisher's Mann- Random-
Exact Whitney isation Rho
Profitability and Size:
Average assets 
Opening assets 
Average sales 
Opening sales
Profitability and Growth;
Assets
Sales
Profit Variability and Size:
i. Standard deviation: 
Average assets 
Opening assets 
Average sales 
Opening sales
ii. Coefficient of variation: 
Average assets 
Opening assets 
Average sales 
Opening sales
iii. Residual variance: 
Average assets 
Opening assets 
Average sales 
Opening sales
U t
1 16 1.2272 0.2821
2 1 1 1.2400 0.0036
1 13 1.3333 0.2929
3 20 0.8085 0.1500
1* 1 1 ** 2.0750* 0.6130**
1 * 13** 1.9000* 0.6857**1
0 7** 2.0000* -0.6988***
0 10 1.3793 -0.5179**
10* 1.5384 -0.5702**
0** 10** 2.7917** -0.5845**
0* 2*** 3.1535*** -0.7143***
1 12 0.7946 -0.4500*
2 10** 1.6163 -0.6393***
3 18 1.0854 -0.5000*
0 8** 1.5787 -0.6679***
0 15 1.1960 -0.5643**
0* 12* 2.0635* -0.5321**
0* 14 2.2478** -0.5643**
Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1%.
We are now in a position to summarise the findings on profit perform­
ance for this group of firms over the period 1968-1977. These findings 
may be stated briefly as follows.
1. There was no significant upward or downward trend of profits 
over the period relative to U.K. manufacturing industry as a 
whole.^
2. As measured by both the standard deviation and coefficient of 
variation of the intragroup profit ratios in each year, there 
was no trend of increased or decreased homogeneity of the 
group as regards firm profitability over the period.
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3. Considering the two subperiods 1968-1972 and 1973-1977, 
there were no significant differences in profit perform­
ance among the firms over the two subperiods.
4. The relative profitability of the firms to one another 
within the group, as measured by the Spearman rank cor­
relation coefficient, did not change significantly over 
the two subperiods.
5. There was a significant linear relationship between the 
16-firm set of average profit ratios for the two sub­
periods .
6. This particular group of firms over the period 1968-1977 
displayed no significant relationship between size and 
profitability, or between size and profit variability, 
although the non-parametric tests whose results are 
summarised in Table 4.9 did suggest that there was a 
relationship between firm size and profit variability 
over time. It was also noted that there was a signi­
ficant positive linear relationship between growth and 
profits, supported by the results of the non-parametric 
tests.
The general picture which emerges then is one of stability of profit 
performance so far as this group of firms is concerned. The profits 
and profit variability-size relationship is also consistent with compar­
able U.K. studies. Even accepting that we are studying the performance 
of a surviving or continuing group of firms (data on those firms which 
died during the period are not available), some of the results are still 
a little surprising.
Growth :
The growth variable must be regarded as a particularly important 
measure of company performance in an industry where the traditional 
market has been characterised by rapid decline. Growth on the part 
of an individual firm under such conditions implies either superior 
performance within the traditional market (significantly increasing 
market share), or successful diversification in moving into new market 
areas.
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Singh and Whittington in their econometric study of firm growth
distinguish between willingness and ability to grow on the part of 
20firms. The former characteristic, willingness, reminds one that
not all management/ownership classes of business may have a high desire
or incentive to grow; and since the pattern of ownership or management
is likely to be related to firm size, with smaller businesses being
owner-managed, this suggests that on this ground at least growth may be
21a function of firm size. With regard to profitability and growth,
one would expect a fairly close causal relatiopship from the former to
the latter. On the oasis of a very simple financial model involving
no access to new outside funds (which may not depart so far from
22reality for our population of films) the maximum asset growth rate, 
g, is determined by the product of the profitability of capital employed 
and the extent of corporate savings. Thus, g = (P/K) (R/P) where P = 
profits, K = capital employed, and R = retentions. It would be 
accepted that the thinking behind this expression can be extended to 
include cases where growth can also be financed externally, as share­
holders (existing and potential), debenture holders and bankers will all 
regard past profit performance by a business as a primary indicator in 
arriving at their lending decision.
There are two aspects of growth to be examined here. First, what 
appear to be the causal factors behind growth for our group of firms, 
and in particular what are the roles of size and profitability? Second, 
is there any evidence of persistency of growth within the total period 
1968-1977? Looking at the first question, data on assets and sales, 
and on growth of assets and sales were used for the 15 firms for whom 
these were available. Sales data were expressed in 1967 terms by 
reference to the Index of Wholesale Prices (Textiles), and assets were
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also expressed in 1967 terms by reference to Price Index Numbers for Current
Cost Accounting (Textiles, Leather & Clothing). This enabled one to dis-
23tinguish between the volume growth of assets and sales. It is known that 
an unpublished series of jute prices is available from the Department of 
Industry. This index was not used in obtaining real sales data for our 
firms because it was regarded as too specific in respect of a group of 
firms which had moved significantly into a range of textile activities 
(and to a limited extent non-textiles) over the period 1967-1977. It may 
be argued that the relationship between profitability and growth measured 
by employment contains a number of complexities concerning labour product­
ivity and profitability. Nonetheless employment data were included for 
comparative purposes.^
The use of both asset, sales and employment data as growth measures 
was thought necessary as a cross check for a number of reasons. First, ex­
pansion of assets by a firm may indicate movement from labour- to capital- 
intensive methods of production rather than expansion of the scale of an 
enterprise. Second, a company which is profitable, and which does not 
pay out all profits as dividend, is by definition expanding its assets 
base by adding to retained earnings, thus creating a spurious and tauto­
logical relationship between profitability and asset growth. This 
would be so particularly if, as in our case, assets are measured at year- 
end values. Third, it has been pointed out that different measures 
of firm size are only "inter-changeable" (i.e. the findings in the 
type of analysis below are independent of the actual measure of firm 
size used) if the measures are proportional to each other. This 
assumes that for two input measures of firm size, for example assets 
and employment, the production function is homothetic - i.e. the iso-
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quants lie parallel to one another and thus the expansion path is
linear. Homotheticity is not something which one can assume a priori.
25Indeed there would appear to be evidence to the contrary. Likewise,
the proportionality of measures of firm size such as assets (input) and
sales (output) is likely to be upset by the presence of economies of
26scale, for the existence of which there is considerable evidence.
A final problem in using assets as a measure of firm growth in the 
context of size-growth-profitability studies is that there is some 
evidence that larger firms revalue their assets more frequently than 
smaller firms. Such revaluations obviously overstate the growth per­
formance and understate the profitability ratio of larger businesses.
Fortunately the general conclusion in Whittington's study was that this
27tendency did not seriously bias the results. In the case of our
population of firms the asset revaluations which had occurred had in­
deed been carried out by the largest firms. These were, however, 
minimal and were not corrected for in the asset data used in the tests. 
Having made these points it may nonetheless be of interest to note the 
results of the rank correlation analysis of size measures.
Table 4.10
Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients of Film Size Measures
Size Assets/Sales Sales/Employment Employment/As sets
Opening
Average
Closing
0.9679
0.9714
0.9893
0.9705
0.9634
0.9500
0.9830
0.9437
0.9500
The first part of the regression analysis involved adopting size as the 
single explanatory variable in respect of growth. The results are 
presented in Table 4.11 below.
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Table 4.11
Linear Regression of Growth and Opening Size
Dependent variable: 10-year average annual real growth rate 1968-1977*
Size (Opening) Constant b t 2R DW**
Assets -2.5 0.00018 0.2899 0.0064 1.7944
Sales 0 .0 1 0.00005 0.2175 0.0036 1.9888
Employment -2.0 -0.00026 0.2226 0.0038 2.4977
* in the case of employment the period is 1969-1977 as no 1967 data 
were available;
** not significant at 10%.
Size appears to explain no significant amount of growth, either 
in terms of assets, sales or employment. This leads one to the inter­
esting conclusion that, in this market where growth predominantly im­
plied adoption of new technology and significant new investment, firms 
which were initially large performed no better over the period than 
their smaller competitors.
The data imply that the performance of firms in this group over
the period complied with Gibrat's Law: that the proportionate rate of
growth of the firm is independent of initial size. It was decided to
28test for this explicitly using the approach of Smyth et al. The
test here is to regress the opening and closing size values in terms
29of their natural logarithms. In our case the equation is 
x± (1977) = a + bx± (1968)
where x. represents the various measures of firm size expressed in the 
form of natural logarithms. If b equals 1, or is not significantly
different from 1 , then firm growth rate is independent of opening size. 
The results are reported below.
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Table 4.12
Linear Regression of Natural Logarithms of Opening and Closing Firm Size
Size Measure
Assets
Sales
Employment 
* with respect to 1 .
Constant
-0.178
-0.040
0.253
b
0.9862
1.0129
0.9248
t*
0.0746
0.1076
0.5905
Since in no case is the t statistic in Table 4.12 significant we
may conclude that b is not significantly different from unity, and
thus that the performance of our group of firms complied with Gibrat's
Law. This result is not in conflict with general findings regarding
the relationship between firm size and growth. Over different time
periods and using different samples of companies slightly different
conclusions have been reached by different authors. A fair summary
of these studies, however, would be that no clear relationship has
30emerged between firm size and growth rates.
We now turn to profitability as an explanatory variable in respect 
of growth.
Table 4.13
Regression Analysis of Growth and Profitability
Dependent variable: growth? profits unadjusted
Growth Measure Constant b t R2 DW***
Assets -1 0 .2 0.7557 3.5116** 0.4868 2.4522
Sales -5.4 0.5243 3.3674** 0.4660 2.5947
Employment -6 .8 0.4221 2.6899* 0.3576 2.9614
*significant at 5%; **significant at 1%; ***not significant at 10%;in regard to the data on Employment the DW statistic is within the
indeterminate range.
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Table 4.14
Regression Analysis of Growth and Profitability
Dependent variable : growth; profits adjusted
Growth Measure Constant b t R2 DW***
Assets -9.8 0.8092 3.8406** 0.5316 2.4647
Sales -5.1 0.5547 3.5808** 0.4966 2.5989
Employment -6.5 0.4528 2.8954*  * 0.3920 2.9699
*significant at 5%; **significant at 1%; ***not significant at 10%
in regard to the data on Employment the DW statistic is within the 
indeterminate range.
Table 4.13 and 4.14 above highlight two points. First, employ­
ment growth is much less well explained by profitability than growth of 
assets or sales, although even in respect of employment the t statistic 
is highly significant. Second, it is relative or adjusted profitabil­
ity which has a slight edge, in terms of the coefficient of determin­
ation, over the unadjusted profit data in explaining growth in respect 
of all three growth variables. This suggests, not surprisingly, that 
it is likely to be an industry's profit performance relative to manu­
facturing industry as a whole which acts as a stimulus to new invest­
ment.
Although we have found no significant relationship between profits 
and size for this group of firms, it was decided to conduct a multiple 
regression analysis of growth, profitability and size in order clearly 
to identify the separate impact of profitability and size upon growth.
The results of this analysis are reported in Table 4.15 below.
Table 4.15
Multiple Regression Analysis of Growth, Size and Profitability
*  2Constant b* t r R F DW
**
-9.6 -0.00015 0.3317 -0.0953 0.5358 6.927*** 2.5770
Independent
Variables
Size (Assets)
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Profitability 0.82380 3.
Size (Sales) -4.8 -0.00008 0.
Profitability 0.57278 3.
6991*** 0.7300
4938 -0.1411 0.5358 6.161** 2.8650/
4968*** 0.7105
Size (Employment) 
Profitability
- 6.0  - 0.00068
0.47149
0.7361 -0.2079 0.4183 4.315** 3.1470
2.9249** 0.6450
*partial coefficients; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%;
**** not significant at 10%; / within indeterminate range.
Table 4.15 highlights the impact of profits as an explanatory variable 
in respect of growth when the impact of size has been "held constant". It 
should be noted that the t value in respect of the size variable itself 
when considered along with profitability is much greater in the case of 
labour than assets or sales. However, the relative effect of the profit­
ability variable is in the opposite direction. The coefficients of 
multiple determination in respect of the assets, sales, and employment 
equations are respectively 0.5358, 0.5066 and 0.4183.
It should be noted that one is so far hypothesising on a cross- 
sectional basis that growth in this industry over a 10-year period is a 
function of the 10-year average profit ratio relative to manufacturing 
industry. Such data do not, however, allow one to answer the question 
of whether there is any evidence of a causal relationship between profit­
ability and growth. This question may be answered by reference to time- 
series data.
In an attempt to answer this question the existing set of data on 
profits, assets and sales for each of the 15 firms and for the period 
1967-1977 were used to obtain unweighted 15-firm averages of profits, 
and sales and asset growth rates for each of the years 1968 to 1977 in­
clusive. The first relationship measured was that of 15-firm average 
profitability, and growth of assets and sales in the industry, each in
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the form of unweighted averages. Profits and growth were for the same 
year. The results are presented below.
Table 4.16
Time-Series Analysis of Growth and Profitability 
Dependent variable: growth
Growth Measure Constant b t 2R DW**
Assets -10.7 0.93877 1.1327 0.13822 1.8157
Assets* -12.4 1.24470 0.9998 0.11113 1.7970
Sales 2.5 0.22270 0.2378 0.08380 1.8273
Sales* 1 2 .2 -0.78758 0.5783 0.03948 2.0032
* adjusted profits as independent variable; 
**not significant at 10%.
The point which stands out in Table 4.16 is that although none of 
the t statistics is significant, profitability appears to be more closely 
associated with asset than sales growth.
In an attempt to establish a clearer causal relationship between 
profits and growth, the approach above was modified by regressing the 
15-firm average of profits in year t-1 against growth in year t. The 
assumption being that high levels of profit in year t- 1  would provide 
both the incentive and the finance for expansion in year t. Thus the 
absolute and relative 15-firm average profit ratios for the years 1967- 
1976 were regressed against the asset and sales growth rates for 1968- 
1977: 1967 profits to 1968 growth etc. The results were as follows.
Table 4.17
Time-Series Analysis of Growth and Profitability 
Dependent variable: growth
Growth Measure Constant b t 2R Rho DW***
Assets 4.7 -0.51415 0.6160 0.04523 -0.1394 2.0022
Assets* 15.1 -1.63075 1.3389 0.18295 -0.3576 1.9700
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Sales
Sales*
15.4
31.1
-1.03333
-2.73562
1.2571 0.16496
2.6355** 0.46484
-0.4788 1.6392
-0.6242 1.5391
* adjusted profits as independent variable;
** significant at 5%;
***not significant at 10%.
The surprising feature of these results is the consistent negative 
sign of the b coefficient, although only in the case of the last indepen­
dent variable is the coefficient significant. This implies that higher 
levels of profitability in one year are associated with lower rates of 
growth the next. For this relationship there would appear to be no 
immediate economic explanation, although one must emphasise that the 
relationship was significant only in respect of one of the growth 
measures used.
The relationship between adjusted profitability and growth was also 
tested using nonparametric statistics, and the results of this are 
presented below.
Table 4.18
Nonparametric Analysis of Size, Profitability and Growth
Fisher's Mann- Random-
Exact Whitney isation Rho
D U t
Opening Size and Growth:
Assets 2 19 0.4151 0.0983
Sales 5 24 0.2500 -0.0250
Employment 2 20 0.1351 -0.0716
Growth and Profitability:
Assets 0** 8** 2.4878** 0.6130**
Sales 2** 7** 3.4643*** 0.6857***
Employment 0** 8** 2.4444* 0.5760**
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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To answer the question relating to the persistency of growth over 
the whole period, and also to find out whether there was any evidence 
of a pattern of growth within it, the growth experience of the 15 firms 
in respect of assets, sales and employment was broken down into the two 
subperiods 1968-1972 and 1973-1977. (In the case of employment, the 
absence of 1967 data meant that the two subperiods were 1969-72 and 
1973-77). The first task was to compare the (unweighted) average 
annual growth rates in the two subperiods; and the results of this, in 
terms of both parametric and nonparametric tests, are presented below 
in Table 4.19.
Table 4.19
Comparison of Average Annual Growth Rates in Two Subperiods
Average Annual Prob. Under HoGrowth ]Rate t** t Sign Wil-
Test coxon1968-72 1974-77
Assets -2.1 -2 .2 0.0387 . 0.0238 1.000 T = 47
Sales 2.8 -1.3 2.7333*** 1.6400 0.118 T = 17***
Employment* -3.6 -1 . 1 1.0909 0.8621 1.00 0 T = 44
* 1969-72 and 1973-77
** the t test used was one which treated the two subperiod averages 
for each firm as 15 paired observations: see ref. 11.
*** significant at 5%.
From the above table it is clear that, with the exception of both 
the parametric and nonparametric paired tests in respect of sales data, 
there was no change in the growth performance of this group of firms 
between the two subperiods. What is interesting to note is the diverg­
ence of the data within the columns of the table, with regard to growth 
rates. It would appear that the industry's annual rate of decline of
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asset volume continued at just over 2% for the whole period, but that 
the rate of decline of labour slowed down somewhat. Sales, on the other 
hand, expanded in real terms by 2.8% per annum 1968-1972, while asset 
and labour inputs were falling, but turned round to decline by 1.3% per 
annum 1973-1977, a rate of decline lying somewhere between that of 
assets and employment in the industry.
Given the lack of clear change in the growth rates over the two 
subperiods, a further question to be asked is, did the relative positions 
of the firms to one another in respect of their growth rates alter 
between the two subperiods? The answer is given in terms of the cor­
relation of the ranks of growth over the two subperiods.
Table 4.20
Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients of Subperiod Growth Rates
Rho t
Assets
Sales
Employment
0.3643
0.5893
0.3220
1.4104
2.6300*
1.2263
significant at 5% (two-tailed).
Table 4.20 suggests that, with the exception of sales growth, 
there was some disruption to the previous (1968-72) rank order of 
growth in the following (1973-77) subperiod. This is in contrast to 
the experience with regard to profit performance (see p.167 above). 
However, sales growth was an exception to this: firms which did rela­
tively well (or badly) in the former subperiod performed relatively 
well (or badly) in the latter. It may be that the sales growth data 
is the most reliable in this instance, as a change in the ranks of 
asset or employment growth might merely indicate a movement from
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labour- to capital-intensive technology by different firms at different 
times. Firms making this change in, say, subperiod 1 would rank 
highly on asset growth relative to others; but, having completed the 
changeover, might be expected to rank below others in the following 
subperiod. Thus the overall conclusion on the stability of growth in 
the two subperiods is that, as in the case of profitability, there was 
no disruption among the firms in terms of growth.
The final piece of analysis carried out here is to test the 
strength of the relationship between growth in the former subperiod (as 
the independent variable) and growth in the latter. This was done by 
means of linear regression, and the results are tabulated in Table 4.21 
below.
Table 4.21
Linear Regression of Subperiod Growth Rates
Constant b t 2R DW**
Assets
Sales
Employment
-1.5
-2.8
-0.4
0.3190
0.5369
0.2141
1.4770
2.7157*
1.1706
0.1437
0.3620
0.0954
1.1170/ 
1.2927 / 
1.9884
* significant at 2%; ** not significant at 10%; / indeterminate.
Once again the sales data stand out as indicating in this case a 
fairly strong positive relationship between growth in the two sub­
periods. However, the coefficient of determination is fairly low,
31indicating only a modest degree of explanatoriness.
A summary of the findings with regard to growth for our group of 
firms over the period 1968-1977 is as follows. The results apply in
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respect of growth in terms of assets, sales and employment, and to 
parametric as well as nonparametric tests, unless otherwise stated.
1. (Opening) size had no impact upon the 10-year growth record 
of the firms.
2. In particular, a specific test for the existence of Gibrat's 
Law (Table 4.12) suggested quite clearly that the proportional 
rate of growth for firms over the period was independent of 
firm size.
3. The relationship between 10-year average profits and 10-year 
average growth was highly significant. That is, firms which 
were generally over the period profitable also exhibited high 
growth rates. It was also noted that relative (to U.K. manu­
facturing industry as a whole) profitability explained a greater 
proportion of growth performance than absolute profitability.
The point was also made that such cross-sectional statistics 
did not allow one to arrive at clear causal relationships 
between, say, profitability and growth.
4. Analysis (in Tables 4.16 and 4.17) of 15-firm average profits 
and growth rates for each year, unlagged and lagged, produced 
results which were generally not significant.
5. In respect of asset and employment data, there were no signi­
ficant changes in the growth rates between the two subperiods 
1968-1972 and 1973-1977. The reduction in the rate of growth 
of sales between the two subperiods was significant, although 
this did not appear in respect of value added (see Appendix to 
this Chapter).
6 . Testing for relative consistency of performance by measuring 
Rho in respect of growth rates for the two subperiods, only in 
respect of sales would it appear that the firms performed con­
sistently relative to one another, although again this finding 
of consistency did not appear in respect of value added.
7. Finally, the growth rates in the latter subperiod were regarded 
as the outcome of growth in the former (Table 4.21). Only in 
the case of sales was there a significant (positive) relation­
ship between growth performance in the two subperiods, but again 
this finding is not supported by the value-added analysis of the 
Appendix.
8 . Despite the "disruption" regarding subperiod ranks and linear 
relationship concerning growth performance, the data in 
Appendix Table 9B indicate that over the whole period high 
growth did not have to be bought at a cost of increased var­
iability of profits. Indeed if anything the opposite appears 
to be the case.
186
C. Employment and Labour Productivity
So far as the Dundee jute industry is concerned, some part 
of the more recent history of labour usage appears to have been 
shaped by more distant events, including a rather harsh and remote 
relationship between the "jute barons" of the nineteenth century 
and their largely unskilled workforce. The dominance of the jute 
industry in the city of Dundee has not helped matters, for unemploy­
ment in the jute industry has meant hard times for the city as a 
whole. The historical significance of jute employment in the area 
may be understood from the following data relating to textile employ­
ment. That this was largely accounted for by the jute industry may
be gathered from the further estimate that in 1924 50% of the "workers
32in the city (Dundee)" were employed in the jute industry.
Table 4.22
Textile Employment in Dundee as a Proportion of Total
1881 491
1911 48
1931 41
1951 23
1961 18
Source : A.M. Carstairs, "The Nature and Diversification of Employ­
ment in Dundee" in S.J. Jones (ed.), Dundee and District 
(Dundee: British Association 1968) pp.320 and 329.
A further feature of employment in the industry has been the inci­
dence of unemployment and low wages. Lenman in his recent economic 
history of Scotland speaks of the scale on which men from Dundee joined 
the armed forces in 1914 as "a glowing tribute to the recruiting effect
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and instances withof heavy unemployment and grinding poverty,
regard to the times of depression that in July 1932 there were 37,000
34unemployed jute workers in Dundee. Again the Report of the 1948
Board of Trade Working Party, having spoken of the massive unemploy­
ment in the jute industry in the 1930's, summed up:
"Short time, low wages, idle mills and spells of 
prolonged unemployment were the lot of the jute 
workers, and since the industry ... was the major 
one in Dundee, the depression laid a heavy hand 
on the city and her people suffered acutely."35
That this view was not unduly coloured by proximity to the time 
may be gathered from more recent reference to Dundee as "a city in 
which industrial relations were poisoned by the low wages of the (jute) 
industry, by the connection of the employers with the competing jute
36industry of India and by devastating unemployment between the wars".
What has also to be remembered in this context is that in the past the
skilled work in the jute industry was predominantly carried out by 
37female labour. It was reportedly said that in Dundee the women
worked while the men stayed at home; and employers had a reputation
for taking on boys for unskilled work and paying them off when they
were old enough to receive an adult wage. With regard to changes in
the overall level of employment in the industry, the jute trade lost a
large part of its labour force during World War II. Employment in
38Dundee fell from about 26,000 in 1939 to 11,000 in 1945. Figures
relating to Dundee and district show an expansion of this latter
39figure to around 13,000 in 1950. Appendix Table 4.1 contains a
consistent set of data from 1948 to 1977 relating to actual employment 
in the industry - i.e. employees or insured persons in employment.
From the data one can discern two things clearly: the fall in the
33
188
total number of persons employed, especially since 1966; and also 
the changed ratio of male to female workers. The reduction in male 
employment over the whole period 1948-1977 was 33%, while in the case 
of females it was 78%. This divergence is again reflected in the 
change in the ratio of females to males in the industry from 1 .6 : 1 in 
1948 to 0.5:1 in 1977. Unemployment data are more difficult to inter­
pret as they represent neither purely a stock of unemployed nor a flow 
in and out of the jute industry. (Employees unemployed in the jute 
industry may leave this category to become employed in other industries.) 
From a consideration of unemployment and industry output data, however, 
one could suggest that whereas in earlier periods temporary unemployment 
might later be reduced by reabsorbing labour into the industry, from the 
mid 1960's there was a final shedding of labour by the industry at a con­
siderable rate.
The impact of the general labour situation in more recent decades 
has been to make "going into the mill" an unattractive prospect even for 
more skilled workers; and this has influenced the investment and locat­
ion decisions of firms in the industry in the period since 1945. The 
major problem for the industry in the immediate post-war period, however, 
was that of a shortage of labour. This was brought about by a combin­
ation of a reluctance of previous employees to return to the industry 
after war service, and a lack of new recruits influenced by the image of 
pre-war unemployment. To these negative supply factors was added the 
competition for semi-skilled male and female labour which was at that 
time being offered to the industry by firms in the light-engineering 
sector which were establishing themselves on the new industrial 
estates around Dundee's northern perimeter. Wage and labour competition 
from this source has in fact been a constant talking point in the jute
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industry for the past thirty years. The lack of suitable labour was 
put forward by the industry in the 1950's as a major reason for not 
being able to meet demand. It has also been said to have influenced 
decisions on capital-intensive modernisation schemes. Most of such 
new investment was "costed" on the basis of double shift working so as 
to write off the new plant over as large an output as possible. Where 
such double shift working was not possible due to labour shortage, it 
is possible that there was a reduced incentive to new capital invest­
ment.
In more recent times, although the total workforce of the industry 
has declined rapidly, shortage of suitable labour has nonetheless fig­
ured in discussions within the industry. The Financial Times, for
example, described labour shortages in the late 1950's as "acute", and
40spoke of "a great scarcity of workers for both spinning and weaving".
It has been held that those firms wishing to expand output were forced
to acquire other businesses rather than install more machinery in their
own plants, in order to acquire additional labour. More recently, and
with the rapid falling away of demand for jute goods, the industry has
become more aware of what is openly admitted to be a declining standard
41of quality of new recruits. Although polypropylene processing does
demand a higher standard of operative labour, it is a much more capital 
intensive manufacturing process; and in this way firms have sought to 
reduce their dependence upon labour. A further policy has been one of 
geographical diversification; and much of the expansion in recent years 
by Dundee-based firms has been in Fife, new industrial estates in South 
Wales and West Scotland, and even in the industrial Midlands. In these 
locations the firms may be seeking a more skilled or adaptable labour 
force, more generous Government assistance, or sites better placed for
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marketing and transport of raw materials and finished goods.
It is not easy to measure labour productivity directly from 
available aggregated data. Isolated figures, however, suggest that 
the industry has succeeded in improving its performance in this dir­
ection. It was pointed out in the early 1950's, for example, that
while employment had declined by 40% compared with the pre-war situation,
42output in the industry was only 25% below the 1939 figure. The
British Jute Trade Federal Council was reported as claiming in 1960
that spinning output per worker had increased by 40% over the previous 
43decade; the Financial Times reported in 1962 that in the previous 13
years output per man in yarn spinning had increased by 78%, with a com-
44parable figure for spinning, weaving and finishing of 56%; while the
Restrictive Practices Court was informed in 1963 that in jute spinning
the number of workers per ton per week had fallen from 3.63 in 1949 to
452.16 in 1961, and that similar improvements had been made in weaving. 
Finally, the following index was published by the British Jute Trade 
Federal Council.
Table 4.23
Index of Productivity in Jute Spinning (1949 = 100)
1950 108 1957 140
1951 113 1958 152
1952 114 1959 153
1953 125 1960 160
1954 126 1961 168
1955 133 1962 169
1956 138 1963 170
Source : B.J.T.F.C. quoted in Financial Times, 14th December 1964.
Using the data in Appendix Table 2.1 to Chapter II. and Appendix 
Table 4.1, the following figures emerge from an analysis of output and 
employment divided into three subperiods representing some stability
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after World War II (1945-1960), the beginnings of decline (1961-1969), 
and the collapse of the traditional jute industry (1970-1977).
Table 4.24
Changes in Employment and Jute Spinning and Weaving Output
Change in Changes in Output%
Employment % Yarn Cloth
1948-60 -15.2 +41.4 +39.4
1961-69 - 8.9 - 8 .1 -24.6
1970-77 -32.8 -46.5 -66.3
Source : Annual Abstract of Statistics (London: H.M.S.O.)
The results of this type of analysis for the first subperiod are 
quite unequivocal. Between 1948 and 1960 employment in the industry 
fell by 15.2% while output of yarn and of cloth rose by 41.4% and 39.4% 
respectively. Over the period of contraction of output from 1961-69 
the reduction in employment, though marginally ahead of that in yarn, 
was well behind that of cloth. The pattern of data in respect of the 
most recent figures suggest a falling off in labour productivity; although 
by this stage there may have begun to be a lack of correspondence between 
those employees classed as "jute" and those who were fully and solely 
employed in spinning or weaving jute as opposed to other fibres.
A less direct measure is to compare raw jute consumption per employee 
over the period 1948 to date, as a measure of the quantity of material 
processed per employee.
The figures in Table 4.25 below suggest an improvement in labour 
productivity from 1948 which was sustained until 1960. Thereafter per­
formance appears to have slipped somewhat; although it has remained 
above the levels of the mid 1950's, and once again may be understated
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if some employees not wholly engaged in jute spinning and weaving are 
included in the industry. This pattern is emphasised if one compares 
the data for jute with labour productivity indices for U.K. manufact­
uring industry as a whole and in respect of the Textiles sector. The
raw data for this are set out in Appendix Table 4.4 and comprise 
figures for output per person employed in index form taken from British 
Labour Statistics together with the original data from Table 4.25 below 
in index form. The conclusion one arrives at from a comparison of the 
first two index number columns in Appendix Table 4.4 is that whereas 
productivity in jute more than kept pace with that in manufacturing 
industry as a whole from 1950 until 1960, the former compares very un­
favourably with the latter from this period onwards, especially during 
the late 1960's and the 1970's. A comparison with Textiles is only 
possible from 1963 onwards in terms of data availability, but again in 
terms of this closer comparison jute shows up very badly.
Table 4.25
Raw Jute Consumption per Employee (tonnes per annum)
1948 5.00 1958 7.65 1968 7.29
1949 5.23 1959 8 .1 2 1969 7.00
1950 6.19 1960 8.22 1970 7.29
1951 6.05 1961 6.91 1971 7.54
1952 6.35 1962 7.51 1972 8.21
1953 6.64 1963 7.92 1973 7.66
1954 6.62 1964 7.58 1974 6.31
1955 7.35 1965 7.37 1975 6.48
1956 7.44 1966 7.16 1976 6.28
1957 7.47 1967 7.44 1977 5.79
Source : Annual Abstract of Statistics (London: H.M.S.O.)
Wages in the jute industry are determined by two Joint Industrial 
Councils (J.I.C.'s): one covering Dundee employers and unions, the
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other non-Dundee (basically Forfar and Kirriemuir) representatives.
The J.I.C.'s took over from the Jute Wages Council in 1970, and appear 
to have inherited a system of fairly stable industrial relations. Data 
on jute industry wages are not available prior to 1960; but for the 
period 1960-77 some comparison can be made with manual workers earnings 
in manufacturing industry as a whole. The following figures are derived 
from Appendix Tables 4.2 and 4.3.
Table 4.26
Hourly Earnings (£)
Jute Industry
Manufacturing
Industry
Ratios:
Jute Industry/ 
Manufacturing
Ratios;
Jute Industry/ 
Manufacturing
Ratios: 
Jute 
Industry
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men/Women
1960 0.25 0.17 0.32 0.18 0.78 0.94 1.47
1961 0.26 0.18 0.34 0.19 0.76 0.95 1.44
1962 0.28 0 .2 0 0.35 0.20 0.80 1.0 0 1.40
1963 0.29 0 .2 0 0.37 0 .2 1 0.78 0.95 1.45
1964 0.31 0 .2 2 0.40 0.23 0.78 0.96 1.41
1965 0.33 0.23 0.44 0.25 0.75 0.92 1.43
1966 0.36 0.25 0.46 0.26 0.78 0.96 1.44
1967 0.40 0.27 0.48 0.28 0.83 0.96 1.48
1968 0.42 0.29 0.52 0.30 0.81 0.97 1.45
1969 0.48 0.33 0.56 0.32 0.86 1.03 1.45
1970 0.53 0.33 0.64 0.37 0.83 0.89 1.61
1971 0.56 0.41 0.72 0.42 0.77 0.98 1.37
1972 0.67 0.48 0.82 0.49 0.82 0.98 1.40
1973 0.77 0.58 0.93 0.56 0.83 1.04 1.33
1974 0.93 0.74 1 . 1 2 0.73 0.83 1 . 0 1 1.26
1975 1.18 0.96 1.40 0.93 0.84 1.03 1.23
1976 1.27 1.13 1.56 1.09 0.81 1.04 1 . 1 2
1977 1.32 1.17 1.62 1.13 0.81 1.04 1.13
Source : Appendix Tables 4.2 and 4.3
Taking male employment first - which rose from 51% to 67% of the
total over the period 1960-1977 - weekly hours worked in the jute industry
do not appear to have differed significantly from those in manufacturing 
industry as a whole. Earnings per hour in jute have, however, remained 
below those in manufacturing. The "discount" was 22% in 1960, and had 
only narrowed to 19% in 1977. This slight narrowing is reflected in
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for manufacturing. Use of such ratios shows that during the rapid 
change in hourly rates in 1974-75 the premium of manufacturing wages 
over jute earnings was narrowed somewhat. Thus, although wages in the 
jute industry have remained lower than for manufacturing industry as a 
whole, there has been no increased deterioration by this comparison.
With regard to female earnings the comparative situation is very 
different. Over the period 1960-77 women too in jute manufacturing 
have increased their hourly earnings at a slightly faster rate than 
those in manufacturing in general; the ratios of 1960 to 1977 female hourly 
rates being 6.88 for jute and 6.28 for manufacturing industry. However, for 
women in the jute industry this represents an improvement from a situation 
in which they were earning slightly less per hour (a discount of 5.5% off 
the figure for manufacturing) to one in 1977 in which they earned a 
premium of 3.5%. This has been accompanied by a diminishing gap between 
male and female hourly earnings. In 1960 the ratio of female to male 
hourly earnings was 0.68 for jute and 0.56 for manufacturing. In 1977 
the respective figures were 0.89 and 0.70. Women in the jute industry 
have thus significantly improved their earnings position; and this does 
not appear to have been as a result of overtime working.
In general, therefore, incomes from employment in the jute industry 
have kept pace with the general rise in earnings in manufacturing 
industry; and figures for weekly hours worked suggest that this reflects 
underlying basic wage rates rather than excessive overtime at premium 
rates. The data also suggest that there are no grounds for the hypo­
thesis that the continued existence of the U.K. jute industry, or a 
reduction in its rate of decline, has been based upon low wages, or a
the ratio of 1977 hourly rates to those for 1960: 5.28 for jute, 5.06
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failure of those wages to keep pace with industry in general.
Finally, it is worth commenting on the generally good industrial 
relations that have existed in this market. After 1945 the industry 
appears to have adopted a new approach to employee relations: partly
the result of a new, younger group of owners emerging among the larger 
businesses, and partly arising from a realisation that, following 
demobilisation, the jute industry might not attract back to it all of 
those who left in 1939 and 1940. To this last factor was soon to be 
added competition for semi-skilled labour from new, often American, 
businesses established on Dundee's recently created industrial estates 
established around its northern perimeter. It was, in fact, a relative 
labour shortage in the industry which stimulated both increased mechan­
isation and the introduction of work study and logical re-deployment of 
labour. This work was initiated within the industry (one of the first, 
indeed, to do so) but was often carried out by independent firms of 
consultants. The result was a new wage system introduced in 1952 
based upon job evaluation, and improved labour productivity referred to 
above. Indeed the situation called forth a "surprised" reaction from two 
observers that "the employment of industrial consultants has become
almost a commonplace throughout an industry where the tradition has long
46been one of conservatism on the part of both employers and employees".
This changed attitude meant not only a fairly rapid acceptance by workers
of job evaluation schemes etc., but was also accompanied by a genuine
concern for employees on the part of mill and factory owners. For
example, an estimated two thirds of establishments in the industry had a
47personnel officer by the mid 1950's.
Over the restricted time period of 1968-1977 it was possible to
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use data on real sales and employment to measure labour productivity at 
the individual firm level. This approach could only be adopted over 
this shorter period because of the lack of earlier data. The figure 
calculated was that of sales at constant 1967 terms per employee per 
annum.
Throughout this study in respect of data derived from company 
reports, figures relating to sales rather than output have been used 
even where, for example in analysing labour productivity, one might 
have expected to be able to analyse the behaviour of output per head. 
Sales data have been used not only because they are the data explicitly 
presented in company annual reports but because the translation of sales 
into output by means of adjusting for the building up or running down 
of stocks is not possible on the basis of published data. Company 
annual reports do contain data on stocks. These data however relate 
to stocks of raw materials, work in progress and finished goods, whereas 
it is only the last category which concerns us. Moreover, the stock 
figure is usually presented in company accounts combined with debtors - 
another current asset. Over a 10-year period it is not considered that 
any serious error is likely to arise in using sales data in this way as 
a surrogate for output.
The data, which were available in respect of 15 firms, are not 
perfect. On the employment side, part-time staff in the denominator 
may distort the figure; although it is considered that this is not 
likely to be a serious source of error because of the small number of 
those involved. More contentious is the correction for inflation used 
to produce "real" turnover data over the period. The actual sales 
figures in each year for each of the 15 firms were restated on the basis
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of 1967 prices using the output wholesale prices index (Textiles) .
It was hoped by such means to indicate the increase or decrease in 
sales per annum, correcting for the trend of price increases.
The results of the analysis indicate, firstly, a surprising range 
of averages for sales per employee over the 10-year period. These 
ranged from £2,040 from a small synthetic spinning firm to £13,170 for 
a large diversified company (both figures in 1967 terms). The un­
weighted average for the 15 firms in index form over the period was as 
follows.
Table 4.27
Sales per Employee at Constant Prices (1968 = 100)
15-Firm U.K. Manufacturing
Average Industry*
1968 100 100
1969 102 102
1970 108 104
1971 115 106
1972 130 113
1973 131 12 1
1974 127 119
1975 141 117
1976 140 122
1977 125 122
The figure here is the volume index of manufacturing output for 
the U.K. divided in each year by the total number of employees 
in employment in manufacturing industry and converted into 
index form 1968 = 100. The source for the data is British 
Labour Statistics (London: H.M.S.O.). See Appendix Table 4.4
For our industry the data indicate a considerable rise in labour 
productivity from 1968 up to the mid 1970's. These data are, however, 
difficult to interpret, especially when compared with those for manu­
facturing industry as a whole. In particular, one would suspect that 
because the wholesale price index for Textiles as a whole has probably
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lagged behind a more accurate price index for the sales or output of 
our firms their output has in real terms been overstated.
The data discussed immediately above were also used to try to 
establish "causes” of the variation in the level of labour productivity 
within our 15-firm population. Average size was the first independent 
variable chosen for the linear regression analysis.
Table 4.28
Linear Relationship of Firm Size and Labour Productivity
Dependent variable: 10-year average real sales per employee
Average Size Measure Constant b t 2R DW***
Assets 3.13 0.00058 6.7498** 0.7780 1.8101
Sales 3.06 0.00026 6.3053** 0.7536 1.7635
Employment 3.34 0.00119 2.1432* 0.2611 2.0170
* significant at 10%; **significant at 0 .1%; ***not significant at 10%.
The unmistakable conclusion is that size, as measured by assets or 
sales, is very clearly associated with labour productivity. Although 
the t statistic in respect of labour as a size measure was also signifi­
cant (at 10%), by comparison with alternative size measures labour 
performed poorly, as is clearly reflected in the respective coefficients 
of determination. Another possible influence upon labour productivity 
is growth, on the grounds that growth yields benefits in terms of 
learning, or that it gives access to economies of scale. The former
effect is simply one aspect of the general hypothesis regarding growth
48and productivity known as Verdoorn's Law.
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Table 4.29
Linear Relationship of Growth and Labour Productivity
Dependent variable: as in Table 4.28
Growth Measure Constant b t R2 DW**
Assets 4.72 0.11657 1.5121 0.1496 2.0590
Sales 4.31 0.17076 1.4471 0.1386 1.9727
Employment 4.94 0.22183 1.9545* 0.2272 1.8872
* significant at 10%; ** not significant at 10%.
In respect of growth, the degree of explanation of variations in 
labour productivity is low compared with size. Furthermore, the roles 
of the individual size or growth variables are reversed with regard to 
the parametric test. Growth of employment is significant in terms of 
the t statistic at 10%; although even here the coefficient of determin­
ation is low compared with those in Table 4.28.
Finally, on a bivariate basis, capital per employee was chosen as 
an independent variable; and this was measured as net assets (from 
company balance sheets) per employee in real terms, assets being conver­
ted into 1967 terms by reference to Current Cost Accounting indices for 
the appropriate Minimum List Heading. The results of the linear re­
gression indicate the importance of this variable, which on a bivariate 
basis is more significant than firm size.
Table 4.30
Linear Relationship of Capital Intensiveness and Labour Productivity
Dependent variable: as in Table 4.28
, 2Constant b t R DW**
0.81 1.96390 9.4237* 0.8723 1.2627
* significant at 0 .1%;**not significant at 10%r within indeterminate 
range.
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The relative importance of size, growth and capital intensiveness can 
be seen from the multivariate analysis, including partial correlation 
coefficients.
Table 4.31
Linear Relationship of Size, Growth, Capital Intensiveness and Labour 
Productivity
Dependent variable: as in Table 4.28
Independent Variable Constant b* t r*
Size (Sales)
Growth (Employment) 
Capital Intensiveness
1.79 0.00023
0.04772 
1.19984
1.8256** 0.4823 
1.6013 0.4347 
2.7955*** 0.6445
2Multiple R = 0.9101 F = 37.14**** DW = 1.8818 (not significant at
10%)* partial coefficients
significance levels: ** 10%, *** 5%, **** l%.
The conclusion in respect of our group of firms on the average level 
of labour productivity is that capital intensiveness and average size (in 
terms of assets and sales) are very significant determinants. Growth 
appears to offer much less of an explanation, although in the case of 
growth of employment the coefficient of determination was 0.2272. These 
relative contributions are highlighted in Table 4.31.
With regard to growth of labour productivity over the period 1969- 
1977, this was measured as the average annual rate of growth of sales per 
employee.
Table 4.32
Linear Relationship of Firm Size and Labour Productivity Growth
Dependent variable: 9-year average annual rate of growth of labour
productivity
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Average Size Measure
Assets
Sales
Employment
Constant b
3.2 -0.00018
3.2 -0.00008
3.1 -0.00037
1.7615 0.1927
1.6642 0.1756
0.9418 0.0639
* not significant at 10%.
DW*
1.5569
1.5311
1.4416
None of the results in Table 4.32 is significant; although it is 
interesting to note the negative sign of the b coefficient with respect 
to all of the size measures. This would suggest, although it must be 
stressed that the results are not statistically significant, that over 
this period small firms have demonstrated higher rates of labour product­
ivity growth than larger ones.
The results of the linear regression of the growth of the firms and 
the growth of labour productivity are presented in Table 4.33 below.
Table 4.33
Linear Relationship of Firm Growth and Labour Productivity Growth
Dependent variable:
Growth Measure
Assets 
Sales
* not significant at 10%.
as in Table 4.32. 
Constant b
2.8
2.7
2.7
0.02643
0.04929
-0.03810
0.5046
0.6218
0.4707
O.0192
0.0289
0.0168
DW*
1.6147
1.4161
1.6078
Surprisingly, again none of the results is significant; and in the 
case of growth of employment, although it must be stressed again that the 
results are not significant, it would appear that firms which expanded 
employment less rapidly experienced higher rates of growth in labour 
productivity.
Table 4.34
Linear Relationship of Capital Intensiveness and Growth of Labour 
Productivity
Dependent variable: as in Table 4.32
Capital 
Intensiveness: Constant b t 2R
Average 3.6 -0.46508 1.6322 0.1223
Growth 2.9 0.10075 1.1685 0.0951
* not significant at 10%.
DW*
2.3188
2.1246
Taking the cross-sectional figures on capital intensiveness - i.e. 
the average data for each firm over the period 1968-1977, and the corr­
esponding average growth rate 1969-1977 - again none of the results is 
significant (at 10%). Within these limitations it nonetheless appears
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that more highly capital intensive firms had lower rates of growth of 
labour productivity than less capital intensive. Increases in capital 
intensiveness over the period may, however, have been associated with 
faster rates of growth in labour productivity.
The use of sales per person as a measure of labour productivity is 
not of course ideal. It is true that unless there were violent fluct­
uations in the level of stocks held then sales and (gross) output 
should strongly coincide as measures of production and productivity. 
However, the extent of vertical integration within our group of firms 
varies quite considerably as we saw in Chapter II. Low levels of 
vertical integration obviously overstate the labour productivity of a 
firm relative to that of a business which is highly vertically inte­
grated when sales per person is used as a measure of labour productiv­
ity. Moreover, the extent of vertical integration may be related to 
factors such as firm size used as independent variables in seeking to 
explain differences in labour productivity among firms. The data in 
Appendix Table 9A indicate a significant negative relationship between 
firm size and the extent of vertical integration. In order to avoid 
this problem the regressions in Tables 4.28-4.34 were recalculated using 
value added per employee as a measure of labour productivity.
As a preliminary check the 1968-1977 10-year averages of value 
added per employee and sales per employee together with their correspon­
ding growth rates over the period for each of the 15 firms for which 
data were available were compared. The results confirmed the need for 
further analysis of labour productivity using value added as a basis.
The rank correlation coefficient (Rho) between the two average measures 
of labour productivity was 0.5821, which is significant at 5%, while in 
respect of the respective growth rates it was -0.1559. In more detail 
the regression analysis, with value added as the dependent variable, was
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as follows.
Table 4.35
Linear Regression of 10-year Average Sales and Value Added per 
Employee, and Growth Rates of Sales and Value Added per Employee
Constant b t DW**
Average
Growth
0.80
2.34
0.1230
0.0434
4.3463*
0.0833
0.5915
0.0005
1.5434
2.4816
* significant at 0 .1%; ** not significant at 10%.
On this basis the regressions in Tables 4.28-4.34 are presented 
again below with labour productivity now being measured on the basis 
of value added. For ease of comparison with the previous results 
the tables are numbered 4.28^ - 4.34^.
Table 4.28
Linear Relationship of Firm Size and Labour Productivity
Dependent variable: 10-year average real value added per employee
Average Size Measure Constant b t R2 DW***
Assets 1 . 1 1 0.00007 3.5000** 0.4769 1.9682
Sales 1 . 1 0 0.00003 3.0000* 0.4492 1.9549
Employment 1.14 0.00015 1.5789 0.1524 2.2488
Value Added 1.09 0.00014 2.8000* 0.3613 1.9762
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** not significant at 10%.
Table 4.29/
Linear Relationship of Growth and Labour Productivity
Dependent variable : as in Table COCM
Growth Measure Constant b t 2R DW***
Assets 1.34 0.03079 3.0039* 0.4098 2.2460
Sales 1.24 0.04356 2.6708* 0.3543 2.1626
Employment 1.39 0.05181 3.5102** 0.4866 2.4782
Value Added 1.27 0.03760 2.2222* 0.2758 2.4838
* significant at 5% ; ** significant at 1 %? *** not significant at
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Table 4.30/
Linear Relationship of Capital Intensiveness and Labour Productivity
/Dependent variable: as in Table 4.28
2Constant b t R
0.74 0.29198 6.3640* 0.7570
* significant at 0.1%; ** not significant at 10%.
Table 4.317*
Linear Relationship of Size, Growth, Capital Intensiveness and Labour 
Productivity
Dependent variable: as in Table 4.28^
DW**
1.8885
Independent Variable Constant b* t r*
Size (Value Added) 0.92 0.00002 5 .0000** 0.1339
Growth (Employment) 0.02929 3.1906** 0.6932
Capital Intensiveness 0.21468 3.6504** 0.7401
Multiple R = 0.8745 F = 25.54** DW = 2.8089***
* partial coefficients; ** significant at 1%; *** not significant at
10%f within the indeterminate range.
Table 4.32
Linear Relationship of Firm Size and Labour Productivity Growth
Dependent variable : 9-year average annual compound rate of growth
of labour productivity on value-added basis
Average Size Measure Constant b t 2R DW*
Assets 2.5 0.00006 0.2857 0.0058 2.4753
Sales 2.6 -0.00002 0.2000 0.0036 2.4694
Employment 2.9 0.00032 0.4156 0.0137 2.6197
Value Added 2.3 0.00003 0.0625 0.0004 2.5010
* not significant at 10%.
Table 4.33/
Linear Relationship of Firm Growth and Labour Productivity Growth 
Dependent variable: as in Table 4.32
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Growth Measure Constant b t R2 DW*
Assets 2.2 -0.06770 0.6939 0.0357 2.4213
Sales 2.5 -0.16946 1.1793 0.0967 2.4065
Employment 2 . 1 -0.11821 0.7886 0.0457 2.4685
Value Added 2.4 0.12332 0.8558 0.0534 2.5092
* not significant at 10%.
Table 4.34^
Linear Relationship of Capital Intensiveness and Growth of Labour 
Productivity
Dependent variable : as in Table 4.32^
Capital Intensiveness: Constant b t R2 DW*
Average 3.6 -0.66111 0.9889 0.0700 2.6021
Growth 2.4 0.01278 0.0750 0.0004 2.5036
* not significant at 10%.
Briefly comparing the company accounts based labour productivity 
analysis on a sales and value added basis one can see that the effect 
of using the latter basis in a bivariate regression is somewhat to mute 
the influence of firm size on labour productivity. In the case of
the impact of firm growth on labour productivity, measuring the latter 
on a value added basis greatly increases the impact of growth on 
average labour productivity. The former change is particularly ex­
plained by the relationship between size and the average index of 
vertical integration revealed in Appendix Table 4.9A. The low degree 
of explanatoriness of firm size, growth and capital intensiveness with
regard to labour productivity growth of Tables 4.32-4.34 was not enhanced
J /  2in Tables 4.32 - 4.34 , indeed the figure for R fell markedly.
It is believed that value added per employee is a more correct 
measure of labour productivity, and this has therefore been used in
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conducting the nonparametric tests in this area. The results of 
these tests are reported in Table 4.36 below.
Table 4.36
Nonparametric Tests on Labour Productivity on Value-Added Basis
Fisher's Mann- Randomis- Rho
Exact Whitney ation
D U t
Average Labour Productivity:
Average size : Sales 0** 8** 1.6957 0.6464***
Assets 0 6*** 1.9048 0.6536***
Value Added 0 12 1.5600 0.6750***
Employment 0 12 1.5600 0.4808*
Growth : Sales 2 13 1.7391 0.6643***
Assets 1 1 1** 1.9048 0.7668***
Value Added 1 13 1.5455 0.6179**
Employment 1 15 1.5000 0.6810***
Average capital intensiveness 0 3*** 2.3000** 0.8382***
Labour Productivity Growth:
Average size : Sales 2 28 0.6470 -0.0966
Assets 1 19 0.1111 -0.0823
Value Added 0 12 1.2632 -0.0662
Employment 0 12 1.2632 -0.0358
Growth : Sales 1 25 0.1667 -0.2469
Assets 1 23 0.2778 -0.0976
Value Added 1 20 0.1667 0.1592
Employment 1 19 1.1579 -0.2310
Capital intensiveness growth 1 14 0.1053 0.0161
Significance levels: *10%, **5%, *** 1%.
The conclusions on employment and labour productivity in the 
industry are as follows.
1. There was a rapid decline in the total number of employees 
in employment in the industry from 1967 onwards.
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2. This decline was particularly rapid among female rather than 
male employees, and this is reflected in the changed ratio 
of female to male employees in the industry. This is a 
reflection of changes in the technology of the-industry.
3. For male employment, although earnings per hour are still 
around 20% less than those of U.K. manufacturing industry 
as a whole, this "discount" has not changed significantly 
over the past decade and a half.
4. For female employees there has been a considerable increase 
in hourly earnings since 1960. This increase has brought 
these earnings in jute much more into line with male 
earnings (although the "female discount" is still in excess 
of 10%), and has taken jute industry females from a slight 
discount compared with manufacturing industry as regards 
hourly earnings in 1960 to a premium position of around 4% 
in 1977.
5. As regards labour productivity, there appear to have been 
considerable strides made in this area from 1948 onwards, 
the period 1948-1960 being a particularly outstanding one. 
Since 1960 progress has been less obvious - see Tables 
4.24 and 4.25 - suggesting some relationship between 
industry growth and productivity.
6. Over the more restricted period 1968-1977 company accounting 
data suggest that the average level of labour productivity 
was significantly influenced by average firm size, growth 
and capital intensiveness.
7. As regards growth of labour productivity 1969-1977, no 
obvious causal explanations emerge from the analysis of 
our population of firms. Neither firm size nor growth 
were significant independent varia b l e s , nor was capital 
intensiveness.
D. Investment and Modernisation
An important aspect of any industry's performance is the extent to 
which it has invested • in .new capital equipment .in order to keep its 
plant up to date and to maintain itself at the forefront of technology. 
The first approach to examining this issue in the jute industry was to 
try to construct a time series of total new capital investment since 
1945. The data are not entirely satisfactory since they may be
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based upon different concepts of new investment. Census data, for
example, consider investment as acquisitions less disposals, while
business people tend to think in gross (acquisitions only) terms. On
the other hand Census data include vehicles as well as plant and
buildings, whereas industry estimates will exclude the first category.
The data for total new capital investment since 1945, and for annual
51new investment in each year are given in Appendix Table 4.5. As
ref.51 indicates, the new investment data were gathered from a variety 
of sources, not all of which adopted consistent definitions. From 
these, however, it was possible to graph total investment from 1945 to 
1977, and to read off from the graph data for individual years. The 
results of this exercise are shown in Appendix Table 4.5 and in graphical 
form in the following Appendix Tables. Column 1 shows the total, and 
column 2 the annual investment at each data. These data are expressed 
in current prices; and although a particular pattern emerges over 
certain time periods it is possible that this could have been influenced 
by changing rates of inflation. Fortunately, a by-product of recent 
concern over inflation accounting has been the publication of a series 
of price indices of, inter alia, plant and equipment in various 
industries, running from 1956 to the present time. The appropriate 
category of these has been used to inflate or deflate the data in 
column 2 into a common value basis (1970 = 100). This has enabled 
one to produce in column 4 a series of annual investment figures at 
1970 prices. For the period 1948 to 1955 the current price levels for 
investment have been inflated by an All Industries capital expenditure 
(machinery and plant) index using the same source as the more dis­
aggregated index and linking the two sets of indices at 1956. No 
constant price data are available for the period 1945-47, but even the 
current data are largely estimates up to 1950, so that only by that
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The graph of total new investment in current values (Appendix 
Table 4.6) suggests that from 1945 to the later 1950's expenditures 
were rising at an increased rate. This rate of new investment 
appears to have slowed down for the first part of the 1960's, but 
accelerated from around 1964 onwards. It should, of course, be borne 
in mind that in respect of data stated in current terms an upsurge in 
the rate of general inflation in the economy could create the impression 
of increased capital spending, which was nonetheless in real terms 
fairly static. Thus the restatement of annual levels of investment 
in constant price terms gives a much more accurate indication of 
events. These are presented in Appendix Table 4.7, with 3-year moving 
averages in dotted lines.
Despite the problem of sources of data, the figures reflect what 
discussions within the industry also suggest. The period following 
1945, during which Control and the trading agreements were of signifi­
cance in the industry, was one of considerable new capital spending.
This was the era in which individual electric motors (rather than 
single motors and multiple drive belts) were introduced into weaving. 
Circular looms (for bag making) and automatic cop loading were also 
brought into use in weaving. On the spinning side considerable 
investment was made in automatic spindles; and by the early 1960's 
the industry was based entirely upon high-speed or "sliver” spindles. 
Indeed for 1960 the Financial Times was able to report that only 3%
of the spinning machinery was of the "old type" (i.e. mule spinning),
52while nearly half of the looms were automatic. In addition to
latter date do we have an accurate idea of the level of investment in
the immediate post-war period.
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these technical innovations, considerable improvements were being
made over this period in plant layout, often in new factory buildings.
Indeed the Financial Times had been able to comment by the mid 1950's
that "the British (jute) industry today must be classed as one of the
53most up-to-date textile industries in the world". Even by the
early 1960's, when the jute industry had certainly-passed' the peak, of
its new capital expansion rate, the same newspaper considered that
"Jute has for its size been one of the British industries most con-
54spicuous in modernising plant and equipment".
When asked about the forces behind the spate of new investment 
in the industry for the decade and a half after 1945 members of the 
industry have placed some emphasis on the protective environment of 
Control and the trade pricing agreements. These gave the industry 
confidence in a more stable future demand, at least with regard to 
Indian competition. In respect of the impact of the trading agree­
ments, it was argued by the industry:
"There is no other traditional textile industry which has re­
equipped itself to so considerable an extent. It is virtually 
certain that only a very small proportion of this re-equipment 
would have been undertaken had there not been a general assur­
ance of economic stability and of future prospects conferred by 
the combined structure of protection (i.e. Control) and of the 
Seven Registered Agreements. ... If the agreements were dis­
continued and protection terminated or rendered inoperative, 
capital expenditure in the jute industry would be reduced to a 
small fraction of its present level. In consequence there 
would be reduced prospect of any future productivity improve­
ment by way of new machinery, and future wage increases would 
fall very largely upon the final price of the product.
This incentive effect was also embodied in the conclusion of an 
academic study of the conditions for technical progress in industry. 
Thus,
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"In the jute industry, the greater security given by import 
controls and by Government purchasing has freed managers 
from the immediate struggle for existence, and they have 
been able to give attention to the introduction of new ^  
equipment which had been developed in other industries."
These same authors also suggest that a further benefit to the
industry from Control's operations was the taking over by Control of
the risk and financial cost of stockholding of raw jute. This
produced a situation in which firms had additional funds with which
57to finance new investment in plant etc.
What one cannot judge from the statistics and general discussion 
on capital investment and its causes is the rate at which new ideas 
have been adopted by the industry as a whole relative to what they 
might have been, and the speed and method by which such innovations 
were adopted across the industry. Some firms have evidently re­
equipped substantially and frequently, others have continued to use 
very old jute machinery, and even continue to weave mixtures or poly­
propylene on jute looms. Sidlaw, for example, spent around £1,200,000
58in 1967 in modernising its jute spinning capacity, while even quite 
small firms have spent considerable sums merely installing polypropylene 
weaving equipment. One small business, for example, with fewer than 
200 employees in 1977, spent more than £1.5m. over the previous decade 
(at current prices) investing successively in two generations of poly­
propylene weaving equipment.
Not surprisingly, the upsurge of new investment spending in the 
late 1960's was due to the need to equip for polypropylene. McDowall 
et al. give data at current prices which show the changing emphasis 
from jute to polypropylene; and while these, in the authors' view,
2 1 2
59nonetheless indicate the trend of investment by jute firms.
considerably underestimate the level of investment in synthetics, they
Table 4.37
Capital Investment in Jute and Synthetics (£’000)
Source
Jute Synthetics
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
S. McDowall et al., Trade Adjustment and the British Jute 
Industry (unpublished monograph, St.Andrews University),
p.120.
1,648
742
438 435
453 880
330 725
683 1,334
474 1,509
E. Research and Development
Closely related to the question of investment in the industry is
the issue of research and development. The quality of the former may
be influenced by the extent of the latter. Prior to 1946 there was no
co-operative or group research carried out in the Dundee jute industry;
although reports suggest that the largest firms in the industry had
previously established their own individual laboratory facilities for 
60research. in 1946 however, under the auspices and with the
financial support of the Department of Scientific and Industrial 
Research, the British Jute Trade Research Association was formed. The 
Research Association was a purely voluntary body (in contrast to such 
industries as wool and flax where joint research was financed by a 
statutory levy), and was financed by a subscription amounting to h% 
of each firm's wage bill. This sum raised by the industry was approx­
imately matched by the D.S.I.R. (later the Ministry of Technology).
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Some 97% of jute spinners and manufacturers were members of the Assoc­
iation, and these were joined by merchants, brokers etc. as well as by
61machinery manufacturers.
The Research Association carried out a number of activities. These
may be divided into three categories. First, long-term basic research -
covering work designed to discover and examine the molecular basis of
the physical and chemical properties of jute. Second, short-term
applied research and development - whose purpose was to use research to
solve current problems, including the development of new markets for jute
products. Third, information, advisory and liaison work - communicating
the results of the previous categories of work to firms, and the solving
62of day-to-day problems for Association members.
Some idea of the scale of work carried out by the Association can 
be gained from the data in Appendix Table 4.8 which covers the period 
from its foundation until its winding up in its earlier form and the 
creation of the Scottish Textile Research Association in 1969.
During its period as a purely jute research association, the B.J.T. 
R.A. appears to have carried out work of value to its members. Some 
of its longer-term work never came to fruition. It searched in vain 
for alternative sources of jute fibre for Dundee, or indeed for altern­
ative natural fibres similar to jute (pineapples seemed a likely area at 
one timeI). Likewise no dramatic breakthrough occurred in respect of 
new end-use areas for jute. Some work was done on trying to use jute 
in place of glass fibre in developing new resins; but little came of 
this. Likewise there were few major advances in jute spinning and 
weaving machinery for which the Association was responsible. The
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Association's achievements were perhaps more general. It undoubtedly 
acted as a forum on technical matters for the industry. It may also 
have had the effect of reducing the differences in technical compet­
ence among the firms in the industry: bringing more of the firms into
line with the technologically more progressive. In this context it 
must be remembered that, given the basis upon which the industry it­
self contributed to the Association's finances, the research was over­
whelmingly paid for by the largest firms. One trade source estimated 
that during the 1960's Sidlaw, Low & Bonar, and Scott & Robertson were 
together contributing some 80% of the industry' s total - around 40% of 
the Association's total income.
With regard to jute itself, what the Association failed to do was 
to find a replacement for the large-scale standard-product markets such 
as sacking and linoleum backing which formed the bulk of the industry's 
output in the immediate post-war period. This, of course, may appear 
to be demanding much of the Association. What is relevant, however, 
is that as these markets and that for tufted carpet backing disappeared 
in the latter part of the 1960's, the jute industry and jute industry 
research became less viable.
The coming of polypropylene brought about a reorientation of the
Association's work. By 1966 the Association had specifically decided
that a proportion of its funds - around 30% - should be spent on non-
62jute work - basically polyolefins. The following year the Assoc­
iation was able to report progress on its research on polypropylene 
slit tape as an alternative to jute yarn. This non-jute work was
reported to account for over 20% of the Association's research effort; 
and reports indicate that the Association was aware of the end-use
6
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market potential of polypropylene, and also of the implications of 
such changes for jute.
Inevitably the Research Association decided eventually to reflect
its movement away from an undivided interest in jute by a change of
name. In 1969 the body became known as the Scottish Textile Research 
64Association. This body continued in existence until 1975 when
government matching of industry support for research in this area came 
to an end. Some idea of the extent of the Association's reorientation 
may be gained from the following data relating to Government support.
Table 4.38
Research Association Government Grant
Source : Trade and Industry, 23rd June 1971, p.618.
F. Conclusions
This chapter has been concerned with analysing the market perform­
ance of the firms in what was at one time the Dundee jute industry.
This performance was specified in terms of "financial" performance 
revealed through company accounting data, labour productivity, invest­
ment and modernisation, and research and development. It was 
emphasised that the research based upon data relating to individual 
firms covered only those businesses which were part of the jute 
industry in 1967, in respect of whom separate accounting data were
"for Jute Work" "for Polypropylene Work"
1966- 7
1967- 8
1968- 9
1969- 7-0
1970- 1
£20,387
19,385
15,726
16,337
10,942
£ 7,964 
9,652 
18,310 
18,750 
25,302
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available, and which survived until 1977. The results of tests on 
company accounting data are to be interpreted in the light of the 
limitations imposed by such data, and also on the basis of the assumpt­
ions regarding the manner in which one interprets company accounting 
data discussed at the beginning of Section B of this chapter.
Turning first to the data on company financial performance analysed 
in Section B above, the first point to be made is that one's findings 
broadly conform to the pattern of results of a number of other cross- 
sectional and time-series studies regarding performance across U.K. 
manufacturing industries. This is so with regard to such relation­
ships as that between profitability and growth, size and growth, and 
size and profitability. This is reassuring, for what it suggests is 
that despite the smallness of sample size the results of the tests can 
be accepted as not being totally abnormal.
Turning to the data on company financial performance, and first to 
the results of the analysis of profitability, the findings of our study 
were the absence of any trend of company profits relative to those for 
U.K. manufacturing industry as a whole over the total period 1968-1977 
(including intra-group profit variability), a remarkable stability of 
profit performance between the two subperiods 1968-72 and 1973-77 
(including a significant maintenance of rank order among the firms and 
a significant linear relationship between the profit ratios in the two 
subperiods), and the usual relationship between profitability (as a 
dependent variable) and average company size and growth (as measured 
by either assets or sales) and with the two independent variables being 
incorporated jointly in the multiple linear regression. That is, 
growth was a significant determinant but size was not. These results,
217
or the lack of significant difference from expected behaviour, confirm 
some of our hypotheses and conclusions on the strategy of diversifi­
cation dealt with in the previous chapter. Not only did surviving 
firms in the industry maintain their profitability relative to manu­
facturing industry over a period of quite dramatic change in their 
traditional markets for jute; but despite individual firms following 
quite different strategies from one another, the rank order of their 
profit ratios in the subperiods remained high. Thus we might conclude 
that not only were the surviving firms successful in surviving but that 
they even held their ground relative to manufacturing industry as a 
whole. Surprisingly too, despite following very different survival 
strategies, the firms were successful in a very homogeneous way, for 
example with regard to the lack of change in intra-group profit varia­
bility over time and the maintenance of rank order of company profit­
ability between the two subperiods. Thus our conclusion is that none 
of the drama of the period so far as the collapse of traditional markets 
is concerned worked its way through to company profitability.
In respect of corporate growth, the broad findings with regard to 
our group of firms were that the rate of growth over the period 1968- 
1977 (1969-77 with respect to employment) was not significantly depend­
ent upon opening size as measured by either assets, sales or employment, 
but that average profitability was, however, significantly linearly assoc­
iated with average growth. As in the case of profitability there was 
no significant change in the growth rates of firms between the two 
chosen subperiods. However there was some disturbance to the growth 
rank order of the firms between the two subperiods. Some findings differed 
according to the growth measure used. Compared with other figures, 
sales or value added data were regarded a priori as the most
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reasonable to use. Although these findings are not surprising when 
taken in the context of those of other econometric studies, they are 
perhaps so with regard to our group of firms. One might have 
ejected, for example, that in our context large firms would have had 
an advantage in growing (in a declining traditional market) over 
smaller ones: that their size might have been associated with greater
financial weight, or management or technical expertise (perhaps in­
cluding a body of professional managers separate from traditional 
owners) which would have stimulated and facilitated a more effective 
strategy of response to Jute's decline compared with that of the small, 
family owned businesses. That this has not been the case confirms 
again the conclusion in this respect in Chapter III on diversification: 
that success in this area is not clearly associated with identifiable 
variables such as company size.
With regard to labour productivity, Tables 4.23-4.25 suggest at an 
aggregated level that the industry had some success in this area in the 
1950's, but that performance fell off badly in the late 1960's and 
1970's, although one can be far less certain in interpreting recent 
statistics due to the problem of allocating employees between jute and 
synthetics areas of work. The data in Table 4.26 are more reliable 
and tell an interesting story. The point to remember is that there 
was a considerably greater reduction in female employment in the 
industry compared with male employment during the main period of adjust­
ment. For example, in 1960 the jute industry employed females and 
males in almost equal numbers. From that date to 1977 the number of 
males employed declined by 40% while the number of females fell by 68% 
to a point where males comprised two-thirds of the work force. This 
changed position may be taken in conjunction with changes in relative
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earnings of males to females in the industry. In 1960, for example, 
male hourly earnings were almost one and a half times those of females 
in the industry. Since that time this "male earnings premium" in 
the industry has declined to around 10% in 1977 as men, although 
narrowing the gap, have failed to change significantly their position 
relative to manufacturing industry as a whole, while jute industry women 
have moved from an earnings discount relative to women in manufacturing 
industry to a small premium position. There appears, therefore to 
have been a change in the male/female employment pattern accompanied 
by one also in relative earnings. That is, as women become more ex­
pensive relative to men the industry, it might be argued, began to 
employ men in greater proportion. It was decided to test statistically 
the hypothesis that the decreased ratio of females to males might be a 
response to the reduced male earnings premium. The dependent variable 
in Table 4.39 below is the ratio of females to males in the industry 
(from Appendix Table 4.1) while the independent variable is the ratio 
of male to female hourly earnings in the industry (from Table 4.26 
above). The results of the linear regression were as follows :
Table 4.39
Linear Regression of Female/Male Employment and Male/Female Earnings 
1960-1977
Dependent variable: ratio of female/male employment
2Constant b t R Rho DW
-0.64 1.0434 3.0679** 0.3855 0.5074*  0.2225
* significant at 2.5%; **significant at 0.5%.
There may thus have been some tendency to change the ratio of male 
to female employment in the industry in response to a change in 
relative earnings, although the very low Durbin-Watson statistic
2 2 0
suggests the presence of a non-linear relationship.
Turning to the conclusions on labour productivity derived from 
company accounting data (value added per employee) and concerning 
relationships between this measure of labour productivity and other 
company financial variables, it was noted that size (as measured by 
assets and sales), growth and capital intensiveness contributed strongly 
to increased labour productivity when considered on a bivariate re­
gression basis. With regard to the growth of labour productivity, 
the results were inconclusive so far as the impact of size and growth 
were concerned. This applied also, rather surprisingly, in respect of 
growth of capital intensiveness. These results are not in conflict 
with those across U.K. manufacturing industry. At the same time they 
do not reveal anything of special significance regarding our group1s 
economic performance over this period.
The data in respect of capital investment and modernisation in the 
industry, dealt with in Section D above, are of varying degrees of 
reliability. They do, however, suggest that the industry responded to 
the potentially more stable environment in the post-1948 period under 
Jute Control by investing heavily in new plant and equipment. Although 
it is not possible to offer a precise analysis of this dimension of the 
industry's performance - for example by relating this industry's new 
investment to its existing capital stock or making such comparisons 
with U.K. manufacturing industry as a whole - there does seem to be 
some impressionistic evidence to suggest that not only had the jute 
industry in an absolute sense made considerable strides in modernising 
its equipment over the period of the 1950's, but also that its perform­
ance in this direction compared extremely favourably with that of
2 2 1
other textile industries. If the publication of the 1948 Report gave
an initial impetus to a high level of investment in the industry, the 
effective operation of Jute Control and of the industry's trade pricing 
agreements seem to have been sustaining forces. These, certainly up 
to the early 1960's, allowed the jute industry to believe that price 
competition from India and among home producers would be limited. And 
while this study has elsewhere suggested that such price levels may have 
hastened the entry and impact of polypropylene upon jute's end-use 
markets, at the same time the investment must have provided for a higher 
level of efficiency in jute spinning and manufacturing. Again, im­
perfect though the data may be, figures suggest that, while continuing 
to spend significant sums in maintaining its jute plant in a modern 
state, the industry as a whole invested heavily in synthetics plant and 
machinery from the late 1960's onwards. This latter direction of 
spending was largely responsible for the upsurge in total investment 
figures during the late 1960's and early 1970's.
Finally, with respect to research and development, the industry's 
voluntary co-operative efforts in this area from 1946 onwards appear 
from discussions with those involves in this aspect of the industry 
at the time to have had the effect of improving the quality of product 
and production methods across the industry. This was achieved by a 
pooling of resources for research and development in the industry, and 
by spreading the results of such work more widely across the 97% of 
spinners and manufacturers in the industry who were members of the 
B.J.T.R.A. than would otherwise have been the case. As in the area 
of capital investment expenditure, the industry appears to have respond­
ed quickly to the potential for developing polypropylene in terms of the 
switch of emphasis in its research and development expenditure.
2 2 2
This chapter has illustrated quantitatively a number of features 
of the traditional jute industry in a period of transition. Several 
characteristics stand out. First, there is evidence at a market 
level of a real effort by the industry to accomplish the transition.
This is illustrated through the data on capital equipment expenditure 
and research and development effort. Second, the transition from 
almost complete dependence upon jute to a wider industrial textiles 
base and other interests was accomplished with quite remarkable smooth­
ness by all of the surviving firms. This applied particularly to 
profitability, both relative to U.K. manufacturing industry, and with 
respect to profit performance within the group of firms and over sub­
periods within the years 1968-1977. Third, company size does not appear 
to have conferred overwhelming advantage on those firms within our group. 
Larger firms performed no better than smaller ones in respect of average 
profitability or growth over the period 1968-1977. These larger firms 
do, however, appear to have had an advantage in terms of the average 
level of labour productivity; and there is some evidence that the 
variability of their profits over time was lower than that of smaller 
competitors. These latter advantages did not however translate them­
selves into a better performance in the fundamental areas of profitabil­
ity or growth.
Having summarised our findings and offered some analysis of these 
in the area of economic performance in this industry in the final 
section of this chapter, it remains in Chapter V to bring together all 
of the strands of findings and analysis in the thesis so far.
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Appendix Table 4.1
Employment in the Jute Industry ('OOO)
Males Females Total Females:Males Unemployment
1948 7.9 12.4 20.3 1.56:1 388
1949 7.2 10.0 17.2 1.39 1,361
1950 7.1 10.5 17.6 1.48 483
1951 7.7 11.1 18.8 1.44 291
1952 7.0 9.8 16.8 1.40 1,420
1953 8.1 11.8 19.9 1.46 619
1954 9.3 11.5 20.8 1.24 602
1955 8.8 11.0 19.8 1.25 1,087
1956 8.5 10.6 19.1 1.25 1,460
1957 8.6 10.1 18.7 1.17 1,646
1958 7.8 8.4 16.2 1.08 2,613
1959 8.2 8.7 16.9 1.06 1,258
1960 8.8 8.4 17.2 0.95 710
1961 8.3 8.6 16.9 1.04 1,655
1962 8.2 9.2 17.4 1.12 640
1963 8.6 8.4 17.0 0.98 945
1964 8.8 8.5 17.3 0.97 617
1965 8.9 8.6 17.5 0.97 459
1966 8.8 8.3 17.1 0.94 358
1967 8.0 7.3 15.3 0.91 950
1968 8.2 7.0 15.2 0.85 640
1969 8.5 6.9 15.4 0.81 542
1970 6.9 5.0 11.9 0.72 995
1971 6.1 4.2 10.3 0.69 1,415
1972 5.7 3.8 9.4 0.67 1,251
1973 5.5 3.5 9.0 0.64 931
1974 6.0 3.4 9.4 0.56 529
1975 5.3 2.8 8.1 0.53 730
1976 5.0 2.6 7.6 0.52 897
1977 5.3 2.7 8.0 0.51 923
Sources: Department of Employment, British Labour Statistics - Historical
Abstract 1886-1968 
annual editions of
(London: H.M.S 
British Labour
.0., 1971) : and 
Statistics.
subsequent
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Appendix Table 4.2
Earnings and Hours Worked in Manufacturing Industry*
lien Aged 21. and Over Women Aged 18 and Over
Average Weekly Average Weekly Average Weekly Average Weekly
Earnings Hours Worked Earnings Hours Worked
(£) (£)
1948 7.17 46.5 3.74 41.6
1949 7.40 46.6 3.96 41.7
1950 7.83 47.5 4.16 42.1
1951 8.60 47.8 4.53 41.5
1952 9.24 47.7 4.84 41.8
1953 9.83 47.9 5.16 42.0
1954 10.61 48.5 5.45 42.0
1955 11.55 48.7 5.80 41.8
1956 12.11 48.2 6.00 41.5
1957 12.44 48.1 6.31 41.5
1958 13.06 47.6 6.58 41.2
1959 14.21 47.6 7.07 41.5
1960 15.16 47.4 7.41 40.4
1961 15.89 46.8 7.71 39.6
1962 16.34 46.2 8.03 39.3
1963 17.29 46.8 8.41 39.6
1964 18.67 46.9 8.94 39.3
1965 20.16 46.1 9.59 38.6
1966 20.78 45.0 10.06 38.0
1967 21.89 45.3 10.54 38.0
1968 23.62 45.8 11.31 38.2
1969 25.54 45.7 12.12 37.9
1970 28.91 44.9 13.98 37.7
1971 31.37 43.6 15.80 37.5
1972 36.20 44.1 18.34 37.7
1973 41.52 44.7 21.15 37.5
1974 49.12 44.0 27.05 37.2
1975 59.74 42.7 34.23 36.8
1976 67.83 43.5 40.71 37.2
1977 74.20 45.6 45.00 39.8
* Data are for manual workers in manufacturing industry 
Source : Department of Employment Gazette (H.M.S.O.)
230
Appendix Table 4.3
Earnings and Hours Worked in Jute Industry*
Men Aged 21 and Over Women Aged 18
Average Weekly Average Weekly Average Weekly
Earnings Hours Worked Earnings
(£) (£)
1960 11.79 47.8 7.37
1961 11.93 45.6 7.54
1962 12.88 46.4 8.05
1963 13.43 46.0 8.13
1964 14.57 46.3 8.85
1965 15.71 47.0 9.21
1966 16.56 46.3 9.62
1967 18.08 45.6 10.36
1968 18.96 45.5 10.80
1969 21.47 45.2 12.32
1970 23.25 44.1 12.52
1971 25.02 44.9 15.70
1972 29.40 44.2 18.37
1973 33.14 43.3 21.72
1974 40.45 43.5 28.51
1975 50.50 42.8 34.74
1976 54.44 43.0 42.48
1977 56.36 42.7 42.47
* Figures are those for October each year.
Sources : 1960-69 unpublished Department of Employment
1970- Department of Employment Gazette (H.l
and Over
Average Weekly 
Hours Worked
42.4 
40.8
40.7
40.5
39.5
39.6
38.4
38.3
37.8
37.7 
37.6
38.0
38.1
37.5
38.6
36.1 
37.5
36.3
figures
l.S.O.)
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Labour Productivity Comparisons
Appendix Table 4.4
Index of Index of Output
Raw Jute Consumption per Person Employed
per Employee (Manuf. Industry) 3* 4**
1950 = 100 1950 = 100
1950 100 100
1951 98 102
1952 103 99
1953 107 104
1954 107 109
1955 119 113
1956 120 111
1957 121 114
1958 124 114
1959 131 121
1960 133 126
1961 112 125
1962 121 127
1963 128 133 100 100
1964 122 144 95 106
1965 119 146 93 111
1966 116 149 91 114
1967 120 155 94 120
1968 118 166 92 140
1969 113 170 88 143
1970 118 172 92 148
1971 122 176 95 162
1972 133 187 104 173
1973 124 201 97 183
1974 102 198 80 172
1975 105 195 82 178
1976 101 203 79 191
1977 94 202 73 201
* as in 
** as in
col. 1 1963 = 100 
col. 2 for Textiles 1963 = 100
Sources: Table 4.25, and British Labour Statistics (London: H.M. S.O.,
various editions).
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Appendix Table 4.5
Capital Investment (£’000)
Cumulative
Total Annual
Price
Index*
Annual at 
1970 Prices
j"ieai
Moving
Average
1945 500 500 .. ..
1946 1,000 500 • •
1947 1,500 500 • • ..
1948 2,000 500 40.3 1,240
1949 2,500 500 41.2 1,214 1,212
1950 3,000 500 42.3 1,182 1,529
1951 4,000 1,000 45.7 2,190 1,677
1952 4,850 850 51.2 1,660 1,897
1953 5,830 980 53.2 1,840 2,097
1954 7,330 1,500 53.7 2,790 2,133
1955 8,330 1,000 56.6 1,770 1,900
1956 9,830 1,500 60.5 1,140 1,537
1957 10,290 1,090 63.9 1,700 1,327
1958 11,670 750 65.8 1,140 1,177
1959 12,130 460 66.5 690 817
1960 12,600 420 67.5 620 627
1961 13,000 400 70.2 570 630
1962 13,500 500 71.7 700 653
1963 14,000 500 73.0 690 907
1964 15,000 1,000 75.0 1,330 1,143
1965 16,100 1,100 77.9 1,410 1,390
1966 17,250 1,150 80.3 1,430 1,397
1967 18,350 1,100 81.3 1,350 1,577
1968 20,000 1,650 84.7 1,950 1,550
1969 21,250 1,250 90.8 1,350 1,850
1970 24,500 2,250 100.0 2,250 1,953
1971 27,000 2,500 110.7 2,260 2,347
1972 30,000 3,000 118.8 2,530 2,623
1973 34,000 4,000 130.0 3,080 2,863
1974 38,500 4,500 150.9 2,980 2,560
1975 41,500 3,000 185.5 1,620 1,667
1976 42,500 1,000 247.3 400 732
1977 43,000 500 282.0 177
* From C.S.O., Price Index Numbers for Current Cost Accounting (Loi
H.M.S.O., 1978). 
Sources: see ref. 51.
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British Jute Trade Research Association
Appendix Table 4.8
Income Member-
Industry Government Total ship Employees
1946-47 • • • • £18,502 138 4
1947-48 £13,463 £10,557 24,020 160 12
1948-49 15,523 13,001 28,524 170 22
1949-50 16,963 14,346 31,309 172 29
1950-51 17,372 14,662 32,034 176 30
1951-52 19,579 14,559 34,138 175 36
1952-53 20,770 16,301 37,071 171 39
1953-54 21,580 17,193 38,773 166 43
1954-55 25,331 19,538 44,869 152 48
1955-56 27,496 20,001 47,497 154 43
1956-57 31,874 20,950 52,824 136 45
1957-58 32,057 21,617 53,674 129 45
1958-59 31,081 20,943 52,024 139 46
1959-60 32,425 24,052 56,477 124 50
1960-61 33,387 23,228 56,615 120 50
1961-62 37,621 24,238 61,859 117 50
1962-63 39,596 27,533 66,129 114 50
1963-64 38,960 25,604 64,764 108 50
1964-65 40,116 26,791 66,907 105 40
1965-66 41,330 28,218 69,548 104 43
1966-67 44,314 31,831 76,145 101 39
1967-68 44,415 34,592 79,007 95 44
Source: British Jute Trade Research Association, Annual Reports.
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Appendix Table 4.9A
Linear Regression of Firm Size and Vertical Integration
Dependent variable : 10-year average ratio of value added to sales
Size Measure Constant b t R2 Rho DW
Average assets 0.334 -0.00001 3.2316*** 0.3742 -0.4214 1.3346/
Opening assets 0.335 -0.00001 2.5461** 0.3766 -0.3679 1.2518/
Average sales 0.338 -0.00000 3.1561*** 0.4196 -0.4679* 1.4121
Opening sales 0.338 -0.00001 3.3972*** 0.4134 -0.5393** 1.2931/
Average employ. 0.338 -0.00003 3.4218*** 0.2235 -0.4647* 1.2419/
Opening employ. 0.336 -0.00003 1.5211 0.2361 -0.4665* 1.2873/
Growth Measure
Assets 0.313 -0.00027 0.1125 0.0010 -0.0947 1.1786/
Sales 0.313 0.00013 0.0361 0.0001 0.0393 1.1920/
Employment 0.313 -0.00004 0.0108 0.0000 -0.0054 1.1836/
Appendix Table 4.9B
Linear Regression of Firm Growth and Profit Variability
Dependent variable : Profit variability
Growth b
Profits: Assets -0.23631
stand. Sales -0.35862
dev. Emp. -0.30131
Profits: Assets -3.38635
coeff. Sales -5.21188
var. Emp. -5.11632
Profits: Assets -5.31154
resid. Sales -8.20612
var. Emp. -7.03408
t R2 Rho DW
1.5526
1.5484
1.2461
0.1565
0.1557
0.1067
-0.4061 
-0.2574 
-0.3059
2.2983
2.2331
2.4172
2.7331**
2.7826**
2.6414**
0.3648
0.3732
0.3493
-0.6845**
-0.5357**
-0.6166**
2.3326 
2.1021 
2.3014
1.6037
1.6334
1.3411
0.1652
0.1703
0.1215
-0.3199
-0.1571
-0.2252
2.2073
2.1244
2.2931
Significance levels : * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%, **** 0.1%
DW : none of the statistics was significant at 10% - those marked /
were within the indeterminate range.
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Appendix to Chapter IV
Comparison of Sales and Value Added as Company Size and Growth Measures
Although there are some uncertainties concerning our measure of value 
added, and although a number of alternative firm size measures have already 
been used in the tests in this chapter, it was decided to check to see if 
the findings regarding the impact of company size upon profitability and 
growth held true where value added was used in place of sales as a company 
size measure.
There was found to be a strong relationship between opening and average 
sales and value added data, and between the sales and value added growth 
measures. The respective coefficients of rank correlation (Rho) were 
0.8643, 0.9929 and 0.8786, which were all significant at 0.1%, while the 
coefficients of determination when the value added measure was adopted as 
the dependent variable were 0.9469, 0.9436 and 0.6386 respectively. Not 
surprisingly therefore there was only a minimal change in the findings on 
the impact of firm size or growth on profitability (Tables 4.6-4.9) using 
these two different size or growth measures. In respect of the analysis 
of growth in Tables 4.11-4.18, although the growth-size findings were 
virtually identical, profitability appeared to explain a slightly lower 
proportion of value added growth compared with sales growth.
Only in respect of Tables 4.19-4.21 were the value added findings differ­
ent from those based upon sales growth. Relating to the data in Table
4.19 there was no marked difference in the growth rates of value added
between the two subperiods using any of the tests. The figure for Rho in
Table 4.20 on a value added basis was 0.2929, which was not significant at
210%; and the t statistic and R figures for Table 4.21 on the basis of 
value added were 1.3375 and 0.1210 respectively. This latter set of 
results relating to Tables 4.19-4.21 brings the s u b p e r i o d  output measure 
findings into line with those based upon input growth measures. It there­
by strengthens the contrast between subperiod profit and growth perform­
ance. Comparing the findings on p.167 and Table 4.5 with those in Tables
4.20 and 4.21, the conclusion incorporating the value added data is that 
while there was no significant overall change in the level of profitabil­
ity or growth rates over our two subperiods, so far as growth is con­
cerned there was some disturbance in the rank order of firms between the 
two subperiods, and growth in the latter subperiod was much less related 
to growth in the former than was found to be the case with profitability.
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Annex to Chapter XV
Total Factor Productivity
It is recognised that measures of efficiency such as rate of 
return on capital employed or labour productivity are partial. In 
particular measures of physical output or sales or value added per 
employee (labour productivity) cannot be considered in isolation from 
changes in the amount of capital employed by the business. A common 
feature of industry, and our group of firms is no exception, is a pro­
gressive increase in the ratio of capital to labour employed.
Apparent rises in labour productivity may not under such circumstances
be the result of increased efficiency in the use of labour itself but
65of an enhanced ratio of capital to labour. This particular limit­
ation in the use of labour productivity as a measure of efficiency may
be especially serious in a case such as the jute industry where
66considerable changes in technology have occurred. In order to
obtain a more reliable indication of changes in the total efficiency
of a business over a period of time use may be made of a measure of
total factor productivity. This measure, essentially a residual,
indicates the part of the growth of output of the firm which is not
accounted for by increased inputs of capital and labour. The arith-
67metic index formula used for our calculations is given below.
p  =  -------- 2 ---------aL + bK
where Q is an index of output, L and K are indices of employment of 
labour and capital respectively, and a and b are the proportions of 
wages and profits respectively to value added in the base period (a + b 
= 1). There are two major areas of difficulty in a study such as
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this which the use of total factor productivity creates. The first 
concerns the broader, issues of what is actually being measured.
The total factor productivity formula above includes only capital and 
labour inputs, and therefore ignores the contribution of increased 
materials to output. Furthermore, not only does the formula not 
allow for the advantages of economics of scale, but it takes no account 
of learning effects or substitution between capital and labour. Nor, 
more controvertially, is account taken of changes in the quality of 
capital and labour. If these types of change are not built into the
6Eequation then total factor productivity, as a residual, is overstated. 
The second area of difficulty concerns the actual measure of labour and 
capital inputs and proportions in the base year and of value added. In 
our case labour input is measured as the total number of employees as 
recorded in the company Annual Reports. This is a reasonable measure 
of labour input although it does not reveal the number of hours worked 
and thus ignores overtime or short time working. Capital is measured 
as total capital employed (fixed and current assets less non-bank 
current liabilities) measured over the period in real terns by 
reference to the appropriate C.S.O. Current Cost Accounting index 
(Textiles, Leather and Clothing, M.L.H. 411-450). The output measure 
used is value added expressed in real terms by reference to the approp­
riate wholesale price index. Value added was used in place of sales 
because it is known that for a proportion of the firms in our group the
ratio of value added to sales changed significantly over the 1968-1977 
69period. Thus the period used for measurement was 1968-1977, and in
the base year value added was calculated from the company accounts by 
reference to data on sales, trading profits, and total remuneration 
of employees including directors. Material and fuel inputs were 
assumed to be sales less trading profits, less remuneration of all
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employees including directors. Value added was calculated as sales 
less material for fuel inputs. The proportion of value added 
accounted for by labour (a in the equation above) was the ratio of all 
remuneration to total value added, with the remainder being attributed 
to profits (b in the above equation).
The result of the total factor productivity analysis is interest­
ing. In respect of none of the measures used (assets, sales, employ­
ment, or value added) did average size explain any significant 
proportion of the variation in total factor productivity among the 
firms. This finding applied in respect of both the parametric and the 
nonparametric statistical tests, and the Durbin Watson statistics relat­
ing to the linear regressions revealed no evidence of autocorrelation. 
With regard to growth as an explanatory variable the results differed 
between the growth measures. These are presented below.
Table 4.40
Linear Regression of Total Factor Productivity and Growth
Dependent variable: Total factor productivity 1968-1977
Growth Measure Constant b t 2R Rho DW**
Assets 23.1 -1.41088 1.8997* 0.2173 -0.2609 2.6214
Sales 27.7 -2.33528 2.1210* 0.2571 -0.3536 2.6669
Employment 21.7 -1.85800 1.5627 0.1581 -0.2449 2.7392
Value added 26.0 -0.00978 0.0078 0.0000 -0.0393 2.6301
*significant at 10%; **not significant at 10% or within indeterminate
range.
Although none of the values of Rho in the above table was signifi­
cant, there is obviously evidence of a fairly strong negative linear 
relationship between asset or sales growth and total factor productivity. 
Our finding therefore is that although size had no effect upon the
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extent of total factor productivity, growth of sales and assets did, 
in the sense that firms which experienced lower rates of growth 
achieved higher levels of total factor productivity. Although the 
explanation for this may be complex (perhaps firms trying to grow at 
above particular rates encountered lower levels of management product­
ivity) the relationship is consistent with some of our earlier 
findings. This consistency is brought out if we examine the relation­
ship between total factor productivity and the two partial measures of 
efficiency - rate of return on capital, and labour productivity. It 
will be remembered that average profitability and average growth among 
our firms were strongly related (see Tables 4.6 and 4.9), and also that 
growth and labour productivity were strongly related when the latter was 
calculated on a value-added basis (see Tables 4.29^ and 4.36). Our 
findings with regard to the relationship between total factor product­
ivity and capital and labour productivity are as follows.
Table 4.41
Linear Regression of Total Factor Productivity and Rate of Return on 
Capital Employed and Labour Productivity (Value-Added Basis)
Dependent variable : Total factor productivity 1968-1977
Constant b t R Rho DW**
Rate of return 38.2 -1.24145 1.4339 0.1366 -0.1357 2.7952
Labour product. 63.4 -29.2927 1.8960* 0.2167 -0.3536 2.7271
* significant at 10%; ** not significant at 10% or within indetermin­
ate range.
Table 4.41 above suggests evidence of a negative relationship between 
the two partial measures of productivity on the one hand and total 
factor productivity on the other, while there exists a strong positive 
relationship between the two partial measures themselves. (In this 
latter case the rank correlation coefficient was 0.4750, and with
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labour productivity as the independent variable the t statistic relating
2to the b coefficient was 2.3076 and R was 0.2906.)
Our conclusion from this area of study must be that while our two 
partial measures of productivity appear to be quite strongly related - 
indeed on a simple bivariate regression basis differences in labour 
productivity account for about 30% of observed variations in profita­
bility - total factor productivity is clearly measuring something 
different. This difference is particularly brought out when growth 
is adopted as the independent variable in explaining differences in 
total factor productivity. Here, quite contrary to our earlier 
findings in respect of the influence of growth on labour productivity 
and the relationship between profitability and growth, firms in our 
group which achieved lower rates of growth in terms of assets and sales 
performed better in the dimension of total factor productivity than 
their faster-growing competitors.
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CHAPTER V
Conclusions
A. Introduction
Jack Downie justified his meagre one and a half pages of con­
clusions at the end of The Competitive Process by a reference to 
Keynes' famous remark on economics being an "apparatus of the mind", 
and a suggestion that "it is because economics is as he (Keynes) 
described it that few books on economic subjects have a very lengthy 
chapter on conclusions"."*" It nonetheless seems both appropriate and 
possible to draw a number of conclusions from this study, and these 
relate both to the behaviour of firms in an individual market and to 
the broader topic of resource allocation and efficiency in general. 
Indeed there appears to be a growing realisation and confidence that 
studies of individual firms or industries can lead on to the formul­
ation of useful generalisations on economic behaviour; and also that 
the study of firm or individual-industry decision making at the micro-
economic level can throw light upon questions of the overall or macro-
2economic operation of the economy. The same argument must also 
apply to the conditions governing international competitiveness. 
Furthermore this relationship between micro and macro performance may 
be particularly significant in the area of economic growth where a 
major determinant of the rate of expansion of firms and of an economy 
is the rate at which new technologies are developed or adopted. This 
particular study, being one largely concerned with an environment of 
technological change and of the process of the adaptation to new 
technology, is one in which it should be especially possible to high­
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light certain wider implications on the basis of observation of a 
single industry.
This study has been one of a declining industry, indeed of an
industry demand for whose traditional products for sacking and bags and
for yarn and cloth for the carpet industry collapsed very rapidly over
a relatively short period of time at the end of the 1960's. To give
one example in respect of a major end use, jute's share of the market
for the primary backing of tufted carpets fell from more than 90% in
31967 to less than 5% in 1974. In such an environment a number of
questions and issues automatically arise. First, was the traditional 
jute industry in any sense responsible for its own demise, or for the 
timing or pace of its downfall? Was it the case, for example, that 
arrangements of one form or another among firms in the jute industry, 
or simply the general uncompetitiveness of the traditional market, 
caused new products to take over from jute on a price or quality basis? 
If such a takeover was in some sense inevitable, was the process 
speeded up by conduct on the part of jute manufacturers? Second, were 
changes in demand for jute or in the accompanying technology foreseen 
by firms in the traditional market? How aware were the original jute 
manufacturers of the possibility of technical obsolescence in respect 
of jute yarn and cloth; and what steps were being taken to deal with 
the situation? For example, were any of the jute manufacturers 
responsible for major developments in polypropylene? Third, what was 
the reaction of the original jute manufacturers to the commercial 
development of polypropylene from the mid 1960's onwards? Fourth, 
and related to the previous question, how far did the traditional jute 
manufacturing firms participate in new technology as it related either 
to jute or to polypropylene? It is in an attempt to answer some of
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covered largely under the same headings but not in the same sequence as 
in the body of the thesis as a whole.
these questions that these Conclusions are written. The material is
B. Changes in Markets and Market Structure
As mentioned in the Introduction to this chapter, this study has 
been one of market decline so far as the traditional jute industry is 
concerned. This decline came from two sources: radical change in
technology (from handling and transporting goods in jute bags to bulk 
handling and containerisation), and substitution of synthetic fibres 
(predominantly polypropylene) for jute. To the question, could jute 
in the long term have competed more effectively against these new 
methods, the answer must be no. There is no indication that other than 
dramatically lower jute prices could have preserved a container end-use 
market for jute, or that polypropylene’s inroads into jute's traditional 
markets were not the result predominantly of better technological perfor­
mance combined with lower prices given the nature of the synthetic raw 
material. It was, however, noted in Chapter II that the system of Jute 
Control and the restrictive trading agreements did have the effect of 
artificially raising the price of jute above world levels. Control, 
for example, "marked up" the price of some imports of jute goods by up 
to 50%; and in other areas there was a complete ban on imports from
Calcutta - Dundee prices in some cases being up to 75% above those of
4potential imports. Furthermore, attention has been drawn to the fact 
that quite apart from the impact of Control, jute manufacturers in the 
U.K. do not appear in the late 1960's and early 1970's to have been 
prepared to fight any rearguard action along the price dimension of 
competition to maintain the position of jute in its existing markets.
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The history of changing markets for firms in the traditional 
jute industry is that of the disappearance of former jute end uses, 
and of the efforts by most firms to participate in the necessary 
technological change to avoid total loss of business. Thus although, 
as was noted in Chapter III, there are one or two small spinners who 
have remained entirely in jute, satisfying demand largely for woven 
carpet yarns, and although many of the large firms still combine jute 
spinning and weaving with synthetic interests, most firms have moved 
significantly into polypropylene or other man-made fibres, or into 
more diversified interests. The result of changes in technology is 
that although the carpet industry is now responsible for purchasing a 
much greater share of total jute output - the proportion having risen 
from around 50% in the late 1950's to 70% by the early 1970's - it can 
give the jute industry only a fraction of the custom which it once did.
The main point about changes in markets brought about by the 
growing significance of polypropylene is that the former jute manufact­
urers are now operating in a much more sophisticated market. Instead of 
buying on a world market having some of the characteristics of perfect 
competition on the raw material supply side, the synthetics weavers or 
extruders are now purchasing their input requirements from the large 
constituents of the petroleum and chemical oligopolies. These are 
producing propylene as a by-product of refining crude oil (or natural 
gas liquids in the case of the United States), the propylene emerging 
along with ethylene from the by-product naphtha. The attitude towards 
the production and pricing of these products by the major oil companies 
is therefore of considerable importance to the Dundee industry. Nor 
should it be forgotten that although some 65% of textile, polypropylene 
is processed in Dundee and the surrounding area, a major competitor to
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these local firms exists in the form of Pachogue Plymouth, the AMOCO 
subsidiary. This business is a fully integrated concern, being part 
of Standard Oil of Indiana. So far as sales of polypropylene output 
are concerned, it has to be remembered that textile uses are largely 
(70%) dependent upon the tufted carpet industry, characterised by 
cyclical tradition conditions and concentrated buying power. Thus,
5although polypropylene has a wide variety of uses in various forms,
the local Dundee industry is heavily oriented towards carpet backing
and packaging end uses, about 70% of output going into the former and
6a further 8% into the latter.
One of the questions posed in the introduction to this chapter 
related to the degree to which the industry as a whole, and individual 
constituent firms, had recognised the need for change away from 
dependence upon jute to the new market areas, and had responded to 
the need. At an individual level there is no doubt that a number of 
firms responded quickly to the possibilities of textile applications 
of polypropylene. As early as 1965 Low & Bonar and Sidlaw each 
acquired a 40% interest in Polytape Ltd., the joint subsidiary of 
British Ropes (now Bridon) and Plasticisers which had been established 
to explore the possibility of producing tape yarns from extruded poly­
propylene film. These two local firms went on to establish their 
own tape weaving subsidiary Synthetic Fabrics (Scotland). Other 
firms which invested in some aspects of polypropylene technology at
an early date were Don Bros. Buist, Caird, and Scott & Fyfe - the
7latter two being relatively small firms. Other businesses were
more reluctant to enter the polypropylene market so early; and some 
of course followed other lines of diversification. At first there 
may have been some doubt as to how far and how rapidly polypropylene
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would displace jute in the latter’s established end-use areas; and 
this feature no doubt discouraged some firms from following the 
example of those quoted above. Indeed generally there seems to have 
been a lack of appreciation as to just how quickly jute was likely to 
be superseded by polypropylene. Thus at the end of 1968 one trade 
source was of the opinion that "for the primary backing of tufted car­
pets ... polypropylene is seen not so much as a fibre that will make
0
inroads into jute but as an additional fibre" - yet jute was almost
entirely eliminated from this market by the early 1970's. Again
even at the end of 1971, and instancing in particular the use of jute
in woven carpets, the same source felt that "there are still large
markets for which jute is technically better, and does a superior job
9than any known man-made fibre" - although this market too is now 
increasingly catered for by polypropylene. Thus one can say that 
although a number of firms in the industry took an early part in the 
new technology, the pace at which polypropylene was to displace jute 
was probably underestimated by the trade as a whole.
Another relevant characteristic in this context is the relation­
ship between the rate at which firms in the industry moved into new 
market areas or adopted new technologies, and variables such as company 
size and existing commitment to the jute industry. Very few clear 
relationships have emerged from the research. As indicated in 
Chapter III (Tables 3.7 - 3.13) there was no statistical relationship 
revealed by the parametric statistical tests, between size and diversi­
fication, although opening size (by sales) was significantly greater 
for diversified than non-diversified firms in terms of the nonpara- 
metric tests which constitute more robust evidence with regard to our 
group of firms. Again in Chapter IV, as an indirect measure of the
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adoption of new technologies and markets, no evidence was found 
(Tables 4.11, 4.15 and 4.18) of any parametric or nonparametric 
relationship between opening firm size and growth. (None of the 
above conclusions is invalidated by the use of value added in the place 
of sales as the measure of company output.) This evidence certainly 
does not suggest that large firms had any enormous technical, financial 
or managerial advantage over their smaller competitors in adapting to 
new market conditions. Thus while some of the smaller spinning firms 
have continued to remain entirely in the jute industry - preferring not 
to have to face the problems of learning new technologies and raising 
additional capital - others in this size category were among the 
earliest to invest in the new technology. Likewise, while some large 
firms have successfully diversified and adopted new technologies, this 
has by no means been the case with all.
Regarding the relationship between diversification and extent of 
existing commitment to the traditional jute industry, it is worth noting 
that Low & Bonar - which although a large firm never occupied a pre­
dominant place in the jute industry - has consistently been a diversi­
fier, while Sidlaw - which has traditionally been the market leader in 
jute - has proved to be less committed to synthetics and not uniformly 
successful in other diversified areas. The more conservative reaction 
of Sidlaw with respect to jute is perhaps best summed up by a
reported comment by its chairman in 1968: "I'd still rather be in jute
10100 per cent, than in synthetics 100 per cent.".
A part of the material in the two previous paragraphs can be
11illuminated by reference to the concept of barriers to exit. In our
case one has in mind barriers not only to the exit of firms in a total 
sense but also to the transfer of firms into new technologies quite
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evidently superseding their existing methods of serving particular 
markets. There is evidence of both of these phenomena in the jute
industry. We saw in Section C of Chapter II that a number of company
deaths only occurred finally after many years of financial losses; and 
the reluctant attitude of some firms as regards leaving their dependence 
upon jute to invest in polypropylene has been referred to immediately 
above. It is interesting that at least one survey of the phenomenon 
of barriers to exit, while referring to the "technical" causes of these 
such as durable and specific capital assets, specific qualities of a 
labour force (and the cost of redundancy payments), and regional con­
centration of producers, also gives considerable emphasis to "the
importance of intangible and managerial exit barriers relative to those
12linked to tangible assets". This relative emphasis receives
support from our study of the jute industry. Obviously the industry 
in the 1960's was characterised by the existence of plant and machinery 
which was highly durable and specific, and some of which was so old 
that from the point of view of some accountants its use entailed no 
charge against the profits of the business. The industry's labour 
force too was regarded by some as being rather specific and not necess­
arily adaptable to having to cope with new synthetic fibre technologies. 
The geographical concentration of the jute industry around Dundee may 
also have inhibited thinking in terms of any dramatic geographical 
shift of firms' activities. Nonetheless the different speeds at which 
various firms reacted to the decline of the traditional jute market, and 
differences in the rapidity with which they adopted new technologies 
both lend weight to the emphasis of Caves and Porter upon managerial 
factors in this area.
Turning now to the changes in the general market environment, it 
would appear that on the face of it the operation of Jute Control and
251
of the trading agreements must have protected the Dundee industry from
both foreign and domestic competition, and therefore in some sense led
to a misallocation of resources. Indeed it was the explicit purpose
of these arrangements to protect the local industry. A system such as
Control, which in 1962 had the effect of creating an absolute import
13barrier in respect of 80% of total U.K. jute goods production, could
not have had any other effect than to permit the survival of firms
which would otherwise have gone out of business. Indeed one study
sugg2sts that in the late 1950’s and early 1960's the abandonment of
Control's import protection would have led to the "virtual extinction"
14of the Dundee industry. It is difficult to be more precise
regarding the impact of Control upon the size of the industry. There
were no major exits from the market up to the later 1960's except for
five disappearances in 1959, and these did not coincide with changes in
Control regulations. This does not, however, mean that the earlier
withdrawal of import protection would not have resulted in a much
faster slimming down of the Dundee industry. The major adjustment to
Control in 1963 and 1964 was not, correspondingly, accompanied by any
apparent reduction in the number of firms in the market. Indeed the
industry itself did not appear to expect the change to have a dramatic 
15effect. The point about any analysis of the impact of the relax­
ation and ending of Control is that many other variables were changing 
at the same time. In particular, the ending of the industry's restrict­
ive trading agreements early in 1963 coincided with a further reduction 
in tariff restrictions; and the final ending of Control's functions in 
1969 and its replacement with a purely quota system of import limit­
ation took place just at the time when polypropylene was beginning to 
make serious inroads into jute's hold on the tufted carpet backing 
market. Most commentators would thus agree that Control moved from a
252
position in the 1950*3 where it was indispensable to the survival of 
the Dundee industry to one in the later 1960's where technological 
change had made it irrelevant.
McDowall et al. have pointed to a more intricate relationship 
between Control and technological change. The price levels for jute 
in the U.K. established by Control not only gave domestic producers a 
cushion with which to finance modernisation and ultimately diversifi­
cation into synthetics spinning and weaving (including predominantly 
polypropylene),"^ but also hastened the adoption by carpet manufactur­
ers in this country of polypropylene in place of jute because of the
enhanced price differential compared with, say, the situation in the 
17United States. Certainly those in the industry today with whom the
matter was discussed concede that the price levels established under 
Control were fair, and possibly even generous. They admit that such 
price levels allowed small marginal firms to remain in the market, and 
accept that there was a wide spread of productive efficiency among manu­
facturers. However, one can at the same time point to considerable 
investment in modernised plant over the decades following 1945, and 
also, as detailed in Chapter IV, to increase in labour productivity. 
Furthermore, the number of independent businesses in the local industry 
did fall by 23% from 1945 to 1967, indicating that the arrangements did 
not guarantee complete survival for all of the firms in the market; 
and at the very least one can say that no new firms entered the jute 
market - although textile firms outside Dundee probably considered that 
they faced considerable barriers to entry through failure to enjoy ex­
ternal economies of scale comparable to Dundee producers in contemplat­
ing expansion into the jute market.
Control, therefore, appears to have given the Dundee producers
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a temporary protection from inevitable decline. Any loss of welfare
along the lines of traditional resource misailocation here appears to
have been the price paid for a temporary maintenance of employment in
a city dominated by a single declining industry. It might also be
possible to argue that the temporary respite from traditional overseas
competition granted by Control did more adequately equip the industry
to meet the later technological (Schumpeterian) competition. One
must, however, at the same time recognise that not only do such arrangements
as Control deny domestic consumers access to cheaper goods from overseas
(and also artificially deny overseas exporters the opportunity to compete
on equal terms with U.K. producers), but also that total consumption of
such protected goods is reduced to a level below what it would otherwise
have been without protection. This effect, it was suggested, in the jute
industry probably eventually led to an increase in the rate at which jute
was superseded by polypropylene in major end uses. Furthermore, subsidies
to a particular geographically concentrated industry, such as jute, merely
protect that industry and encourage it to maintain its hold on its existing
labour force, rather than encourage new industries to take up employment in
the area. Finally, of course, if a protected industry is not totally
concentrated geographically, then firms and employees in this market are
protected by tariffs regardless of the total economic conditions of the
region in which they are located. It is against these potential sources
of resource misailocation that one has to set the benefits for the industry
or local employment claimed to arise from tariff or other trade restrict- 
18ions.
The comments above apply with equal force to any analysis of the 
impact upon the industry of the trading agreements. The anticompetitive 
effect of these was continued beyond 1963 by the operation of an inform-
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ation agreement and the practice of price leadership - for both of which 
the industry was indebted to Sidlaw. Both of these arrangements were, 
however, brought to an end by the mid 1960's, and the impact of this 
ending is difficult to distinguish from the termination of Control and 
the emergence of polypropylene. Undoubtedly the trading agreements 
had, together with the geographical concentration of the industry, 
created an environment within the market which discouraged rivalry in 
general. It is unlikely in this context that firms minimised costs or 
eagerly sought to increase sales through price competition. Such an 
arrangement could not, however, survive the impact of an entirely new 
product in respect of which there were non-Dundee competitors, whose 
technology was new and again originated outwith Dundee, and in respect 
of which there was considerable international competition.
Again with regard to the price leadership which emerged in the 
industry following the ending of the trade pricing agreements (see 
Chapter II ref. 58), this practice does not seem to have survived the 
impact of polypropylene's entry into traditional jute end-use areas.
It is possible that Sidlaw continued to exert some form of nominal 
leadership of the "barometric" type in the industry by virtue of its 
size and its earlier role in the Jute Information Bureau. However, 
the very rapid adoption of polypropylene in the tufted carpet backing 
market at the end of the 1960's, and the continued loss of market 
share of woven carpets in favour of tufted (woven carpet manufacturers' 
sales fell from 29.8 m.sq.m. in 1967 to 25.4 m.sq.m. in 1975, represent­
ing a decline in total carpet market share by volume from 32.4% to 
15.8% over the period) created market pressures which no desire to 
maintain prices could overcome. From the late 1960's onwards there 
is evidence as we have seen (Chapter II ref.67) of "serious and
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widespread ... price cutting" having occurred, and this continued into
the 1970's with the observation by another company chairman of how
"when supply exceeds demand some spinners introduce cut prices and
19thus set a lower level of profitability". This suggests that as 
with other potentially anti-competitive structure or conduct character­
istics of this market, the rapid contraction of the traditional market 
was sufficient to nullify any real impact of these.
Given that this study has been one of market decline - and in the 
period 1967-1977 jute cloth output fell by 79% and yarn output by 59% - 
it is not surprising that a major feature of market structure has been 
a sharp reduction in the number of firms. As Table 2.1 in Chapter II 
indicates, the number of firms fell by 50% over a decade: from 30 in
1967 to 15 in 1976. Some part of this reduction is accounted for by 
surviving firms such as Low & Bonar, and Caird (Dundee) ceasing to be 
A.J.S.M. members (our definition of firms in the industry), although 
this in itself is a fair reflection of their exit from the traditional 
jute market. The major part of the reduction in numbers over this 
period however - 12 out of 15 - is due partially to acquisition and 
largely to the total demise of smaller firms. Of the 12 disappearances, 
8 definitely fell into the latter category; and this fate was particul­
arly characteristic of non-integrated weaving concerns, such as R.G. 
Kennedy, T.L. Miller, and Don & Duncan. Neither these disappearances 
nor the mergers which took place appear on the face of things to raise 
any major resource-allocation problems, although the candidate did 
receive a written communication from a senior director of one firm 
stating that from 1970 onwards his firm had followed an explicit policy 
of "under the counter rationalisation" in terms of acquiring and subse­
quently closing down jute manufacturing facilities of its competitors.
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Nonetheless, on the whole the businesses which left the industry at 
this time were predominantly small and family owned/managed. Further­
more, some of the mergers or acquisitions, such as J.D. Wilkie's taking 
over of fellow Kirriemuir producer Ogilvie Brothers in 1971, or the 
earlier more significant merger which created Scott & Robertson, meant 
improved viability for the firms concerned, and possibly increased 
competition for the existing large firms in the market. On the other 
hand some apparent acquisitions, such as Halley's takeover of Spalding 
& Valentine, or Low & Bonar's acquisition of Wm. Fergusson, were in 
fact contractions of the traditional industry as the jute operations 
of the two victims were rapidly closed down. It is interesting, 
indeed, to note that in only two cases - those of Sidlaw's acquisitions 
of Duke & Lowson and the Tayport Spinning Co., and Don Bros. Buist's 
purchase of J. & J. Smart - did major producers in the industry take 
over and continue in operation additional facilities. In general, 
therefore, the industry's contraction went ahead in a gradual and 
"civilised" manner: the only point to notice being that had the smaller
family businesses not gone out of existence, then Sidlaw and Scott & 
Robertson and the remaining larger firms might have found their own 
continuance in the industry more difficult.
It is impossible to conclude firmly whether those enterprises 
which did go out of business were the least efficient. Did the 
decline of the industry (for we have seen that any tendency to more 
aggressive competition among the firms was earlier kept in check by the 
operation of Control and the trading agreements) have the effect of 
eliminating the less efficient firms before the more efficient? In 
the absence of company accounting data the answer must be inconclusive. 
Possibly more important causes of demise appear to have been the size
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and position within the industry structure (including the extent of 
integration) on the part of the firms. Because the weaving side of 
the traditional jute industry declined so much more rapidly than the 
spinning side (the former by 79% in the decade to 1977 in volume 
terms compared with 59% in respect of the latter), those firms which 
were solely weavers were at a particular disadvantage compared with 
those which also had spinning capacity. The fairly rapid disappearance 
of the pure weavers at the end of the 1960's also gave the integrated 
spinners and weavers additional work for their looms at a time when the 
amount of weaving work was diminishing. As regards the effect of 
firm size, deaths were much more common among small than large firms; 
and it may be surmised that in addition to the forces mentioned above, 
the necessary change to an unfamiliar, capital intensive technology was 
much less attractive, even where it was possible, for such firms com­
pared with their larger counterparts.
C. Productivity and Investment
Since these two phenomena have a close relationship, it would 
appear to be sensible to discuss them together in assessing market 
performance. As usual, the indices for measuring the variables were 
not perfect for our purpose; but the general conclusion in the former 
area is that significant improvements in labour productivity were made 
by the industry. Rather surprisingly, however, in the light of 
further comments below, the industry does not compare favourably with 
roughly similar markets in this performance dimension. The following 
data are from a fairly recent cross-sectional study of labour product­
ivity .
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Table 5.1
Annual Average Compoundi Rates of Growth
1954--1963 1963-•1973 1954--1973
Jute
Gross*
Output
-1.0
Output per 
Operative
1.4 -3.0 2.9 -2.0 2.2
Spinning and Doubling -3.7 3.3 -1.0 4.3 -2.3 3.8
Weaving -3.0 4.3 -1.9 4.4 -2.4 4.3
Woollen and Worsted 0.6 2.8 -1.1 3.9 -0.3 3.4
81 Manufacturing 
Industries Average 2.5 2.9 3.2 4.3 3.0 3.6
Source : R. Wragg & J. Robertson, "Britain's Industrial Performance
since the War", Department of Employment Gazette, May 1978, 
pp.513-15.
* The fuller account of this interesting piece of research indicates 
clearly that the data refer to volume changes in output and in output 
per operative (gross output deflated to base-period prices). See 
R. Wragg & J. Robertson, "Post-War Trends in Employment, Productivity, 
Output, Labour Costs and Prices by Industry in the United Kingdom", 
Department of Employment Research Paper No. 3, Department of Employ­
ment, June 1978, p.5.
It would seem, therefore, that comparing the jute industry's 
labour productivity with that of other industries of similar technology 
and comparable experience of market contraction, and with manufacturing 
industry as a whole, the performance along this dimension has not been 
totally satisfactory. It may be claimed that labour productivity in 
jute is understated if some part of a factory workforce is weaving poly­
propylene or spinning nylon staple while the whole of the employment of 
the establishment is regarded as falling into the "jute" category. 
However, similar problems are likely in the case of the Spinning and 
Doubling or Weaving categories above due to the movement from cotton
spinning and weaving to, for example, spinning of nylon staple or weaving 
20of rayon. It is, of course, difficult to know what sort of impact
such imperfections have on statistical comparisons. Our only con-
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elusion must be that although improvements in labour productivity seem 
by themselves to have been reasonable, a still better performance has 
been achieved in other comparable markets.
With regard to new investment, data was constructed on the basis 
of comments from a number of sources. The result is Appendix Table 4.5 
in Chapter IV. Again the actual data confirm the pattern of the 
history of the industry. There was significant re-equipment in the 
immediate post-war period up to the early 1960's, followed by a lull 
which in turn preceded the investment boom of the late 1960's and 
early 1970's associated with polypropylene extrusion and weaving. 
Qualitative assessment of this investment is difficult. It is, 
however, noticeable that with regard to the most recent round of 
capital expenditure that the equipment and new developments in this 
area have come from abroad. Innovation has come not from the trad­
itional home of textile machinery manufacture in this country but from 
overseas: from Switzerland (Sulzer), Germany (Dornier), and from
Italy (Smit). The local textile industry itself, however, appears 
to have been forward in keeping its machinery up-to-date, and in this 
respect presents a very different picture to that painted by Caroline 
Miles of the Lancashire textile industry.
"A characteristic feature of the British cotton industry 
over the last fifty years, perhaps even longer, has been 
its lack of interest in technological development and ^
(in) the use of new production methods and equipment."
The comparison with cotton is an interesting and valid one so far 
as jute is concerned. Both industries have experienced distinct 
secular decline over the past decades; in both cases the technology 
of the traditional industry is relatively static while capable of
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continuous improvement; and again both industries, following Govern-
22ment inquiry, have received some form of special support. The
contrast between Miles' picture of cotton and our own view of the 
jute industry is thus to the credit of the latter. The remaining 
interesting feature of the jute industry in this context is the way in 
which investment and asset growth has not been the prerogative of larger 
firms; and while it is on the one hand heartening to find low barriers 
to such growth in the industry, it is on the other hand perhaps dis­
appointing to see such a relatively poor performance along this dimension
23by the erstwhile leader of the industry.
D. Accounting or Financial Market Performance
Throughout Section B. of Chapter IV it was pointed out that the 
findings on the financial or accounting performance of our firms were 
not out of line with those of U.K.-wide cross-sectional and time-series 
analysis of company performances. Because of this lack of conflict, 
the purpose of this section is to interpret and offer conclusions on 
the statistical findings as they relate to our particular market only.
With regard to profit ratios, the failure to detect any trend 
over the period 1968-1977, either in respect of unadjusted or relative 
("real") profitability, or with regard to intragroup profit variability, 
is surprising. It will be remembered also that subperiod analysis of 
profitability performance (using subperiods 1968-1972 and 1973-1977) 
failed to reveal any "disturbance" in this dimension of market perform­
ance. Even allowing for the fact that the data used cover the perform­
ance of 16 continuing firms, and therefore ignore that of firms which 
failed to survive the period of transition, they do give one a
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It should also be remembered that the market performance of the 16 
continuing firms to which our data apply represents the outcome of a 
variety of strategies in the market, including of course total abandon­
ment of the jute industry in any form by a number of the companies.
The profitability and other data thus refer both to continuing jute 
firms and to those which within the period left the industry.
The absence of any trend in the level or group variability of 
profits, even in respect of a group of surviving firms in a declining 
market, is surprising. What it suggests is that there was no financial 
penalty as a result of the process of transition; and that no one firm 
made a particularly better or worse job of managing the process of 
change than any other, and that the (surviving) firms in general 
managed the process of adjustment quite well. These conclusions are 
supported by the absence of any relationship between firm size and 
profitability over the period in Tables 4.6 and 4.9. The data in 
Tables 4.8 and 4.9 suggest the existence in this particular market of 
the usual relationship at the firm level between size and the time 
variability of profits.
The normal or expected relationships between growth and such 
independent variables as size and profitability were established in 
Tables 4.11 to 4.15 and 4.18 of Chapter IV. As emphasised in that 
chapter, what is significant is that growth in this case may be taken 
as a prime index of relative survival ability and competence in dealing 
with change. It is clear that size has been of no assistance here. 
This indicates either that economic scale is of no value or signifi­
cance in growing, or that "managerial" factors have swamped any
reasonable picture of the industry over a major period of adjustment.
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smaller firms having some inbuilt advantage in responding to change.
With respect to growth performance, although there was no significant
change in average rates between the subperiods 1968-72 and 1973-77, there
was evidence of some disruption in growth performance among the firms,
and growth in the latter subperiod was not as closely related to growth
24in the former as was the case with profitability.
E. Comparison with Other Declining Industries
It would seem appropriate to make some brief comparison of the per­
formance of the Dundee jute trade with at least one other declining tex­
tile industry in order to note any particular contrasting or parallel 
conduct or performance. Two obvious industries which could have been used 
are the Lancashire cotton industry and the Yorkshire woollen trade. Both, 
as their names imply, are highly localised. The former of these was chosen 
for individual comparison on the grounds of having more in common with the 
jute industry; and while no claim is made for a depth of knowledge of this 
industry such as has been accumulated in respect of jute, sufficient study 
has been carried out to make relevant comparisons.
relationship which might have existed between growth and size, with
As in the case of jute, the Lancashire cotton textile industry has 
gone through a period of considerable decline this century, as the data 
below indicate.
Table 5.2
Output of U.K. Cotton Textile Industry
Yarn Woven Cloth
'000 tonnes m. lin. metres
1946 299.8 1,486
1953 314.0 1,704
1956 270.7 1,473
1963 178.8 927
1970 125.8 627
1977 84.4 368
Source: Annual Abstract of Statistics (London: H.M.S.O.)
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In 1914 Lancashire had 40% of world textile capacity, and
accounted for 60% of international trade in cotton. The industry in
1912 employed directly around 750,000 people, and was responsible for
25a quarter by value of U.K. exports. After a temporary post-war
boom, which came to an end in 1921, demand slumped as Indian and 
Japanese markets fell to domestic producers who also ate into some of 
Lancashire's other export markets. (Prior to World War I some 85% of 
Lancashire output was exported.) Output of cotton cloth in 1937 at 
4,000m.yards was exactly half the corresponding figure for 1912. 
Rationalisation in the industry occurred as a result of the mergers 
over this period (the formation of the Lancashire Cotton Corporation 
under the auspices of the Bank of England in 1929 brought around 15% 
of spinning capacity into the hands of a single firm, and Combined 
English Mills was formed in the same year), and of the operation of the 
Spindles Board established under the 1936 Cotton Spinning Industry Act. 
The Board, financed by a levy on the industry, paid spinners and 
weavers to scrap capacity; and by 1937 the industry had reduced its 
1912 capacity by about one third, although output, as noted above, had 
halved over the period.
As in the case of jute, the cotton industry was "concentrated"
during World War II. Again as in the case of jute, a Cotton Control
was established; and, operating from 1947 as the Raw Cotton Commission,
was the sole agency for importing and distributing raw cotton until the
trade was returned to private hands in 1954. Demand for cotton goods
was buoyant immediately after 1945; and indeed labour shortages were 
26a problem. The industry's inefficiency and poor long-term
prospects were, however, recognised, and a number of reports on the 
industry was published, including one in 1946 by a Board of Trade
264
price protection for the industry as was to be the case in respect of
jute in 1948. Up to 1958 cotton goods imports, largely from developing
Commonwealth countries, entered the U.K. from these countries free of
tariff or quota restrictions; and only minor restrictions applied in
respect of other countries. A system of "voluntary limitation"
operated from early 1959, and was expanded in the early 1960's. Such
arrangements were never, however, a major part of the U.K. government's
policy in respect of the domestic cotton industry. The Cotton Report
of 1946 placed more emphasis upon (compulsory) amalgamations and levy-
financed machine redundancy and re-equipment: schemes of which the
industry had of course had previous experience. It should be noted that
the structure of the cotton industry at this time was not unlike that of
jute. The market was dominated by a single large firm, J. & P. Coats.
There was a group of medium-sized firms, including Fine Spinners &
Doublers, and the Lancashire Cotton Corporation, and a large "tail" of
small firms. In contrast to the jute industry, however, few of the
27large firms in cotton were vertically integrated.
The Working Party recommendations outlined above were in fact the
solution adopted by the government for the industry as, after 1951,
demand - particularly export demand - fell away. Although legislation
to implement the recommendations of the Cotton Report was introduced in
1948, the most significant scheme was that introduced by the 1959
Cotton Industry Act. Under this the government bore two-thirds of the
cost of paying firms to scrap existing machinery, an industry levy
financing the remaining third. A similar compensation scheme for
redundant employees was entirely financed by a levy on firms. The 1959
28Act also made grants to firms for re-equipment. The impact of the
Cotton Working Party. This did not, however, recommend a system of
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Act upon the industry can be seen from the following data.
Table 5.4
U.K. Cotton Industry
1937 1959 1967
Employees ('000) 360 239 100
Spindles (m. ring equivalent) 26 15 4.5
Looms ('000) 520 220 92
Cloth output (m. yds.) 4,000 2,333 1,300
Source : C. Miles, Lancashire Textiles: A Case Study of Industrial
Change (London: C.U.P., 1968) Ch. 3.
The 1959 Cotton Industry Act was an important watershed for the
industry itself, and also a significant piece of government inter-
29vention m  private industry. The scrapping compensation scheme
was open for acceptance by the firms for only two months - August and 
September 1959 - and was seen by the government as a once-for-all piece 
of intervention in the market. The government spent around £17m. in
total for the scrapping scheme; and around 50% of the firms in the ind­
ustry (accounting for some 75% of employment in 1959) took part in it. 
The effect of the scrapping scheme was greatest in respect of single 
process, small-scale spinning firms, where the number of such firms 
(having under 1,001 employees) fell from 82 in 1959 to 40 in 1965; 
and although the scheme was not as effective as might have been 
expected in eliminating films in the very smallest size category, the 
disappearance of small, non-integrated firms did have the double 
effect of increasing the proportion of output in the industry 
accounted for by integrated firms (from 30% in 1959 to 41% in 1965) , 
and reducing the significance of smaller firms. As a proportion of
total employment in the industry, firms employing fewer than 1,001
30.employees fell from 55% in 1959 to 46% in 1964. The net effect
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capacity, 48% cf spinning spindles, 27% of doubling spindles, and
3138% of looms were scrapped. The re-equipment phase of the 1959
Act's provisions was expected to last until 1964. Here, as might be 
expected from what was said before, the major uptake of grants was by 
large, integrated firms. Single-process firms accounted for only 31% 
of re-equipment expenditure, and the average employment size of firms 
participating in the re-equipment scheme was 594 compared with the 
industry average of 286.
As in the case of the jute industry, the cotton trade was subject
to a number of outside influences over this period, which make the
impact of each separate change difficult to assess. In 1959 alone the
system of international trade protection was changed, the 1959 Act began
to have its effect, and the industry's common minimum price agreement
32was terminated by the Restrictive Practices Court. In addition, the
years after 1959 witnessed continued secular decline of the industry, 
further pressure from imports, and, as in the case of jute, competition 
from synthetic fibres.
The 1959 Act and its implementation represented a major force in
the post-war history of the cotton industry. Its scrapping provisions
met with considerable response. As mentioned above, almost half (48%)
of the April 1959 installed spinning plant was scrapped under the 1959
Act scheme; and the corresponding figures for doubling and for weaving
were 27% and 38% (see ref.30). The incidence of re-equipment, however,
was low. Only around half of the expenditure in this area expected
33 ^by the Government and the industry was in fact incurred; and the 
reason most frequently given for this was the failure of the Government
of the scrapping scheme was that of the industry's April 1959
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This was a view concurred in by a subsequent parliamentary inquiry
34into the impact of the 1959 Act. It was not until 1966 that a
system of quantitative controls was applied to cotton imports from
countries other than Western Europe, North America and Australia, and
which therefore imposed the first restrictions of any kind upon Hong
Kong, India and Pakistan which were responsible for the greatest
35proportion of U.K. imports in this field. These quantitative
controls operated until they were entirely taken over by tariffs 
following Britain's entry into the E.E.C.
In contrast to the jute industry, cotton textiles continued to
attract the attention of reports and enquiries until much more recently.
3(The most important of these was the 1969 Report by the Textile Council.
The 1969 Report emphasised especially the need for restructuring and for
a more vigorous approach to marketing in the industry. In particular
it rejected any further scheme containing financial incentives for
scrapping plant. The Government followed this analysis of the
industry's problems by making funds available to small and medium sized
textile firms for re-equipment and expansion through the I.R.C. At
the other end of the size spectrum of firms the Government in 1969
announced a general ban on mergers among the largest firms in the
industry; although it had to depart from this in allowing the formation
of Carrington Viyella in 1970 to prevent the collapse of at least one of 
37the firms.
The cotton industry, so far as changes in demand over the last 
thirty years or so are concerned, has faced a situation not dissimilar 
to that of jute. The two industries have, however, responded and
at the same time to give the industry any guarantee on import levels.
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been treated by Governments in rather different ways. In the case of 
cotton the response by the Government in the post-war period, of which 
schemes it had pre-war experience, was to encourage the industry to 
scrap old plant and re-equip with new machinery, and in this respect 
the 1959 Act was partially successful. At the same time the cotton 
industry was not until 1966 protected to any meaningful extent from 
overseas competition by tariffs or other restrictions; and this 
absence of trade protection may have militated against the complete 
effectiveness of the 1959 Act's intentions. That is, although the 
1959 Act provided some financial incentive on the cost side for the 
industry to re-equip, it may have been that this set of incentives 
was insufficient to achieve its intended effect in a total environment 
of considerable uncertainty regarding the demand situation. It may 
thus be that cost incentives without regard to demand conditions, and 
tariff protection in particular, are not sufficient to encourage re­
equipment and the adoption of new technology. The experience of the 
cotton industry indicates that tariff protection and re-equipment 
subsidies are not necessarily alternative means of promoting the sur­
vival of a particular industry. Rather the experience suggests that 
cost incentives must be accompanied by some assurances to the industry 
regarding demand.
The jute industry's experience was the obverse of this. Jute 
Control gave the industry trade protection; but there was no 
provision for financial assistance for re-equipment. Interestingly, 
nonetheless, the jute industry's record of performance on re-equipment 
appears to have been good (see Chapter IV Section E) , and part of the 
credit for this has been accorded to the degree of certainty for 
producers in the industry provided by Jute Control. It would seem,
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resources arising out of the system of Jute Control, so far as
offering a degree of trade protection to the industry and encouraging
it to re-equip and compete with imports is concerned Control was a more
comprehensive system for achieving such aims than the methods adopted
38in the case of cotton. The 1959 Act offered the cotton industry
only a financial incentive to scrap plant and re-equip. Jute Control, 
despite not providing a monetary incentive to scrap old machinery and 
instal new plant, in fact provided the reasonable certainty of short­
term future prospects which was evidently sufficient to encourage a 
very creditable level of new investment in the jute industry until the 
1960's.
therefore, that although there may have been some misallocation of
A further contrast between the two industries lies in the fact 
that while the cotton industry has been in receipt of continuing 
attention until comparatively recently, the trade protection which jute 
enjoyed under Control was being phased out by the mid 1960's, beyond 
which the industry received no further special assistance from the 
Government. In some ways this last contrast between the two 
industries - indicating the greater and continuing degree of attention 
paid by successive Governments to cotton in comparison with jute - is 
itself not reflected in the apparent efficacy of the respective 
policies towards the two industries. Jute Control's protection of 
the Dundee industry, without which there seems to be no doubt the 
industry would not have survived in any recognisable form in the 
1950's, appears to have served its purpose, and indeed was phased out 
as it became irrelevant with the advent of polypropylene. In the case 
of cotton there seems to be much less credit attributed to the various 
scrapping and re-equipment schemes so far as their impact in mitigating
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Miles-/ for example, quotes one senior civil servant as commenting,
"My own personal view is that developments in Lancashire have happened
pretty much as they would have anyway, even if there had not been this
government intervention"; and offers her own view that "There is much
truth in this verdict. ... The pace of decline would probably have been
much the same in the absence of any adjustment assistance: there is no
39evidence to suggest that the measures slowed it."
The comparative analysis of the recent experience of the jute and 
cotton industries in the U.K. indicates that industries in decline due 
to changes in technology and the impact of import competition can be 
the subject of very different Government policies. Equally the re­
action of such industries to factors affecting this decline and to 
Government policies can differ significantly; and this fact again re­
inforces the case made in the Introduction to this thesis for a case- 
by-case analysis of such situations.
F. Diversification
the effect of overseas trade on the industry is concerned. Mrs.
The term diversification has been used in this study to cover the 
broad corporate strategy on the part of individual businesses respond­
ing to rapid decline in their traditional market. Diversification 
thus covers the major part of market conduct or behaviour in this
industry. It is an example, in this case, of resource reallocation
40in a market economy.
A number of points are worth making about the jute industry's 
response to the rapid decline in demand for its traditional product.
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In the first place the real pioneering work in the direction of 
developing textile applications was carried on outwith the Dundee 
industry. Plasticisers Ltd. (at the time a subsidiary of British 
Ropes (renamed Bridon), but now owned by Readicut International) is 
the firm normally credited with the initial development of polypropylene 
polymer extrusion and weaving. Such developments were, however, fairly 
rapidly adopted by two of the largest firms in the Dundee industry,
Sidlaw and Low & Bonar, who, together with Plasticisers, were the 
initial shareholders in Polytape, and who were the equal co-owners of 
Synthetic Fabrics (Scotland). Plasticisers soon withdrew its very 
small shareholding from this consortium, and when Sidlaw withdrew in
the late 1970's this left Low & Bonar as the dominant integrated poly-
41propylene textile manufacturer in Dundee. Low & Bonar was joined
in this field fairly rapidly by other businesses large and small.
Some of these operated on an integrated basis from an early stage, but
a number of others were still at the end of our period of study simply
weavers of tape. (A number of such businesses have since integrated
backwards into extrusion either by acquiring an extruding subsidiary,
or more commonly by purchasing extruding machinery.) Thus, as was
suggested in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 in Chapter III, the adoption of the
"rival" product and technology was for most firms the natural response
42to the change in their market environment.
Although it would be difficult to estimate whether the Dundee 
jute industry firms responded as rapidly as possible to the opportunities 
of the new technology, it is worthwhile reiterating the point that the 
operation of Jute Control (albeit in diluted form throughout the 1960's) 
and the industry's own common pricing agreements probably distorted the 
introduction of polypropylene as a replacement yarn and fabric for jute.
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We have already commented on the fact that there appears to be evidence 
that the jute industry's raising of the price of its product above the 
level which would otherwise have existed not only denied customers 
(predominantly carpet manufacturers) access to cheaper backing material, 
but also hastened the adoption by these same carpet manufacturers of 
polypropylene for both woven and tufted carpets compared with the sit­
uation in the United States of America.
The statistical analysis of diversification using company account­
ing data failed to reveal any significant differences in the performance 
of Diversified and Non-diversified firms over the period 1968-1977 in 
terms of average profit performance, the maintenance of earlier average 
profit levels, or growth. There was, however, some evidence that diver­
sification had reduced profit variability over the period, and that those 
firms which had diversified were initially larger in terms of sales 
(and also value added) than those which chose not to follow such a 
strategy. It has to be accepted, however, in the light of the circum­
stances of the case, that the lack of dramatically conclusive findings 
may be inevitable. Problems highlighted in this instance were the 
varied timing of the commencement of a diversification strategy on the 
part of the companies within our group of Diversified firms, the likely 
length of the time period over which the policy of diversification 
would yield returns in terms of increased profits etc., and the 
possible similarity of economic performance on the part of two groups 
of firms - one in the initial stages of diversification, the other 
continuing to operate in a declining market. Furthermore, such 
findings as those in Chapter III are largely supported by those 
of a study of diversification across a larger number of companies.
The finding of this wider study was that diversification as a corporate 
strategy did not contribute to enhanced profitability or growth or to
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reduced profit variability. Indeed, with particular relevance to our 
study, the authors of this analysis concluded on this point that "In 
general ... there is very little evidence that diversification is
associated with, let alone causes, high performance in conditions of
43high technological change and market turbulence."
These results would seem to confirm our own findings that, 
regardless of the many possible reasons for adopting a strategy of 
diversification, it is a corporate policy which is unlikely to lead to 
significant gains in the short run for companies adopting it.
G. Finale
The purpose of this last section is to offer some final comments 
on the thesis as a whole. These fall under the headings of the use­
fulness of the structure-conduct-performance model, the issue of 
conclusions on resource allocation, and the question of the balance 
between statistical analysis and case-study material in this area of 
study.
Undoubtedly the structure-conduct-performance model has been an 
extremely useful framework within which to examine this industry over 
the past two decades. Without such a framework there is a real danger 
of accumulating a vast array of quite disjointed material. Whether 
sufficient data has been available for us to observe all of the 
interesting hypotheses of the structure-conduct-performance model is 
more open to doubt. Data on relative production costs, pricing and 
profit margins broken down by product and by firm are simply not 
available. Nonetheless it has been possible, for example, to observe
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the behaviour of firms in terms of their trade pricing and information 
agreements in the 1950’s and 1960’s. It has also been interesting to 
identify those firms responsible for price leadership and technological 
change in the industry, and to relate this to other dimensions of the 
firm's conduct or position in the market. One particularly interesting 
feature within the structure-conduct-performance model with reference to 
this study has been the role of barriers to exit from the jute industry, 
and this too has been commented upon.
Resource allocation is another topic on which one might have been 
able to comment at greater length had more data been available (e.g. 
capital expenditure on various forms of plant analysed by firm). None­
theless our study has been quite a vivid one of market forces at work 
forcing a reallocation of resources across the industry in response to 
technological change. We have been able to form an impression of the 
impact of Jute Control and the industry's trade pricing agreements at 
various stages of the market's development over the last thirty years.
The role of these seems to have changed from one of ensuring the survival 
of the firms in the industry in the 1950's in the face of Indian compet­
ition, to one in the late 1960's of hastening the introduction of poly­
propylene in the place of jute for tufted carpet primary backing through 
overpricing jute relative to its cost in other similar economies. One 
other area where we have been able to comment on resource allocation 
relates to the adoption of new technology, where it was noted that the 
adoption of polypropylene weaving and extruding was by no means the 
preserve of large firms in the market.
Finally, we return to an issue raised in the Introduction to this 
thesis: that of the balance to be struck in such a study between case-
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study material and statistical analysis. There is of course much to 
be said in favour of presenting a statistical analysis of one's findings 
as we have done in Chapter IV of this work. Statistical analysis forces 
a clarity of thought upon the researcher, and also leads to a precise 
summary of results. Such analysis can even throw up results which are 
not apparent at first sight from a glance at the data. Such was the 
case with regard to the data on male/female employment and relative 
earnings in the industry brought out in Table 4.39 in Chapter IV.
There are, however, two reservations regarding statistics which one must 
raise in respect of this study. In the first place our population (and 
it is a population, not a sample) of statistics is so modest in size 
that, even in using nonparametric tests, one runs the risk of being 
accused of using a statistical sledgehammer to crack a very small em­
pirical nut. Second, case-study work is essential to analyse aspects 
of an industry not susceptible to statistical analysis, to clarify those 
cases where there is an absence of expected statistically significant 
findings, and to explain why statistically significant findings have 
arisen where they have. Thus one would argue that Chapters III and IV 
in this thesis are complementary and not contradictory in their approach 
to the study. Neither of them would be complete or sufficient without 
the other. It is hoped that together they have contributed to the 
economic analysis of the jute industry which has been the purpose of 
this work.
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